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FIFTH AMENDMENT COMPELLED




The scope of protection currently afforded compelled statements under
the Self-Incrimination Clause' could furnish a suitable, if dry, habitat for
Proteus. Within that span of protection, the morphing Greek sea god would
discover recurring opportunities to shape and reshape himself. Although the
Supreme Court no longer interprets the Fifth Amendment to require a
complete ban on prosecution for the transactions described in compelled
statements,2 the sizes and shapes of protection available to such statements
vary markedly.3 On Mondays, for instance, Proteus could billow to the vast
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Tom Morawetz's superlative review and edit of the manuscript forced me to confront both substantive
and stylistic gaps. Gordon Van Kessel, David Faigman, and David Steinberg each gave generously of
his time to review the manuscript and contribute valuable insights. My thanks to Lou Wolcher, who
inspired much engaging reflection on "met' questions, even as I acknowledge that those reflections
have almost certainly not been effectively realized in this work. I extend thanks to my research
assistants who labored on or in preparation of this work, especially Mark Christensen, Kristin Whipple,
Libbi Joroff, and Joe Parisi. Finally, I am grateful for the funding support both from the Hastings 1066
Foundation and the Hastings Summer Stipend Program.
1. "No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself... "
U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3.
2. "Transactional immunity, which accords full immunity from prosecution for the offense to
which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than does
the Fifth Amendment privilege." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). "We hold that
.. immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-
incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege." Id.
3. See generally Kate E. Bloch, Police Officers Accused of Crime: Prosecutorial and Fifth
Amendment Risks Posed by Police-Elicited "Use Immunized" Statements, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 625,
645-64 [hereinafter Risks]. The current Article is an outgrowth of Risks, my earlier study of use
immunity. In exploring the issue of compelled statements obtained from law enforcement officers during
the internal investigation of alleged criminal conduct, my earlier article raised the larger problem of the
existence of varied levels of protection afforded compelled statements. Because the earlier article
advocated a procedural resolution to the specific problem of internal investigations, the need to ascertain
the level of protection for a given compelled statement proved unnecessary. The earlier piece, therefore,
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dimensions of protection conferred by circuit court decisions like those in
North4 and Poindexter,5 decisions that protect statements compelled
through formal immunity grants. On Wednesday, fatigued by his Monday
efforts,6 Proteus could wither to a reduced form to guard statements beaten
or threatened from unwitting arrestees by law enforcement officials; the
protection of these compelled utterances involves more moderate dimen-
sions.7 And on Friday, he could shrink further still, confined within the
scope of protection of perhaps the least protected compelled statements,
those uttered by the accused who attempts to pursue competing constitu-
tional rights
Proteus' comfort within the range of protections afforded compelled
statements9 results from the evolution of Fifth Amendment doctrine over
the past century and, particularly, within the past several decades.' This
evolution has generated a spectrum of varied protection levels, the
boundaries of which remain quite indistinct. One end of the spectrum
illumines a range of cases in which courts provide extensive protection to
compelled statements. Prosecutors in this band may be prohibited from use
of the compelled utterance for any purpose, either evidentiary or
nonevidentiary." Even awareness of the compelled utterances' contents
left the larger constitutional issue of understanding the existence of varying protection levels for later
analysis. This Article addresses that constitutional issue: Whether there is a rational framework that
comprehends the varied protection levels and enables the prediction of appropriate levels of protection
for compelled statements in future cases. Because the larger constitutional issue was introduced in the
earlier study, there are overlaps in some of the foundational materials.
4. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.) (vacating convictions, in part because of the
district court's failure to engage in sufficiently stringent scrutiny for Kasligar purposes), modified, 920
F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991).
5. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369,371 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (reversing convictions because
of the prosecutor's failure to prove that "Poindexter's compelled testimony was not used against him
at his trial'), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
6. I have taken some liberties by suggesting that Proteus would be fatigued by a single shape
shift. After all, in the grasp of Menelaus and his comrades:
First he became a bearded lion, then a snake,
A panther, and a gigantic boar-then a running stream
And a great leafy tree
before fatigue arrived. THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 65 (Ennis Rees trans., 1977).
7. See Risks, supra note 3, at 653-56.
8. See id. at 656-64. This span of protection excludes statements obtained in violation of Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), unless they otherwise qualify as compelled.
9. Throughout this work, for convenience and concision, I frequently refer to the scope of
protection of compelled statements, although the protection more particularly belongs to the utterer
against the use of his compelled statements.
10. See infra notes 29-254 and accompanying text.
11. See Risks, supra note 3, at 646-53.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss4/5
FIFTH AMENDMENT COMPELLED STATEMENTS
may jeopardize maintenance of a successful prosecution." Cases in the
band at the opposite end of the spectrum condone not only prosecutorial
awareness of the compelled statements' contents, but also a multitude of
uses of those statements. 3 Permitted uses at this end of the spectrum
include "nonevidentiary uses," such as a prosecutor's reluctance to plea
bargain or her increased confidence in the defendant's guilt based upon
awareness of the contents of the compelled statements. 4 In addition, cases
in this band may anticipate direct evidentiary use of the speaker's
compelled utterances for impeachment of the speaker before the trier of
fact. t5
The current state of self-incrimination doctrine evokes a certain irony.
Statements elicited from an uncounseled suspect through threats, or perhaps
even beatings, in the back rooms of the police station 6 receive less self-
incrimination protection than those elicited pursuant to a formal court order,
where the subject often has enjoyed the benefit of counsel and whose
interrogation may proceed in full view of a trial court, a grand jury, or
Congress.
17
Irony invites inquiry. And beyond irony, the mere existence of disparate
treatment levels under a single constitutional entitlement encourages
exploration."9 But concerted attention to the disparities in the scope of
protection under the Self-Incrimination Clause is of relatively recent
vintage, and the primordial questions concerning the disparities remain
largely unaddressed and unresolved. 9 First and foremost, sustained
12 See id.
13 See id. at 656-664.
14 I have some hesitation in naming nonevidentiary uses, because the line separating
nonevidentiary from evidentiary remains to be clearly drawn. North, 910 F.2d at 857 ("An initial
difficulty is that a precise definition of the term nonevidentiary use is elusive."). One commentator
describes "nonevidentiary uses" as "uses that do not furnish a link in the chain of evidence against the
defendant." Gary S. Humble, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony: Beyond the Fifth
Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 351, 353 (1987).
15 See Risks, supra note 3, at 645-64.
16 Although physical violence may now be an uncommon method of eliciting confessions at
police stations, see infra note 311 and accompanying text, during the period in which these disparities
developed, cases record physical violence, sometimes to the extent of extreme and brutal torture, by
police to induce suspects to confess. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1936)
(quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 161 So. 465, 471 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith, J., dissenting)) (detailing the
deputy's effort to whip the defendant, after repeatedly hanging him from a tree, until he confessed).
17 See Risks, supra note 3, at 645-56.
18 But see infra Part IV.E.
19 Many related issues, facets, and subsets of the disparities of treatment have been dialogued.
See, e.g., Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory
1994] 1605
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inquiry has not been directed toward understanding the disparities. The
Supreme Court itself has not articulated a rational framework to compre-
hend the spectrum.20
Understanding the disparities is a prerequisite to evaluation of their
legitimacy.21 If there is a principled framework that explains the current
doctrine treating compelled statements, the first step in evaluating that
treatment is to unearth and articulate the framework. The primary focus of
this Article is to initiate that step. Once unearthed, a framework provides
a common language and a motivation for courts to explain their reasoning
in arriving at disparate levels of protection. Clearer explanations improve
dialogue and understanding, both within and without the courts.22 In
addition, enhanced understanding facilitates consideration of the larger
normative inquiries: Is disparity desirable or legitimate on constitutional,
philosophic, or other normative grounds? And ultimately, what degree of
protection should courts accord the various types of compelled statements?
In pursuit of that initial framework, the Article posits two theories to
explain existing disparities within compelled statement doctrine. A good
theory, in Stephen Hawking's words, "satisfies two requirements: It must
Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (pts. I & 2), 53 OHIO ST. L.J 101 (1992)
(offering an extensive historical analysis of the relationship between the privilege against self-
incrimination and involuntary confessions); Humble, supra note 14 (arguing that nonevidentiary use is
not prohibited by the Fifth Amendment); Kristine Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunty, and
Watergate, 56 Tx. L. REv. 791 (1978) (advocating a return from use to transactional immunity);
Jerome A. Murphy, Comment, The Aftermath of the Iran-Contra Trials: The Uncertain Status of
Derivative Use Immunity, 51 MD. L. REy. 1011, 1012 (1992) (arguing that the standard adopted by the
District of Columbia Circuit "provides more protection than that mandated by the Fifth Amendment"
and describing the standard as "unworkable'); William R. Stein, Note, Resolving Tensions Between
Constitutional Rights: Use Immunity in Concurrent or Related Proceedings, 76 CoLUM. L. REV. 674
(1976) (advocating the provision of use immunity for concurrent or related proceedings). See also Risks,
supra note 3, at 631 n.32 (citing additional sources). But courts and commentators have not adequately
focused on providing a coherent and comprehensive understanding of the full breadth of the disparate
scope spectrum.
20 Review of Supreme Court doctrine suggests that the Court has never fully acknowledged the
spectrum of incongruencies in the treatment of compelled statements. Perhaps the closest the Court has
come to acknowledging the extent of disparity was in Baltimore v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 562
(1990), in which it string cited a list of cases reflecting disparate protection.
21 I am not suggesting, however, that if no rational framework existed or could be discerned, that
the disparities would be a priori illegitimate. For an acknowledgement of the potential value of the Fifth
Amendment generally, even absent a "principled justification," see David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale
for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1063, 1064 (1986).
22 Consider Judge Coffin's comments in this regard with respect to constitutional balancing
generally: "It is therefore high time to stimulate a more self-conscious, systematic, sensitive,
comprehensive, and open effort at balancing." Frank M. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales
of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 16, 22 (1988).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss4/5
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accurately describe a large class of observations on the basis of a model
that contains only a few arbitrary elements, and it must make definite
predictions about the results of future observations."23 A good model
24
of self-incrimination scope doctrine should first describe existing Supreme
Court scope decisions. The model should reasonably integrate as many of
the variable elements of scope doctrine as possible. Second, lower courts
should be able to forecast the appropriate outcomes of future self-
incrimination scope cases by applying the principles animating the model.
By invoking the definition of a scientific theory, I do not intend to suggest
a one-to-one mapping between the application of a theory to the physical
and to the legal universes. However, Professor Hawking's definition of a
good theory, one involving predictive models, can prove an informative
organizing principle for approaching the scope problem. This is similar to
the way in which other constitutional theories describe existing constitution-
al doctrine and facilitate predictions about the resolution of future cases.25
The creation of models that fit Professor Hawking's definition of a good
theory should advance understanding of the existing doctrine by offering
an explanation of current disparities in judicial treatment of compelled
statements. Then, this unearthed framework may be used to guide future
principled decisionmaking in scope cases and to serve as a medium for
evaluating that decisionmaking.26
To establish a foundation for the creation and subsequent evaluation of
explanatory and predictive models, Part II surveys the evolution of
disparate treatment in Supreme Court doctrine. Part III distills two guiding
principles from that evolution: compulsion and balancing. These principles
form the basis for two primary models, one reliant on each of the
principles, to describe the database of disparity decisions. In the first model,
the extent of compulsion determines the extent of protection. The second
model balances the right of the accused against government interests in
order to gauge the required level of protection. Each is an empirically
23. STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES
9 (1988).
24. Although Professor Hawking's definition of a good theory suggests that a model is in some
ways distinct from a theory, I employ model and theory interchangeably for purposes of this Article.
25. Consider, for example, the well-known, albeit oft-criticized, Equal Protection Clause model
of strict, intermediate, and rational scrutiny. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 617-22
(12th ed. 1991) (detailing several theories critiquing Court treatment under this model).
26. The models proposed here, not unlike many other constitutional models, do not eliminate the
need for courts to exercise either judgment or discretion. They should, however, provide an articulated
framework within which that judgment or discretion can be exercised.
1994] 1607
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driven descriptive model. Part III also examines the extent to which each
model accounts for existing doctrine, i.e., how accurately it describes the
class of Supreme Court cases. Part IV critiques the models by highlighting
their limitations, and seeks to develop an improved understanding of the
doctrine upon which the models are based. Part V then explores the
predictive ability of the models by applying them in two circumstances for
which the scope of compelled statement protection remains to be defined.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISPARITY
To understand the evolution that produced the disparity in protection
levels, this Part offers an overview27 of pertinent Supreme Court doctrine.
The overview traces the development of the doctrine in largely chronologi-
cal order. This choice of format emphasizes the near isolation of the cells
that compose the doctrine. Subsequent cases do not integrate and build
upon the sum of previous doctrine. Rather, certain cells of the doctrine
seem to have grown in petri dishes at opposite ends of the judicial
laboratory. The various strains of the Court's compelled statement doctrine
have evolved relatively free of comparative evaluation, and their differences
are not well documented in the lab notes. As a result, although they all may
share the same "DNA of compulsion," the relationship among the resulting
strains is little understood, and the lab notes, at least at first reading,
provide little guidance in determining how to treat new hybrids.
At the conclusion of this section, I group together those cases or entities
that grew together in the same petri dish, forming three primary groups or
tiers. This grouping is not to suggest, however, that these three tiers exhaust
current Supreme Court treatment of compelled statements. Rather, these
groups are chosen because they are the most mature in their delineation of
both the factual circumstances that produced them and the realm of
protection they afford compelled statements. These three tiers, therefore,
can be more accurately contoured than other facets of Supreme Court scope
doctrine.
These tiers will serve a fundamental purpose in the creation and
application of the models. They are the reference classes or control groups
used to test the models' ability to satisfy the first criterion of a good
theory: the ability to "accurately describe a large class of observations on
27. This overview is not intended as a complete or exhaustive study of Supreme Court self-
incrimination doctrine. In light of space and other constraints, I have endeavored to select from among
the many Court cases those that best exemplify the primary features in the evolution of scope doctrine.
[VOL. 72:1603
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the basis of a model that contains only a few arbitrary elements. 28
A. Self-Incrimination in the Supreme Court: 1791-1900
Although the promise that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself"29 ascended to the status of
constitutional text in 1791, nearly a hundred years passed before the
Court's first sustained focus on the Self-Incrimination Clause.3" In Boyd
v. United States, the first significant self-incrimination decision during that
period of focused inquiry, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
statute directing defendants in a forfeiture action to produce an incriminat-
ing invoice regarding items to be forfeited.3 The Court found that this
compelled discovery to the district attorney, accompanied by statutory
permission for the government to use the invoice against the defendant in
the "quasi-criminal" forfeiture proceeding, violated both the Fourth
Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures32
and the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on compelling a person to be a
witness against himself.3 Although the compelling order resembled a
subpoena duces tecum, the court order in Boyd was enforced not through
threat of contempt and incarceration, but by threat of loss by default.3 4
The defendant's failure to produce the incriminating papers empowered the
court to treat the charges against the defendant as "confessed, and made the
foundation of the judgment of the court."35 The compulsion in Boyd was
25. HAWKING, supra note 23, at 9.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3.
30. The period of sustained inquiry began in 1886 with the Court's decision in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
31. Id. at 617-18. For the text of the statute at issue, see infra note 34.
32. Id. at 621-22.
33. Id. at 633-35. The Boyd Court's sweeping restrictions on compelled production of papers has
undergone substantial modification. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 427 (2d ed. 1992) ("Under current precedent, very little, if anything, remains of Boyd's
Fifth Amendment analysis. Yet the Boyd analysis remains a universally accepted starting point for
understanding the many strands of current Fifth Amendment doctrine applicable to the subpoena duces
tecum.").
34. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 620-22. The Boyd Court stated:
[A]nd if the defendant or claimants shall fail or refuse to produce such book, invoice, or paper
in obedience to such notice, the allegations stated in the said motion shall be taken as
confessed, unless his failure or refusal to produce the same shall be explained to the
satisfaction of the court.
Id. at 620 (citing Act of June 22, 1874, § 5, 18 Stat. 187).
35. Id. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring). The court order in question, as Justice Miller explained,
is in effect a subpcena duces tecum, and, though the penalty for the witness' failure to appear
in court with the criminating papers is not fine and imprisonment, it is one which may be
19941 1609
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the threat of automatic forfeiture of the disputed items. This type of
compulsion, while sufficient to invalidate the statute, did not exempt Boyd
from subsequent retrial.36 Neither violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amend-
ments, 37 nor governmental awareness of the existence and the substance
of the unconstitutionally compelled invoice, prevented retrial. One could
infer that, for the next trial, the government would simply be prohibited
from compelling production of the invoice or admitting it into evidence.
The Court denotes no other apparent precautions to prevent the government
from exploitating its awareness of the existence and content of the invoice,
nor any sentiment that such knowledge fatally infects subsequent judicial
proceedings. Compulsion, motivated by threat of default forfeiture,
triggered Self-Incrimination Clause protection. Suppression of the
unconstitutionally produced document was the solution. Retrial, absent the
offending document, was expected.
Boyd inaugurated a period that produced several decisions of critical
import for the question of the scope of self-incrimination protection. Six
years after Boyd, the Court considered the Clause in another context, that
of a challenge to an immunity statute. In its 1892 Counselman v. Hitch-
cock 38 opinion, the Court furnished several principles that continue to
influence self-incrimination jurisprudence today. First, the Court implied
that a grant of immunity of appropriate dimensions could be coextensive
with the privilege itself.39 The protection defined by the statute at issue in
Counselman, however, provided only for direct use immunity. "It could not,
and would not, prevent the use of [the witness'] testimony to search out
other testimony to be used in evidence against [the witness] or his property,
in a criminal proceeding ... ."" To compel testimony, the immunity
made more severe, namely, to have charges against him of a criminal nature, taken for
confessed, and made the foundation of the judgment of the court.
Id.
36. The Court in Boyd held that:
[T]he notice to produce the invoice in this case, the order by virtue of which it was issued,
and the law which authorized the order, were unconstitutional and void, and that the
inspection by the district attorney of said invoice, when produced in obedience to said notice,
and its admission in evidence by the court, were erroneous and unconstitutional proceedings.
Id. at 638. The Court, nonetheless, did authorize a retrial. Id.
37. Unless otherwise specified, reference to the Fifth Amendment is reference particularly to the
Self-Incrimination Clause.
38. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
39. "In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford
absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to which the question relates." Id. at 586.
Presumably such a statute would withstand constitutional inquiry.
40. Id. at 564.
[VOL. 72:1603
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would have to furnish more comprehensive protection than a simple
promise not to use the specific utterances of the speaker against him. 4
1
To respond to the Court's concern about the use of immunized testimony
to search out other evidence, one may infer that, in addition to protection
against direct use, constitutionally valid immunity would require protection
against derivative use, at least derivative evidentiary use.42 But the
Counselman Court went well beyond the prohibition on derivative use
necessary to reach its holding. The Court declared that "no statute which
leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the
criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the
privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States. '43 To compel
a witness to incriminate herself, pursuant to reasoning in the rarified
atmosphere of immunity, the government was required to deliver total
amnesty. Where compulsion came in the form of threat of contempt and
incarceration, the potential for derivative use invalidated the immunity
provision.' Although a similar possibility of derivative use, based upon
prosecutorial awareness of the existence and contents of the invoice, was
latent in the Boyd circumstance, the Court in Boyd had not barred future
retrial. Disparate treatment of compelled statements had entered its infancy.
Counselman further established that self-incrimination protection
extended not merely to an ultimate confession, but to all the "links [that]
frequently compose that chain of testimony which is necessary to convict
any individual of a crime."4 Both of these principles, that immunity can
41. Id. at 585-86.
42. The term "derivative use" has come to encompass two forms of use. The first, that to which
the Counselman Court appears to be regularly referring, is derivative evidentiary use. Derivative
evidentiary use consists of evidence, generally testimony or physical items, derived from the compelled
statements. The second form of use, now sometimes included under the rubric "derivative use," is
derivative nonevidentiary use. To illustrate the distinctions between these forms of derivative use,
suppose that a suspect in a murder case has been compelled to give a statement. If the compelled
statement described the location of the murder victim and, as a result of pursuing the description from
the compelled statement, the police located the victim's body, the victim's body would be derivative
evidence. If instead of introducing the victim's body, the prosecutor simply felt greater confidence in
pursuing her case as a result of locating the victim's body, that would arguably constitute
nonevidentiary derivative use.
43. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 585. This is transactional immunity, the need for which was
ultimately repudiated by the Court eight decades later. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,453
(1972) ("Transactional immunity, which accords fall immunity from prosecution for the offense to
which the compelled testimony relates, affords the witness considerably broader protection than does
the Fifth Amendment privilege.").
44. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 564-65.
45. Id. at 566.
1994] 1611
Washington University Open Scholarship
1612 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
supplant the privilege and that the privilege protects all the links in the
chain of testimony, continue to influence Supreme Court doctrine today.46
In apparent response to the dicta in Counselman, Congress hastened to
enact an immunity provision that provided full or transactional immuni-
ty.47 The Court in Brown v. Walker" considered and approved that
statute in 1896, four years after Counselman.49
Just two terms beyond Brown and only five years after Counselman, the
Court again found itself exploring the application of the Self-Incrimination
Clause. The new context was unlike that of Boyd, which involved the
compelled production of papers, or that of Counselman and Brown, both of
which involved immunity. The Court in Bram v. United States"0 evaluated
the application of the Self-Incrimination Clause inside the police station.
The Bram Court considered the voluntariness of a statement by an in-
custody arrestee to a police detective."' The Court explicitly grounded its
determination that the confession was compelled on the Self-Incrimination
Clause:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question
arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue
is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.""
With the question of the constitutional basis for assessing involuntary
confessions settled for the moment, the Court turned to a definition of
46. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1979) (noting that immunity statutes
can comport with the Self-Incrimination Clause); Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975)
(affirming that protection extends to "information which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence").
47. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 451-53 (detailing passage and provisions of the Compulsory
Testimony Act of 1893); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906) (describing passage of the same
legislation).
48. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
49. "While the constitutional provision in question is justly regarded as one of the most valuable
prerogatives of the citizen, its object is fully accomplished by the statutory immunity.. . ." Id. at 610.
50. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
51. Id. at 537-39. Bram was not the Court's first treatment of an accused's confession obtained
by a police detective. See, e.g., Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S.
613, 623 (1896) (evaluating the voluntariness of a confession in federal court without explicit reliance
on any particular constitutional provision, and holding that "the true test of admissibility is that the
confession is made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort"). Bram,
however, appears to reflect the Court's first articulated application of the Self-Incrimination Clause to
such circumstances.
52. Brain, 168 U.S. at 542.
[VOL. 72:1603
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compulsion. The Boyd Court had readily determined that production of
documents under statutorily authorized threat of default forfeiture
constituted compulsion. 3 In Counselman, the definition of compulsion had
not even been at issue, for Counselman's compulsion was the primary form
of legal compulsion historically recognized in Anglo-American courts,
contempt punished by jail for refusal to answer. 4 The question of what
constituted compulsion arose in Bram because the detective who questioned
Bram after his arrest had no legal basis upon which to compel the answers
from an in-custody arrestee"
The Bram Court set forth "the general rule that the confession must be
free and voluntary-that is, not produced by inducements engendering
either hope or fear."56 In addition to articulating the general standard for
testing voluntariness, a standard that has undergone some modification,57
two features of the Bram Court opinion deserve emphasis for our inquiry
into disparate treatment. First, the Bram Court employed "compelled" and
"not voluntary" interchangeably under a self-incrimination rationale,
suggesting that, at least in 1897, the Court considered these concepts
equivalent." Second, in marked contrast to the Court's broad and
demanding standard of full exoneration or transactional immunity in
Counselman, there is no suggestion that the Self-Incrimination Clause
requires total amnesty when a confession is compelled, not by an immunity
statute, but by an overly zealous law enforcement officer. To the contrary,
Bram and those cases to which the Bram Court makes prominent reference
53. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633.
54. Counselman, 142 U.S. at 551-52. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g) ("Failure by any person
without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon that person may be deemed a contempt of
court .. .).
55. Brain, 168 U.S. at 556-57.
56. Id. at 557-58. The extent to which an "inducement engendering hope" would render a
statement involuntary has been the subject of recent Court and scholarly commentary. For example, the
Court in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991), stated that "although the Court noted in
Brain that a confession cannot be obtained by 'any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by
the exertion of any improper influence,' it is clear that this passage from Brain ... under current
precedent does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession." Id. (citing Bram
168 U.S. at 542-43 (quoting 3 H. SMITH & A. KEEP, RUSSELL ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 478
(6th ed. 1896))). See also Welsh S. White, Confessions Induced by Broken Government Promises, 43
DuKE L.J. 947, 952-53 (1994) (detailing Brain's dwindling influence regarding government promises
that produce confessions); George E. Dix, Promises, Confessions, and Wayne LaFave 's Bright Line Rule
Analysis, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 207, 259 (1993) (advocating a return to some type of Brain "across-the-
board prophylactic promise" protection).
57. See supra note 56.
58. Brain, 168 U.S. at 563-64.
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merely require the excision of the offending incriminating remarks.59 The
Court's extreme solicitude regarding the scope of protection afforded
compelled responses pursuant to an immunity statute, as demonstrated in
Counselman and Brown, is conspicuously absent.
Perhaps the most persuasive proof of the Court's belief that a compelled
or involuntary confession, one that did not stem from the immunity context,
did not warrant complete amnesty finds voice near the conclusion of the
majority opinion in Bram: "We are also, as the result of our conclusion on
the subject of the confession, relieved from examining the many other
assignments of error, except in so far as they present questions which are
likely to arise on the new trial. '60 The Court's terminology is neither "no
new trial permitted" nor "if there is a new trial," but "on the new trial."
Use of compelled utterances in this trial did not even raise an articulable
possibility of a ban on a future trial. Nor is there any cautionary language
regarding the effect that awareness of the incriminatory words may have on
the efforts of future prosecutors. The concern of the Court in this regard is
to insure that the offending remarks themselves are not presented to the
trier of fact. The remedy for this improper compulsion, like that in Boyd,
is excision of the offending material.
Thus, in 1897, compelling an utterance under the Self-Incrimination
Clause might require the government to furnish total amnesty, as in
Counselman immunity, or merely prohibit the government from introducing
the statements before the trier of fact, as in Brain or Boyd. These are two
profoundly different consequences derived from protection under the
identical constitutional guarantee.
The contrast between the Court's treatment under the Self-Incrimination
Clause of immunized statements and of other "involuntary or compelled"
statements began a trend toward disparity that has persisted to this day. As
pursued below, in the decades that followed, the basis for the exclusion of
some involuntary confessions would shift from a self-incrimination analysis
to a due process analysis. However, the essentially two-tiered ap-
proach-extreme solicitude for immunized statements and considerably less
protection for other coerced statements-would continue.
59. Id. at 565. In today's spectrum of protection, Brain represents a more moderate form of
protection than that generally provided to statements compelled by formal immunity grants. As the
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B. Self-Incrimination in the Supreme Court: 1900-1963
The Court's next significant encounter with the Self-Incrimination Clause
occurred in 1908, eleven years after Brain. In Twining v. New Jersey,6 the
Court held "that the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the
courts of the States is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitu-
tion."'62 The Twining holding meant that the Self-Incrimination Clause
would be available only in situations involving federal law enforcement
officials and not for state law enforcement excesses resulting in involuntary
confessions. Twining set the stage for the explicit schism in the constitu-
tional basis for excluding compelled statements.
In Brown v. Mississippi,63 the 1936 Court was faced with an egregious
and uncontested example of an involuntary confession elicited from an in-
custody suspect by brutal torture at the hands of state law enforcement
officials.' 4 The Court, without recourse to the Self-Incrimination Clause,
determined that admission of such a confession violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6" The Court acknowledged its
Twining holding, but concluded that "the question of the right of the State
to withdraw the privilege against self-incrimination is not here in-
volved."66 Distinguishing Twining as compulsion involving "the processes
of justice by which the accused may be called as a witness and required to
testify,"67 the Court asserted that "[c]ompulsion by torture to extort a
confession is a different matter."6 For twenty-eight years following
Brown, those who sought to invoke the Supreme Court's power to reverse
a state conviction based upon the admission of a compelled statement could
look to the Due Process Clause for relief.
69
61. 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
62. Id. at 114.
63. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
64. Id. at 281-82.
65. Id. at 286-87.
66. Id. at 285.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53-54 (1947), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954) ("The use in a state criminal trial of a
defendant's confession obtained by coercion-whether physical or mental-is forbidden by the
Fourteenth Amendment."). See also Herman, supra note 19, at 499 ("Between 1936 and 1964, the Court
gave the confession rule its greatest development and direction by deciding more than thirty state cases
involving claims of involuntariness. It resolved all of them under the Due Process Clause.') (footnotes
omitted). Despite the Court's reliance on the Due Process Clause, some members of the Court had come
1994] 1615
Washington University Open Scholarship
1616 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 72:1603
Whether recourse lay in due process for state prisoners, or self-incrimina-
tion and/or due process for federal prisoners, 0 compulsion by law
enforcement officials never resulted per se in total amnesty; excision was
the solution.7' Where the evidence was otherwise sufficient, retrials were
granted.72 In these years, the Court also perpetuated the position of
Counselman-that statements compelled by immunity required total
deliverance.73 This confirmed the enormous disparity in the scope of
protection between statements compelled by formal immunity and those
compelled by other persuasion.
Consistent with the approach begun in Bram, the Court seldom compared
these two branches of self-incrimination doctrine. In those exceptional cases
making reference to both halves of the dichotomy, the Court rarely
provided more than cursory or cryptic comparisons. 74 In one unusual
decision, Shotwell Manufacturing Co. v. United States,75 the 1963 Court
suddenly equated the protection to which immunized and coerced
statements were entitled without acknowledging the long history of treating
these statements disparately. The Shotwell Court considered the effect of a
partially false disclosure under the Treasury Department's amnesty
over the years to view the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause. Leyra, 347 U.S. at 558 n.3. However, the Due Process Clause remains a viable
vehicle for the suppression of compelled statements. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279
(1991).
70. The Court itself sometimes seemed ambivalent about the constitutional basis for federal
exclusion. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1951) ("whether involuntary confessions are
excluded from federal criminal trials on the ground of a violation of the Fifth Amendment's protection
against self-incrimination, or from a rule that forced confessions are untrustworthy .... .') (footnotes
omitted).
71. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 189 (1953) ("This Court never has decided that reception
of a confession into evidence, even if we held it to be coerced, requires an acquittal or discharge of a
defendant. On the contrary, this Court has returned all such cases for retrial, which we should not have
done if obtaining and attempted use of a coerced confession were enough to require acquittal.'). Stein
was overruled on other grounds by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
72. See, e.g., Jackson, 378 U.S. 368.
73. The perception that the Self-Incrimination Clause required transactional immunity was
reiterated by the Court in a number of cases. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906) ("The
interdiction of the Fifth Amendment operates only where a witness is asked to incriminate himself-in
other words, to give testimony which may possibly expose him to a criminal charge. But if the
criminality has already been taken away, the Amendment ceases to apply.').
74. For example, in Bram, the Court makes reference to Brown v. walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896),
a transactional immunity decision. But the citation relates to the historical development and subsequent
inclusion of self-incrimination protection in the Constitution, rather than any comparison or discussion
of differing scopes of protection afforded each type of compelled statement. Brain, 168 U.S. at 544-45.
75. Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963).
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program, the "voluntary disclosure policy."76 The policy, as described by
the majority opinion, and as understood by the dissent, appeared to offer
transactional or full immunity from prosecution for voluntary disclosure
that preceded criminal investigation."' Yet, the Court, in a bizarre
procedural twist, received the case as a suppression rather than as a
dismissal question." Having been procedurally metamorphosed from a
transactional immunity dismissal question into a suppression or exclusion
question, both the majority and the dissent classified the case under
Bram.79 After reciting the Bram test for voluntariness, the Court deter-
mined that a voluntary disclosure involving false information vitiated the
immunity protection. 0 The Court was then able to conclude that the
admission into evidence of the information furnished under the voluntary
disclosure policy "did not offend the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."'
The Shotwell opinion is puzzling. 2 Ignoring the historical treatment
descending from Counselman, the Court fails to explain why the Shotwell
immunity circumstance, in which the discloser is promised protection
76. Id. at 344 ("In substance that policy amounted to a representation by the Treasury that
delinquent taxpayers could escape possible criminal prosecution by disclosing their derelictions to the
taxing authorities before any investigation of them had commenced.") (citation omitted).
77. Id. at 368-69 (Black, J., dissenting).
78. The defense moved the trial court for dismissal prior to trial, but the motion was denied.
According to the dissent, the trial court had refused to dismiss because "the Treasury Department's
promises of immunity were not authorized by statute, the Government was not legally bound to keep
these promises and could therefore break faith with its taxpayers whenever it chose to do so." Id. at 369
(Black, J., dissenting). "Having been denied the promised immunity, the defendants then moved to
suppress their confessions," that information which they had furnished under the voluntary disclosure
policy. Id. This suppression motion relied on the Self-Incrimination Clause. It was the denial of this
suppression motion and the affirmance of that denial by the court of appeals that the Supreme Court
reviewed in Shotwell. Id. at 369-71 (Black, J., dissenting).
79. Shotwell, 371 U.S. at 347-48, 372.
80. Id. at 350.
81. Id. (footnote omitted). The Court appears to have treated the case using contract law concepts:
[G]ranting that in deciding whether to disclose or run the risk of prosecution petitioners were
initially justified in relying on the Treasury's general offer of immunity, once a fraudulent
disclosure had been determined upon they must be deemed to have recognized that such offer
had in effect been withdrawn as to them or, amounting to the same thing, that they were no
longer entitled to place reliance on it.
Id. at 349-50. Under a formal or statutory immunity grant, the usual penalty for false testimony is a
perjury prosecution, rather than an invalidation of the immunity grant. Courts have, however, not
uncommonly treated informal grants of immunity under contract principles. See, e.g., United States v.
Luloff, 15 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Informal immunity agreements are contractual in nature and
are governed by ordinary standards of contract law.") (citations omitted).
82. For an analysis of the Shotwell opinion in the context of government promises and compulsion,
see Dix, supra note 56, at 215 n.36.
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against prosecution, is appropriately treated as an excision question. The
opinion certainly suggests that some type of governmental immunity is
equivalent to a Bram coerced confession and that both merit analysis under
the same exclusionary framework.13 Unfortunately, in this rare circum-
stance where there is an explicit juxtaposition of immunity and coerced
confession, the Court fails to explain its choice of a coerced confession
framework, and further fails to explain the relationship between coerced
confessions and immunity. Shotwell represents a lost opportunity for
delineating a framework for principled decisionmaking in scope cases.
C. Self-Incrimination in the Supreme Court: 1964-1994
The year 1964 was pivotal in the evolution of self-incrimination doctrine.
In that year, the Court both incorporated the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment 4 and suggested that
an immunity less encompassing than the transactional immunity required
by Counselman might pass constitutional muster.85
In Malloy v. Hogan,86 the Court revisited and overruled its 1908
Twining determination that the Self-Incrimination Clause did not bind the
states.87 In deciding, fifty-six years after Twining, that the Self-Incrimina-
tion Clause applied to the states, the Court turned full circle back to the
1897 decision in Bram. Justice Brennan even asserted that any distinction
that developed in the 1936 Brown v. Mississippi"8 decision between the
due process test and self-incrimination analysis "was soon abandoned,"89
so that "today the admissibility of a confession in a state criminal
prosecution is tested by the same standard applied in federal prosecutions
since 1897."90 Although Justice Brennan's assertion that the Court had in
fact applied the same standard to state coerced confession cases as it had
to federal cases came under immediate attack by the dissent,9' the intent
83. Shotwell, 371 U.S. at 347 (citing Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-43) ("We have no hesitation in saying
that this principle also reaches evidence of guilt induced from a person under a governmental promise
of immunity, and where that is the case such evidence must be excluded under the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
84. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
85. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).
86. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
87. Id. at 2-3.
88. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
89. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6-7.
90. Id. at 7 (referring to and citing the Bram decision).
91. Justice Harlan, in dissent, stated:
The majority is simply wrong when it asserts that this perfectly understandable distinction
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is clear in Malloy that in the future the tests should be identical. That now
uniform test was "whether the confession was 'free and voluntary: that is,
[it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained
by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of
any improper influence.... ,"92 This regrounding of state coerced
confession analysis in the Self-Incrimination Clause93 underscores the
continuing dichotomous treatment between statements compelled by
immunity and those compelled by other forms of coercion. If both receive
their primary protection from the Self-Incrimination Clause, what
justification provides for the disparate treatment of the two types of
compelled utterances?
Malloy's incorporation of the Self-Incrimination Clause also triggered
developments in the immunity context. If the Fifth Amendment applied to
the states, how could a state compel testimony pursuant to a state immunity
order without guaranteeing the speaker Fifth Amendment protection against
federal prosecution? Absent federal protection, the witness could justifiably
contend that the state was violating her self-incrimination rights.
Thus in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,94 also decided in 1964, the
Court broached the problem of intersovereign immunity in light of its
decision in Malloy. In order to uphold a state grant of immunity without
entirely preempting federal prosecution, the Court fashioned an immunity,
less encompassing than that required in Counselman, to preserve the
witness' federal right against self-incrimination. 95 The Court determined
"was soon abandoned," ante, pp. 6-7. In none of the cases cited, ante pp. 7-8, in which was
developed the fill sweep of the constitutional prohibition against the use of coerced
confessions at state trials, was there anything to suggest that the Fifth Amendment was being
made applicable to state proceedings.
Id. at 18 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 7 (quoting Brain, 168 U.S. at 542-43 (alteration in original)). For a discussion of the
current voluntariness standard involving promises, see the sources cited supra note 56.
93. Two years after Murphy, the Court confirmed the applicability of self-incrimination protection
to "constable's blunder" coerced confessions in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda
Court stated: "Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available
outside the criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their
freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves."
Id. at 467. The need to compare the disparate levels of protection and understand the disparities grew
ever more apparent.
94. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
95. The Murphy court described its immunity as follows:
Wle hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be compelled to give
testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and
its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal
prosecution against him .... This exclusionary rule, while permitting the States to secure
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that transactional immunity at the state level companioned by use and
derivative use immunity at the federal level satisfied the dictates of self-
incrimination protection.16 By implying that, like "constable's blunder"
coerced confessions, statements compelled by immunity might not
necessitate total amnesty from prosecution, the Court enhanced the need to
examine any disparities in the scope of protection for immunized statements
and other compelled statements.
But Congress did not respond to Murphy, by authorizing use and
derivative use immunity, until 1970.'7 In the interim (and years follow-
ing), the richness of the protection spectrum remained to be fully plumbed.
In 1968, two years before Congress replaced Counselnan-style amnesty
with Murphy use and derivative use protection, the Court invigorated yet
another tier of protection, arguably a third tier. In Simmons v. United
States,98 the Supreme Court fashioned an exclusionary rule for statements
given by a defendant at her pretrial motion to suppress evidence.
To advance a Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure claim
through a motion to suppress in federal court, a defendant had to satisfy the
criteria of standing.99 Sometimes, the sole means of establishing the
requisite connection between the items seized and the defendant was
through the defendant's testimony.'te To proceed on a motion to sup-
press, a defendant would take the stand and testify to his connection with
the item in question, an item that might be the murder weapon or other
incriminating evidence. These highly incriminating statements could then
information necessary for effective law enforcement, leaves the witness and the Federal
Government in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in
the absence of a state grant of immunity.
Id. at 79.
96. Id.
97. Congress responded in 1970 to the implications of the 1964 Murphy decision by passing the
Organized Crime Control Act, which authorized grants of use and derivative use immunity rather than
transactional immunity. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
926-932, contained the use immunity sections. Those sections are codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 6001-6005 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
98. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). The discussion of Simmons that follows is drawn largely from my earlier
article, Risky, supra note 3, at 656-60.
99. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 389-90.
100. At the time of Simmons, the Court had articulated two circumstances in which the standing
requirements were "relaxed." Id. at 390. Standing was relaxed when "seized evidence is itself an
essential element of the offense" and where the defendant is "legitimately on [the] premises when the
search occurs." Id. However, when the defendant's situation fell outside these two circumstances, she
was required to establish standing. For the Supreme Court's more recent view of "standing," see United
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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be used against the defendant in the subsequent trial. By asserting his
Fourth Amendment claim, the defendant effectively waived his Fifth
Amendment right. In reviewing this choice, the Court in Simmons found:
[I]t [is] intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered
in order to assert another. We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies
in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds,
his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue
of guilt unless he makes no objection."'
Although the Simmons Court did not specifically apply the label
"involuntary" to the defendant's testimony, the Court strongly suggested
that the "undeniable tension""2 between the choice of constitutional
rights rendered this testimony involuntary. 3 As in Bram, which involved
a coerced confession, Simmons protection does not preclude prosecution.
Nor does the Court suggest that any precautionary measures need be
observed to limit prosecutorial awareness of the defendant's incriminating
testimony. This exclusionary rule, one the Court would later characterize
as "a form of 'use immunity....... is a compromise method of relieving
the accused of unpalatable choices: the speaker receives some protection for
the testimony, the prosecution gains advantages varying from incidental to
substantial in learning the incriminating information, and the trier of fact
benefits from an augmented factual foundation upon which to decide the
legal issue.
But Simmons is a problematic addition to the self-incrimination spectrum.
Just three terms after Simmons, the Court retreated from and attacked
Simmons' reliance on the Fifth Amendment.05 In McGautha v. Califor-
101. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394.
102. Id.
103. Id. The Court reasoned that although testimony is not always involuntary as a matter of law
simply because it is given to obtain a benefit:
[T]he assumption which underlies this reasoning is that the defendant has a choice: he may
refuse to testify and give up the benefit When this assumption is applied to a situation in
which the "benefit" to be gained is that afforded by another provision of the Bill of Rights,
an undeniable tension is created. Thus, in this case Garrett [Simmons' co-defendant] was
obliged either to give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth
Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
Id. (footnote omitted). For a sampling of varied interpretations of Simmons, see Risks, supra note 3, at
657 n.170.
104. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 90 (1980).
105. In addition to the question of the legitimacy of Simmons' Fifth Amendment rationale, the
extent to which Simmons places a prohibition on "fruits" or derivative evidentiary use is unclear.
Although, as indicated below, direct evidentiary use and the corresponding derivative evidentiary use
1994] 1621
Washington University Open Scholarship
1622 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 72:1603
nia,1 6 the Court held that the unitary trial 1 7 of capital cases in Ohio
did not unduly burden the defendant's Fifth Amendment right. The unitary
trial required the "defendant to choose between remaining silent on the
issue of guilt and addressing the court on the issue of punishment,"'0 8 a
circumstance strongly resembling the Simmons burden. But McGazjtha
characterized the "purely Fifth Amendment interests involved in
Simmons " 9 as insubstantial," 0 and indicated that "to the extent that
its rationale was based upon a 'tension' between constitutional rights and
the policies behind them, the validity of that reasoning must now be
regarded as open to question."' 1'
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not overruled Simmons. To the
contrary, just six years after McGautha, the Supreme Court cited Simmons
in defining the sacrifice of one constitutionally protected right for another
as "coercive.'. 2 Additionally, in the 1990 decision of Baltimore v.
Bouknight,'' 3 the Court cited Simmons to support the proposition that: "In
a broad range of contexts, the Fifth Amendment limits prosecutors' ability
may be a viable option for impeachment purposes, see infra text accompanying notes 179-92, the extent
to which the Court views Simmons as prohibiting "fruits" use in the prosecution's case-in-chief remains
unarticulated. However, lower courts and commentators have interpreted Simmons as providing a form
of use and derivative use immunity. See Risks, supra note 3, at 659-60.
106. 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (decided with its companion case, Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183
(1971)).
107. Both guilt and punishment are determined in a single unitary trial proceeding. Id. at 191-92.
108. Joseph Doyle, Note, The Due Process Need for Postponement or Use Immunity in Probation
Revocation Hearings Based on Criminal Charges, 68 MINN. L. REv. 1077, 1083 (1984). See also Stein,
supra note 19, at 683-87. Crampton, the defendant in the case decided with McGautha, "contended that
the Ohio unitary trial procedure was unconstitutional, since under it he could remain silent on the issue
of guilt only at the cost of surrendering any chance to plead his case on the issue of punishment." Id.
at 684 (footnote omitted). In theory, the choice of rights presented in McGautha was between the Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent and a due process right to allocution. Although the due process right
to allocution may be more nebulous than the Fifth Amendment right to silence, Mr. Stein argues that
because the Court assumed the existence of this allocution right, that nebulousness is not a valid ground
for distinction. Id. at 685 n.70.
109. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 212.
110. Id.
I 11. Id. In McGautha, the Court indicated that in the determination of a constitutional violation,
"[t]he threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the
policies behind the rights involved."Id. at 213. Compare Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394 (holding that "when
a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his
testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no
objection") with Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 320 (1976) (permitting prison authorities to draw
adverse inferences from prisoner's silence at a disciplinary hearing).
112. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807-08 (1977).
113. Baltimore Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
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to use testimony that has been compelled."'" 4 Arguably, then, the charac-
terization of Simmons testimony as "compelled," in Fifth Amendment
terminology, retains some vitality. Without this characterization, Simmons
could not be included as a level of compelled statement treatment.
The creation of the Simmons tier clearly implicated the application and
scope of self-incrimination protection. Nonetheless, Simmons mentions
neither Brain nor Counselman (nor Murphy), and supplies no comparison
with the other levels of protection the Court had already created. Notwith-
standing this omission, both the language used in the opinion and common
sense show that Simmons competing rights protection is clearly not
Counselman transactional immunity. The language of the decision indicates
that a defendant must object to the introduction of her Simmons testimony
at trial in order to have it excluded. The need for objection and protection
through exclusion suggests a lesser protection than transactional immunity.
Similarly, common sense dictates that the Simmons Court did not equate its
exclusion with a prohibition on prosecution. Otherwise, any defendant who
wished to prevent prosecution would simply make a motion to suppress
evidence prior to trial and testify to avoid being prosecuted on the
underlying charge. The difficult and, at this stage in the evolution,
unresolved question is whether Simmons competing rights protection is the
same as Bram coerced confession protection. Both provide exclusion as a
remedy. Both require some action on the part of the defendant to have the
statements excluded: in Simmons, the defendant must object, in Bram, the
defendant must demonstrate in a hearing that the confession was not
voluntary. But the Court would not offer clarification of the relationship
between coerced confessions and competing rights protection for at least a
decade.
Three years after Simmons, the Court evaluated a self-incrimination
challenge to a hit-and-run statute requiring a driver involved in an accident
to notify the owner of property the driver had damaged. "' The California
Supreme Court found a tension between the reporting requirement of the
114. Id. at 562 (citing Simmons, 390 U.S. at 391-94). The Court cited Simmons first among the
cases it used to support that proposition. Id. The citation to Simmons was accompanied by an
explanatory parenthetical stating, "no subsequent admission of testimony provided in suppression
hearing." Id.
115. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424,426 (1971) (quoting CAL. VEH. CODE § 20002(a)(1) (Supp.
1971)). The statute required the driver "involved in an accident resulting in damage to any property
including vehicles [to] ... [l]ocate and notify the owner or person in charge of such property of the
name and address of the driver and owner of the vehicle involved." Id.
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statute and the Fifth Amendment.1 6 To obviate that tension, the Califor-
nia court created a "use restriction 117 on the information divulged by the
driver to protect against subsequent use in a criminal prosecution. In a
plurality opinion, the United States Supreme Court considered the statute
and ultimately rejected the need for a use restriction." 8 The Court
concluded "that there [was] no conflict between the statute and the
privilege.""' 9 Of particular interest is the method the plurality used to
arrive at its conclusion-explicit balancing.
Tension between the State's demand for disclosures and the protection.of the
right against self-incrimination is likely to give rise to serious questions.
Inevitably these must be resolved in terms of balancing the public need on
the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the
other; neither interest can be treated lightly. 121
The balance was between state interest and individual constitutional right.
The balancing, acknowledged as inevitable, arises here in a regulatory,
rather than a criminal, context. Of particular cogency, however, is that in
concluding that no conflict existed, the Byers Court avoided altogether the
question of the scope of protection for compelled utterances.' 2 ' What
Byers does indicate is that at least in some regulatory self-incrimination
contexts, balancing may be a permissible means of reconciling conflicts
between the self-incrimination privilege and government interests.
Between Simmons in 1968 and Byers in 1971, Congress incorporated the
use immunity theory of Murphy into the Organized Crime Control Act





121. Byers was certainly not the Court's first contact with self-incrimination issues outside the
confines of the traditional criminal prosecution context. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S,
259 (1927) (finding the Fifth Amendment did not exempt a taxpayer from filing a tax return for illegal
liquor traffic, but suggesting that the Fifth Amendment could appropriately be asserted in response to
particular questions on the return). Compare id. with Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
382 U.S. 70, 77-79 (1965) (distinguishing Sullivan and finding the privilege a bar to forced disclosure
and registration by members of a Communist organization) and Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39, 41-42 (1968) (finding the privilege a bar to forced disclosure and registration for a federal gambling
tax). The Court in Byers clarified that the condemned disclosures in Albertson and Marchetti were, inter
alia, "not in 'an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry."' 402 U.S. at 430 (quoting
Albertson, 382 U.S. at 429) (citations omitted).
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(OCCA).122 Transcribing the Court's apparent change of perspective on
the need for Counselman transactional immunity, Congress empowered the
government to confer an immunity less encompassing than transactional
and still compel testimony." The new immunity protected the speaker
from use and derivative use of the testimony. 24 A challenge to the new
legislation reached the Court in 1972 in the seminal case of Kastigar v.
United States."2
Kastigar unveiled use immunity as an official tier of the protection
spectrum, replacing the Counselman transactional immunity tier.126 Three
tiers of protection were now available for compelled statements: Kastigar's
use immunity, Brain's coerced confession exclusion, and Simmons'
competing rights exclusion. With the formal advent of approved use
immunity, the need for comparison among the tiers grew more insistent.
Was Kastigar immunity equivalent to Bram's exclusion or Simmons'
protection? Kastigar furnishes some clues because it is one of the
exceptional cases in which the Court posits a relationship between two of
the spectrum's tiers. 27 The Court explicitly analogized the statutory use
and derivative use immunity of the OCCA to the type of compelled
statement in Bram.
A coerced confession, as revealing of leads as testimony given in exchange
for immunity, is inadmissible in a criminal trial, but it does not bar
prosecution....
There can be no justification in reason or policy for holding that the
Constitution requires an amnesty grant where, acting pursuant to statute and
accompanying safeguards, testimony is compelled in exchange for immunity
from use and derivative use when no such amnesty is required where the
government, acting without colorable right, coerces a defendant into
incriminating himself.'28
122. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1988). See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 276 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[T]he Reports state that the statutory immunity provided by § 6002 'is
intended to be as broad as, but no broader than, the privilege against self-incrimination. ... It is
designed to reflect the use-restriction immunity concept of Murphy... rather [than] the transaction
immunity concept of Counselman.") (alterations in original).
123. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1988).
124. Id.
125. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
126. "We hold that such immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the
privilege." Id. at 453.
127. Id. at 461-62.
128. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461-62 (footnotes omitted). Support for a reading of Kastigar that
provides parity in the scope of protection for immunized statements and coerced confessions may also
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But the Kastigar analogy to coerced confessions, and to the moderate
protection of excision, conflicts with language earlier in the opinion where
the Court rhapsodizes about the comprehensive scope of protection that
Kastigar use immunity will provide. The Court speaks, for example, of
prohibiting "the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled
testimony in any respect."' 2 9 Yet Bram prosecutors and Simmons prosecu-
tors use the accused's testimony in many respects. Nonevidentiary uses, for
example, are common in both the Bram and Simmons contexts. 30 The
many incidental advantages that accrue from knowledge of the defendant's
statements assist the Bram and Simmons prosecutors.' Are such uses
forbidden Kastigar prosecutors?
The Kastigar Court does acknowledge that immunity protection relieves
a defendant of the burden of proving involuntariness,'32 a necessary
prerequisite to excision in Bram. Such proof is unnecessary here, where the
compulsion is by court order and threat of contempt for failure to respond
be found, for example, in the Court's reference to the work of the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws and its influence on the enactment of the OCCA. Id. at 452 n.36. The Court
cites a Commission report that asserts that "'[t]he proposed immunity is thus of the same scope as that
frequently, even though unintentionally, conferred as the result of constitutional violations by law
enforcement officers."' Id; (quoting the Second Interim Report of the National Commission on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws, Mar. 17, 1969, Working Papers of the Commission 1446 (1970)).
129. Id. at 453. Immunity protection should, however, be limited to utterances responsive to the
question posed. Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 476-78 (1972);
Strachan, supra note 19, at 803 n.48.
130. See Risks, supra note 3, at 654-58 (discussing nonevidentiary use issues in the Bram and
Simmons contexts and citing pertinent authorities). Nonevidentiary uses might include, for example,
increased prosecutorial confidence in the guilt of the defendant or greater reluctance to plea bargain.
131. That the Court has entertained a relatively relaxed view of some types of prosecutorial use in
the Brain tier is reflected in the Court's willingness, for a number of years, to allow jurisdictions to
entrust juries as the ultimate arbiters of a confession's voluntariness. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S.
156 (1953), overruled by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Pursuant to the New York procedure
in Stein, the judge conducted a preliminary inquiry on the question of voluntariness. Id. at 172.
However, the judge was "not required to exclude the jury," id., during that hearing. (Perhaps, the Stein
Court indicated, the judge was "not permitted to do so." Id.) At the conclusion of that hearing,
apparently conducted in the trial jury's presence, the judge made an initial determination as to
voluntariness. Id. The judge was required to "exclude any confession if he is convinced that it was not
freely made or that a verdict that it was so made would be against the weight of evidence." Id.
However, "[i]f the voluntariness issue presents a fair question of fact, he must receive the confession
and leave to the jury, under proper instructions, the ultimate determination of its voluntary character
and also its truthfulness." Id. Although the procedure in Stein was held unconstitutional in 1964, clearly
during the period of its employ, the range of accepted prosecutorial uses of that confession, even where
it was ultimately determined by the jury to be involuntary, was quite substantial.
132. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461-62.
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to the interrogator's questions. 33 But the Kastigar analysis does little to
elucidate the relationship between Bram protection and Kastigar protection.
Moreover, the Kastigar Court never mentions Simmons. Instead of
supplying a principled framework to help differentiate among the protection
tiers, Kastigar ignited a debate among courts and commentators on the
scope of protection appropriate to this tier of the spectrum.134
The ambiguity of the holding, coupled with the absence of explicit
direction from the Supreme Court, has produced a splintering among
circuits on the appropriate scope of protection for statements obtained
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (the OCCA).135 Some courts, like the
District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. North,136 furnish exten-
sive protection. 3 1 Others, like the Second Circuit in United States v.
Helmsley, 38 offer less protection, 39 but perhaps still greater protection
than that contemplated by the Bram coerced confession tier.
If we assume that Kastigar's analogy to coerced confessions does not
equate those two forms of protection, then, by 1972, the Court had created
at least three tiers in the protection spectrum. Tier One is Kastigar use
immunity protection. Tier One protection results from a formal governmen-
tal grant of immunity. It provides use and derivative use immunity. The
language of the Kastigar opinion appears to impose a stringent standard of
scrutiny on prosecutorial uses of the immunized statements. 40 Certainly,
133. "One raising a claim under this statute need only show that he testified under a grant of
immunity in order to shift to the government the heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it
proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources." Id.
134. See Risks, supra note 3, at 645-53 (detailing various responses to Kastigar). In the companion
case to Kastigar, Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972), the Court
held that a New Jersey statute provided use and derivative use immunity coextensive with the scope
of Fifth Amendment protection. Id. at 475. The language of the New Jersey statute focused more on
the term "evidence" than the OCCA language upheld in Kastigar. Following testimony under the
immunity grant, the New Jersey "statute provided that: 'he shall be immune from having such
responsive answer given by him or such responsive evidence produced by him, or evidence derived
therefrom used to expose him to criminal prosecution ...." Id. The New Jersey statute's language
strongly suggests that the use prohibition sufficient to satisfy the Fifth Amendment is solely an
evidentiary use restriction.
135. Risks, supra note 3, at 645-53.
136. 910 F.2d 843, modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991).
137. For a discussion of the rigor of the standard in North, see Risks, supra note 3, at 652-53;
Murphy, supra note 19.
138. 941 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1162 (1992).
139. For an analysis of the level of protection in Helmsley, see Risks, supra note 3, at 650-51.
140. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460 ("impos[ing] on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that
the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled
testimony").
Washington University Open Scholarship
1628 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the Bram decision had never required the intense scrutiny that the Kastigar
Court may be read to have imposed.4 t Precisely how far this stringent
scrutiny would extend was not resolved in Kastigar. In particular, the Court
did not explicitly treat the question of evidentiary use for impeachment
purposes or the precise restrictions, if any, on nonevidentiary use. While the
Kastigar Court does make some reference to prohibiting particular uses,
those of using testimony "as an investigatory lead"'42 or using "any
evidence obtained by focusing investigation on a witness as a result of his
compelled disclosures,"'43 the Kastigar Court does not classify these uses
as evidentiary or nonevidentiary. t"
Tier Two protection, resulting from the coercion of the "constable's
blunder" in Bram, is also a form of use immunity. But the protection it
provides seems much less expansive than Tier One Kastigar immunity.145
As in Tier One, the possibility of impeachment use remained an open
question in 1972. Unlike in Tier One, nonevidentiary uses were accepted
practice. 4 6 The existence and contents of the coerced confession almost
certainly formed a part of the prosecutor's file. The prosecutor who would
try the case would likely be the same one who would litigate the question
of voluntariness. Before the hearing on voluntariness, the statement often
served multiple "nonevidentiary uses,"'47 including facilitating an under-
standing of the case, influencing plea bargaining stance, and modifying trial
strategy decisions.
Tier Three is the compulsion resulting from the tension between
competing constitutional rights. In 1972, it resembled Tier Two. Prosecu-
141. A number of lower courts have read the Kastigar language to require this exacting scrutiny
in demonstrating nonuse of the compelled testimony. Perhaps the most prominent of these is the D.C.
Circuit in the North case. The District of Columbia Circuit in North indicated that the hearing in which
prosecutorial use would be scrutinized upon remand to the trial court "must proceed witness-by-witness;
if necessary, it will proceed line-by-line and item-by-item." North, 910 F.2d at 872.
142. Kasligar, 406 U.S. at 460 (citation omitted).
143. Id.
144. In addition, questions concerning application of the attenuation-of-taint and inevitable
discovery doctrines, and their effect on the issue of derivative use remain unresolved in the Kastigar
context. See infra notes 207-30 and accompanying text; see also Risks, supra note 3, at 651 n.137
(citing various interpretations).
145. See Risks, supra note 3, at 653-56 (describing an area of "moderate" scrutiny).
146. "Use preclusion in coerced confession cases only prohibits direct and derivative evidentiary
use. Prosecutorial knowledge of illegally extracted information and nonevidentiary use are not
prohibited." Strachan, supra note 19, at 83 1. For a discussion of the effect of attenuation and inevitable
discovery on this tier, see Risks, supra note 3, at 655.
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tors knew of the existence and content of the Simmons testimony because
the defense was required to object before the testimony became inadmissi-
ble. Impeachment use was an open question; nonevidentiary use was the
norm. t41 Succeeding terms, as described below, have chiseled only a few
additional contour lines to render more clearly the scope of protection in
each tier.
In 1974, two years after Kastigar, the Court decided the Fourth
Amendment case of United States v. Calandra.t49 In Calandra, the Court
affirmed the position it had adopted many years earlier,'50 that introduc-
tion of "incompetent" evidence before a grand jury did not render the
indictment subject to challenge.' Calandra both reaffirmed this position
with respect to the Fourth Amendment' 52 and reiterated its applica-
tion 53 to the Fifth Amendment. 54 Pursuant to the Calandra line of
cases, "although 'the grand jury may not force a witness to answer
questions in violation of [the Fifth Amendment's] constitutional guarantee'
against self-incrimination,... an indictment obtained through the use of
evidence previously obtained in violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination 'is nevertheless valid.""
'155
The Court's deferential approach to the grand jury's province suggests
that the assessment by the models developed in Part III of the scope of
permitted prosecutorial use may be limited to the question of trial use.
148. For a more detailed discussion of Tier Three protection, see Risks, supra note 3, at 656-64.
149. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). I have chosen this somewhat unusual vehicle (a Fourth Amendment
decision) to address grand jury use of "incompetent" evidence because Calandra is a decision that
succeeds Kastigar. Understanding Kastigar facilitates discussion of the very different approach that
lower courts have, as a general rule, taken with respect to grand jury consideration of immunized
testimony than the one promulgated by the Supreme Court with respect to "incompetent" Fifth
Amendment evidence generally.
150. The Court adopted this position at least as early as 1910. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S.
245 (1910); see also United States v. Costello, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S.
339 (1958); United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966).
151. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 344-45.
152. Id. at 344-45, 351-52.
153. Albeit in dicta.
154. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 344-45 ("[Aln indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge
on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence.... or even
on the basis of information obtained in violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.") (citations omitted); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958).
155. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1743 (1992) (citations omitted) (declining to
require prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence before grand juries). Williams continued the
Calandra line of cases by reaffirming the Court's deferential approach to the province of the grand jury.
The Williams Court characterized the "grand jury proceeding's status as other than a constituent element
of a 'criminal prosecutio[n]."' Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
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Nonetheless, lower courts generally, with respect to the immunity tier of
Kastigar, have not adopted the Court's deferential attitude toward
prosecutorial use of immunized evidence before the grand jury.'56 Lower
court treatment demonstrates a greater willingness to intervene to protect
immunized material in the grand jury context than the Court's traditional
deferential approach to grand jury consideration of evidence implicating the
Fifth Amendment."5 7 Greater scrutiny of prosecutorial use, while inconsis-
tent perhaps with the Court's historical approach to grand juries, is
consistent with the Court's historical approach to immunized testimony.
Whether lower court treatment is an accurate assessment, imposing greater
limits on prosecutorial use in the immunity tier, or whether the traditional
approach to grand juries will prevail, remains to be determined.
During 1974, the Court also decided Lejkowitz v. Turley.'58 Consistent
with a series of earlier decisions,'59 the Court found that a New York
statute requiring a state contractor to either waive immunity "when called
to testify concerning his contracts with the State" or pay the penalty of
having existing contracts canceled and being barred from contracting with
156. For a discussion of the approaches of a number of circuit courts, see Risks, supra note 3, at
649 n. 125. Unlike the position advanced by the Supreme Court's position advanced with respect to Fifth
Amendment evidence generally, lower courts have permitted challenges to grand jury indictments on
the basis that immunized testimony has been introduced before the grand jury. See id. Lower courts
sometimes distinguish indictments challenged upon evidence improperly obtained in the "evidence-
gathering process" from those challenging improprieties "within the grand jury process itself." United
States v. Zielezinski, 740 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1984). The argument, pursuant to this distinction, is
that the violation in the latter context occurs at the time immunized information is introduced before
the grand jury whereas with a traditional coerced confession, the "violation" would already have
occurred before the evidence was introduced in front of the grand jury.
157. See Risks, supra note 3, at 649 n.125.
158. 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
159. The Court treated the intersection of the Fifth Amendment and limitation or termination of
employment in several cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s. On various occasions the Court found
the sanction of termination of employment sufficient to implicate Fifth Amendment protections. See,
e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (holding that statements taken from police officers
under threat of dismissal could not be used against the officers in a criminal proceeding); Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (holding that a state could not require its employees to sign a waiver
of immunity, but could require its employees to answer questions regarding employment under threat
of discharge if the employee received use immunity for his or her answers); Uniformed Sanitation Men
Ass'n, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968) (holding that city-employed sanitation
men could not be terminated for asserting their Fifth Amendment right to refuse to answer questions
under threat of termination during an internal affairs proceeding, but allowing dismissal for refusal to
account for public trust if no attempt were made to coerce them to relinquish their Fifth Amendment
right); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (holding that an attorney who asserts his Fifth
Amendment right and refuses to testify or produce documents in bar disciplinary hearing could not be
disbarred for such refusal).
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the State for five years 6 ° violated the Fifth Amendment. The choice
between employment and incrimination was sufficient compulsion to
implicate the Self-Incrimination Clause. In the Turley decision, the Court
referenced both Kastigar and Bram.6 An illustrative example follows:
[A] witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer unless
and until he is protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and
evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he is
a defendant. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). Absent such
protection, if he is nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are
inadmissible against him in a later criminal prosecution. Brain v. United
States, supra; Boyd v. United States, supra 62
Does the juxtaposition of Kastigar and Bram/Boyd suggest equality in
scope of protection? Although that inference is not unreasonable, the Court,
consistent with the evolution of doctrine in this area, did not clarify the
relationship between the two spheres of protection. Of course, the scope
question was not before the Court. Rather, the Court was simply determin-
ing if the compulsion in question, coupled with a requirement of waiver of
immunity, exceeded the Fifth Amendment threshold. The absence of
explicit guidance leaves interpreters to infer and speculate.
If Turley continued the guidance gap, the Court's 1977 decision in
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham63 magnified the problem. The Cunningham
Court confronted a Fifth Amendment quandary substantially similar to that
of Turley: "whether a political party officer can be removed from his
position by the State of New York and barred for five years from holding
any other party or public office, because he has refused to waive his
constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination."' 4 The
Court concluded that section 22,165 the statutory section that provided for
removal, "is . . . constitutionally indistinguishable from the coercive
provisions we struck down in ... Turley."'166 Does the Court mean that
if statements had been compelled, they would have received Kastigar
protection or Bram/Boyd protection? Or, as the Court suggests on the
160. Turley, 414 U.S. at 71.
161. Id. at 78. Following the references to Brain, the Court also referred to Boyd. Id.
162. Id.
163. 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
164. Id. at 802.
165. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 22 (McKinney 1964).
166. 431 U.S. at 807.
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succeeding pages, would the statements be entitled to Simmons protec-
tion? 167
After concluding that section 22 violated the potential speaker's Fifth
Amendment right for the reasons enunciated in Turley, the Court analogized
to Simmons: "Section 22 is coercive for yet another reason: It requires [the
officer] to forfeit one constitutionally protected right as the price for
exercising another. See Simmons . "..."168 The conflict appears to involve
the Fifth Amendment right to protection against self-incrimination and the
First Amendment freedom of participation in "voluntary political associa-
tions." 69 Does the speaker compelled to choose between loss of employ-
ment and self-incrimination receive the protection of Kastigar or
Bram/Boyd or Simmons? The Court failed to answer this question, and it
failed to spell out the relationship among these spheres of protection.
In 1978, the Court did address the permissibility of the use of Tier Two
statements of the Brain coerced confession variety for evidentiary
impeachment purposes. In Mincey v. Arizona,' the Court relied on a due
process rationale to clarify that the Constitution prohibited impeachment
use of involuntary statements. 7 ' One contour of coerced confession scope
doctrine could now be inked. The Court would permit no direct evidentiary
use of Bram Tier Two coerced confessions. Mincey did not address whether
impeachment use would be permitted in Tier One or Tier Three.
Although fourteen years had passed since the application of the Self-
Incrimination Clause to the states, the Court in Mincey continued to rely on
a due process rationale for evaluating involuntary statements.17 As the
majority opinion in New Jersey v. Portash"' would clarify in the follow-
ing term, the Court viewed due process involuntariness as equivalent to
self-incrimination compulsion. In addition to employing due process
and self-incrimination interchangeably, Portash is a crucial decision in the
evolution of scope-related cases. The Court in Portash determined that, for
167. Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 807-08.
168. Id. (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968)).
169. Id. at 808.
170. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
171. "But any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due
process of law .... Id. at 398 (emphasis in original).
172. This practice has continued to the current day. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279
(1991). For an extensive analysis of the relationship between due process and self-incrimination, see
Herman, supra note 19.
173. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
174. Id. at 459.
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Tier One statements, like those of Tier Two, the Fifth Amendment
prohibited the evidentiary use of compelled statements to impeach the
defendant at a later criminal trial on the underlying offense. 75 One
passage in the Court's opinion is particularly enlightening for our study of
disparate treatment:
Testimony given in response to a grant of legislative immunity is the essence
of coerced testimony. In such cases there is no question whether physical or
psychological pressures overrode the defendant's will; the witness is told to
talk or face the government's coercive sanctions, notably, a conviction for
contempt. The information given in response to a grant of immunity may well
be more reliable than information beaten from a helpless defendant, but it is
no less compelled.. . . Balancing of interests was thought to be necessary in
Harris and Hass when the attempt to deter unlawful police conduct collided
with the need to prevent perjury. Here, by contrast, we deal with the
constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in its most
pristine form. Balancing, therefore, is not simply unnecessary. It is impermis-
sible. 76
This passage is critical in the development of scope doctrine. First, the
Court decided that the Fifth Amendment forbids evidentiary impeachment
use at trial of the accused's involuntary statements whether obtained
through a formal grant of immunity or beaten from the accused at the
police station. The question of evidentiary impeachment use had thus been
resolved for both Tier One and Tier Two statements. Such use was
impermissible in both tiers. Like the analogy in Kastigar, this passage from
Portash suggests a parity in scope between coerced confessions and
immunized statements, at least on the question of evidentiary trial use.
Second, the Court stresses that these circumstances are above balancing. A
pristine invocation of the privilege, presumably one resulting from
"[tlestimony given in response to a grant of legislative immunity," 7 or
perhaps encompassing testimony in response to any influence sufficient to
be called compulsion, sets an inflexible standard on the scope of direct
evidentiary trial use.
By the time of the Portash decision in 1979, courts and commentators
had been struggling to understand the scope of Kastigar and the relation-
175. Id. at 459-60. The compelled statements in Portash were made during immunized grand jury
testimony. Id. at 451-52.
176. Id. at 459. The cases referred to in the passage are Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971),
and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
177. Portash, 440 U.S. at 459.
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ship between Kastigar immunity and Bram confessions for seven years.
Although offering some guidance through its language and its reliance on
Mincey, a coerced confession case, to support its holding,'78 the Portash
Court did not articulate principles animating the relationship between the
Kastigar immunity at issue in Portash and the compulsion in Mincey. And,
consistent with the evolution of scope doctrine, Portash makes no mention
of Simmons.
The failure to engage in comparative scrutiny surfaced in the term
following Portash when the Court reconsidered the Simmons doctrine. The
1980 decision in United States v. Salvucci7 9 reaffirmed the limited "use
immunity" of Simmons.' 0 In direct contrast to the explicit prohibition for
Tier One and Two statements in Portash and Mincey, Salvucci announced
that the direct evidentiary use of the defendant's Simmons testimony (Tier
Three) for impeachment purposes remained an open question.' 8 ' In
formally declining to "decid[e] whether Simmons precludes the use of a
defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing to impeach his testimony at
trial,"' 8 2 the Court lists, without disapproval, lower tribunals which had
held Simmons testimony admissible for impeachment use.'83 Further
supporting the inference that impeachment use does not infringe upon the
scope of protection in this tier of the protection spectrum, the Salvucci
Court reiterates"8 4 an earlier holding8 5 that "the protective shield of
Simmons is not to be converted into a license for false representations.' 6




179. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
180. "This Court's ruling in Simmons... grants a form of 'use immunity' to those defendants
charged with nonpossessory crimes." Id. at 90.
181. Id. at 93-94. However, the dissent characterized the majority's position as "broadly hint[ing]"
that "the testimony given at the suppression hearing might be held admissible for impeachment
purposes." Id. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 94.
183. Id. at 93 n.8.
184. The reiteration comes in a footnote of Salvucci. Id. at 94 n.9.
185. United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239 (1974).
186. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 94 n.9 (quoting Kahan, 415 U.S. at 243). For a critique of the Court's
citation to Kahan and the implication that impeachment use would be permissible, see LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 33, at 468-69 & n.5. Professors LaFave and Israel argue that Simmons testimony
should qualify as "compelled," and be subject to the impeachment restriction of Portash. Id.
187. The dissent, by contrast, does cite Portash. Portash is cited as a but see reference in response
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One ready explanation of the Court's decision to leave impeachment use
as a viable possibility in Tier Three is the criticism launched earlier:
Simmons testimony is not compelled under the Self-Incrimination Clause
definition!"5 But that explanation (as indicated earlier5 g) contradicts the
language in the 1990 decision of Baltimore v. Bouknight,'90 which uses
Simmons to illustrate the Fifth Amendment limits on the use of "testimony
that has been compelled."'19' Moreover, because Bouknight arose in the
context of a state proceeding, over which the Supreme Court generally has
no supervisory power, the Court's decision presumably relies on some
constitutional provision. The Self-Incrimination Clause seems the logical
choice, particularly because the Court in Salvucci chose to reaffirm, rather
than repudiate, its Simmons holding.' 92
The Salvucci case presented the Court with the opportunity to unify the
treatment of all three tiers with respect to direct evidentiary impeachment
use of compelled statements. In declining to rule against impeachment use,
the Salvucci Court chose the path of disparity rather than consistency of
treatment in scope doctrine. The most disturbing feature of the Court's
choice is its failure to relate that choice to the distinctly different choices
it made, just one and two years earlier, with respect to the same question
in Tier One and Tier Two cases.
In the same year as the Tier Three Salvucci decision, the Court also
addressed a scope question in a Tier One statutory use immunity context.
The decision in United States v. Apfelbaum concerned the direct admissibil-
ity of prior immunized testimony in a prosecution for false statements
during that testimony.'9 3 The Court acknowledged that a "source of...
difficulty"'94 for lower courts in ascertaining the admissibility of prior
immunized testimony rested with the Court itself, in the particular language
of its earlier decisions in Kastigar and Portash'95 The phrases "prohib-
it[ing] the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in
188. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
190. 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
191. Id. at 562.
192. For a discussion of a Fourth Amendment rationale for Simmons, see Stein, supra note 19, at
685.
193. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980). The OCCA explicitly authorizes use of the
immunized testimony in "a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to
comply with the order." 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988).
194. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. at 120 n.6.
195. Id.
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any respect"' 9 6 and "any criminal trial use against a defendant of his
involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law"'19 7 certainly, if
read literally,'98 would have precluded admission of the immunized
testimony before the trier of fact in this case. In deciding that immunized
testimony, both the false and the true portions, could be directly admissible
in a prosecution of the speaker for false swearing, the Court retreated from
a literal reading of the sweeping prohibitions on "any" use or "any criminal
trial use" in the Kastigar and Portash decisions, respectively. 9 Although
Apfelbaum is instructive for the Court's retreat from a literal reading of
Kastigar and Portash, cases like Apfelbaum, those separate prosecutions
which involve offenses, like false swearing, that are integral to the act of
giving compelled testimony or failing to do so, are not the subject of the
proposed models. Rather, the models address prosecutorial use of
compelled statements in cases prosecuting offenses involved in the
underlying circumstances about which the defendant was compelled to
speak.
Several developments important to both the scope doctrine and the
models later proposed transpired in the decade after Salvucci and
Apfelbaum. The first development of note was the 1983 Pillsbury Co. v.
Conboy decision.2"0 In Conboy, the interrogator was a private litigant who
sought to compel a witness' responses at a deposition by claiming that the
questions and answers closely tracked, and were therefore derived from,
earlier immunized testimony.2"' The Court construed the federal immunity
provision of the OCCA20 2 under which the original grant of immunity
had been conferred. 0 3 It determined that "a deponent's civil deposition
testimony, repeating verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized
testimony, is [not] immunized 'testimony' that can be compelled over the
196. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
197. Portash, 440 U.S. at 459 (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398 (emphasis in original)).
198. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. at 120 n.6.
199. For analyses of the Apfelbaum and Portash decisions, see Richard S. Hoffman, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination and Immunity Statutes: Permissible Uses of Immunized Testimony, 16 CRIM.
L. BULL. 421, 450 (1980) ("Statements such as immunized testimony 'cannot be used in any respect'
and 'the witness and government must be in the same position before and after the immunity is granted'
have become slogans with a life of their own, applied without any clear discussion of their underlying
rationale."), and Peter Lushing, Testimonial Immunity and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A
Study in Isomorphism, 73 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1690 (1982).
200. 459 U.S. 248 (1983).
201. Id. at 250-52.
202. Specifically, the Court was construing 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976).
203. Conboy, 459 U.S. at 260-62.
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valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege."2' Of importance for
our purposes is the Court's emphasis on the prosecutorial control and
choice exercised in the conferring of immunity. According to the Court,
"[u]se immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from a subsequent
trial only that information to which the Government expressly has
surrendered future use. '205 Similarly, the Court underscored that the
authority to immunize "is peculiarly an executive one."2 6 Although the
decision represented an interpretation specifically of the OCCA immunity
provision, Conboy may imply that prosecutorial control over immunity is
a significant factor in distinguishing among the tiers of protection.
Dicta in a case from the Court's 1984 term also requires discussion here.
In Nix v. Williams,"7 the Court addressed both the application and
limitations of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine in the context of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine
developed in response to police violations of individuals' Fourth Amend-
ment rights against unreasonable search and seizure.208 Under this
doctrine, courts exclude not only "the illegally obtained evidence itself, but
also . .. other incriminating evidence derived from the primary evi-
dence."2 9 The doctrine rests on a deterrence rationale.210 Pursuant to
this rationale, police officers will have greater incentive to respect the
204. Id. at 250, 263-64.
205. Id. at 260.
206. Id. at 261. The Court did not address the provisions of the OCCA that empower Congress,
various committees, and other agencies to confer immunity. The importance of prosecutorial control
over the decision to grant immunity will play a role in the balancing model. In addition to the Court's
emphasis that, at least pursuant to the immunity statute, immunity is an executive, in fact a prosecutorial
function, Conboy, 459 U.S. at 261, the Conboy decision also makes oblique reference to the scope of
protection that such immunity will command. In criticizing the district court for compelling the
deponent to respond to questions, the Supreme Court suggested that the district court "essentially
predicted that a court in any future criminal prosecution of Conboy will be obligated to protect against
evidentiary use of the deposition testimony . I.." "d  The Court's choice of the limiting term evidentiary
may, consistent with the analogy to coerced confessions in Kastigar, suggest that § 6002 immunity
protects against evidentiary use only: that nonevidentiary use is not governed by the Fifth Amendment.
Nonetheless, many commentators and lower courts continue to view Kastigar immunity as substantially
broader than the Brain coerced confession exclusion, a conclusion supported by the distinctly different
historical treatment of these two types of compelled statements. See Risks, supra note 3, at 645-56.
207. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
208. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
209. Williams, 467 U.S. at 441 (citing Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. 385).
210. Id. at 442-43 ("The core rationale consistently advanced by this Court for extending the
exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduct has been that this admittedly
drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory
protections.").
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individual's Fourth Amendment rights if the evidence suppressed includes
not only that obtained as a direct result of the illegal conduct, but also the
useful evidentiary derivatives of that illegally obtained evidence.
However, three limiting principles can truncate the sweep of the fruit-of-
the-poisonous-tree theory. The first, known as the attenuation doctrine,
21
permits the introduction of evidence derived from the initial illegality if
"'granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which
instant objection is made has been come at [not] by exploitation of that
illegality... [but] by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint.""'2 2 Even where the suspect evidence maintains a "but for"
connection to the illegality, sufficient attenuation can render the suspect
evidence admissible. The attenuation principle follows from a deterrence
rationale. At some point, the chain linking the illegality to the suspect
evidence is so convoluted and strained, suppression is unlikely to deter the
police misconduct.2"3
The independent source doctrine represents a second limiting principle.
This principle permits the introduction of evidence despite a violation of
the defendant's constitutional righe 4 if the particular evidence is obtained
from a source wholly unrelated to the illegality. Under a deterrence
rationale, the government does not benefit from the illegality and thus
officers are not encouraged to engage in the illegality.
The inevitable discovery doctrine embodies a third limiting principle on
the reach of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree theory. Like attenuation, and
unlike independent source, the suspect evidence does derive from the illegal
police conduct. The evidence may even derive from the illegality on a
relatively short and direct chain. This suspect evidence becomes admissible,
however, because even absent the illegality, the government would
inevitably or ultimately have discovered the evidence. Suppression, then,
arguably would punish the government unnecessarily, since the government
would have located this evidence with or without the illegality. Or as the
Williams Court said, "the prosecution is not.., put in a better position
than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired. 215
211. The label "fruit of the poisonous tree" is often used to refer not only to the derivative evidence
prohibition but also to subsume one or more of the limiting principles.
212. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (citation omitted).
213. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (explaining
the Court's holding in Brown).
214. Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392. I use the terms "violation" and "illegality" in the
context of a Fourth Amendment application of the independent source principle.
215. Williams, 467 U.S. at 443.
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The Court in Williams confronted the availability of the third limiting
principle, inevitable discovery, for evidence derived from a violation of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.216 In holding this princi-
ple available to truncate the breadth of suppression, the Court discusses all
three limiting principles and refers in dicta to the Murphy and Kastigar
immunity decisions.2"7 The Court indicates that it "has applied [the fruit-
of-the-poisonous-tree] doctrine where the violations were of the Sixth
Amendment ... as well as of the Fifth Amendment."218 To support that
latter proposition, the Court cites both Murphy and Kastigar.2 9 The
language it quotes from Murphy relates both to the prohibition on use of
the compelled testimony and its fruits as well as the ability to prosecute
using independent sources.220 The Court's reference to Kastigar states:
"Application of the independent source doctrine in the Fifth Amendment
context was reaffirmed in Kastigar."'2"
To the extent one reads the dicta in Williams as suggesting that the fruit-
of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine is a prohibition on derivative evidentiary use
and the independent source doctrine provides the applicable limiting
principle in the immunity context, the Williams decision is consistent with
216. Id. at 434.
217. Id. at 442-44.
218. Williams, 467 U.S. at 442 (citing United States v. Wade, 338 U.S. 218 (1967)).
219. Id. at 442 n.3.
220. Id.
221. Id. This is the first of two citations to Kastigar and Murphy in the majority's opinion. The
Court's second citation reference is used to support the following language:
The independent source doctrine teaches us that the interest of society in deterring unlawful
police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a
crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position than they
would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred.
Williams, 467 U.S. at 443. This second reference seems to suggest that deterrence serves as at least a
partial motivating rationale in Murphy and Kastigar. Since the compulsion in the immunity contexts
of Kastigar and Murphy is legally authorized compulsion, reliance on deterrence appears misplaced.
Kastigar and Murphy did indicate, however, that "immunity from use and derivative use 'leaves the
witness and the Federal Government in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed
his privilege' in the absence of a grant of immunity." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 458-59
(1972) (footnote omitted) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964)).
The importance in Kastigar of leaving the witness and the Federal Government in substantially the
same position as if the witness had invoked the privilege does not stem from a deterrence theory.
Rather, the concern results from the need to insure that the OCCA supplied protection coextensive with
that of the Fifth Amendment itself. Id. As a consequence, the Williams Court's reliance on Kastigar and
Murphy in apparent support of the deterrence rationale of the Exclusionary Rule is difficult to
understand. See Strachan, supra note 19, at 826 ("[P]recluding the use of legally compelled testimony
is not meant to correct official misconduct.").
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Kastigar.22 A second reading, however, is available from the language.
This second reading implies that the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree theory with
all three associated limiting principles applies in the immunity context as
it might in a Fourth Amendment context. If one adopts this second reading,
then the Williams decision can be understood both as largely resolving a
number of scope issues in the immunity tier, and arguably, in the eyes of
a number of courts, substantially increasing the scope of permitted
prosecutorial use in the Kastigar immunity tier. 3 Although the language
supports this second reading, for purposes of the models advanced in Part
III, and for the reasons following, I suggest that as a descriptive matter,
absent further Supreme Court guidance, 4 the first reading is to be
preferred.
The second reading, one that imports into the immunity tier all three
limitations on the derivative evidence prohibition, rejects Kastigar's
emphasis on a "legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled
222. At least with a reading of Kastigar that, at a minimum, prohibits evidentiary use.
223. This latter reading of Williams would presumably have resulted in very different decisions by,
for example, the District of Columbia Circuit in United States V. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992), and United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.),
modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991), and the Eighth Circuit in
United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973).
224. In the subsequent Fourth Amendment decision of Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533
(1988), the Court did draw a distinction between the exclusionary rule (which the Court read as
including an attenuation limitation) and the independent source doctrine. Id. at 536-37. The Court
indicated that these two concepts, the exclusionary rule and the independent source doctrine, had
developed "almost simultaneously," id. at 537, and that the latter doctrine, independent source, had
"been applied to evidence acquired not only through Fourth Amendment violations but also through
Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations." Id. The Murray Court's distinction between the doctrines and
its reference specifically to the independent source doctrine as applying to the Fifth Amendment may
be read as consistent with the understanding of Williams advanced in the text. However, the Murray
Court's reference to the Fifth Amendment, like those in Williams, appears to be dicta. Whether the
Court intended to suggest that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, including the attenuation
principle, should apply to the Fifth Amendment remains debatable.
Murray itself clarified the scope of the independent source doctrine in a Fourth Amendment context.
The Court there held that evidence initially discovered through an unlawful search may be admissible
if subsequently acquired through an independent source. Id. at 541-42. Whether this clarification of the
independent source doctrine in the Fourth Amendment arena can be imported into the Fifth Amendment
Kastigar context is also debatable, particularly because the Murray decision relies noticeably on the
language of a deterrence rationale. See id. at 537 (citing language from Williams on "deterring unlawful
police conduct"). If this clarification were transposable, however, it would suggest, at a minimum, that
governmental awareness of immunized evidence would not preclude introduction of that evidence if the
evidence derived from a source independent of the immunized information. Because Murray is a Fourth
Amendment case, broader implications of applying the case to the Fifth Amendment Kastigar context
are not pursued here.
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testimony"' necessary to sustain a criminal prosecution in the wake of
an immunity grant. Instead, under both the attenuation principle and the
inevitable discovery principle, evidence derived from the immunized
testimony could be introduced into the trial. This second reading rejects
Kastigar's explicit finding that "negation of taint" does not satisfy the
government's burden. 6 Attenuation of taint demands less than negation
of taint. This second reading, without even recognizing the vigorous debate
concerning the scope of Kastigar immunity, 7 simply equates the scope
of exclusionary rule protection in the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause immunity context with that available under the Fourth Amendment.
Such a casual resolution of the scope debate, lacking substantive analysis,
in the dicta of a Sixth Amendment decision seems improbable.228
If the 1984 Williams decision had resolved a substantial portion of the
scope debate in the Kastigar tier by application of attenuation of taint and
inevitable discovery, how could courts like the District of Columbia Circuit
have concluded that an immunity grant required the extremely demanding
level of scrutiny promulgated in cases like North 29 and Poindexter?"°
Perhaps of greatest significance, neither the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree
title nor the deterrence rationale seems pertinent in the immunity circum-
stance. In the Kastigar context, there is no poisonous tree. To the contrary,
a formal grant of immunity exemplifies the legally authorized means of
compelling testimony. There is no constitutional violation in the compul-
225. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
226. Id.
227. For reference to or discussion of the views of a number of courts and commentators involved
in the debate both before and after 1984, see Risks, supra note 3, at 640 n.65, 646-53; see also Kenneth
J. Melilli, Act-of-Production Immunity, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 232-33 (1991) ("[lit is by no means clear
that the 'attenuation' doctrine limits the exclusionary principle as applied to evidence derived from
immunized testimony... . Beyond the broad proscriptions of Kastigar, the Court has not yet specifically
addressed the possible application of the 'attenuation' doctrine to the fruits of immunized testimony.")
(footnotes omitted). Review of the sources cited here demonstrates that attenuation, inevitable discovery,
and the applicability of a deterrence rationale, among other related issues, clearly constituted part of the
vigorous debate in progress on the scope of Kastigar immunity in 1984. See Strachan, supra note 19,
at 829-30.
228. I am not suggesting that the Court might not someday explicitly address the scope of Kastigar
immunity and import doctrines of attenuation of taint or inevitable discovery to permit greater
prosecutorial use, or even that such a reading of the existing Kastigar decision would be impossible.
However, given the existence of the debate then in progress about the scope of immunity under
Kastigar, it would seem unlikely that the Court would resolve that debate in cursory dicta, especially
such dicta in a case that did not even involve the Self-Incrimination Clause.
229. 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.), modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941
(1991).
230. 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992).
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sion. Nor should the deterrence rationale apply since there is no constitu-
tional violation from which the government should be deterred. As a
consequence, the first reading, one that simply recognizes the derivative
evidence function of the fruit of the poisonous tree, rather than equating it
precisely with its applicability in the Fourth Amendment, and affirms the
availability of the independent source rule in the immunity context, yields
the preferable interpretation of the Court's dicta in Williams. With this
reading, Kastigar immunity is at least a substantial grant of protection and
the question of the applicability of attenuation and inevitable discovery
remains unresolved.
As the 1886 decision in Boyd" t illustrated, compulsion implicating the
Fifth Amendment is not limited to oral utterances. 232 The most notewor-
thy recent self-incrimination decisions return to the question of compelling
the production of documents or other tangibles. In 1984, the Court in
United States v. Doe 1 3 held that through an appropriate grant of statutory
immunity, the prosecution could compel the production of records 34
Permitting the government to compel production of any documents from
a defendant may be perceived as undermining the promise of Boyd that
such compulsion violates both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
The nature of the compulsion has also changed since Boyd. In Boyd, the
compulsion was threat of default forfeiture. Since Doe requires that the
compulsion proceed pursuant to a formal grant of immunity, the nature of
the compulsion has changed from a threat of default forfeiture to a threat
of contempt of court and incarceration. 35 Thus, the penalty for failure to
comply has arguably been magnified, 36 from loss of property to loss of
liberty, and the Court extends the immunity protection only to specific
231. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
232. Id. at 633 ("And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books
and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a
witness against himself.').
233. 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
234. Id. at 617.
235. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988) ("[T]he witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis
of his privilege against self-incrimination."); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462 (affirming contempt order issued
under 28 U.S.C. § 1826 for refusal to testify under §§ 6002-6003 immunity grant).
236. But see Justice Miller's concurrence in Boyd, 116 U.S. at 639, suggesting that having "charges
against him of a criminal nature, taken for confessed" was more "severe" than imprisonment. The
compulsion scale of the models interprets incarceration as more severe than default forfeiture, contrary
to Justice Miller's position. See infra notes 308-I1 and accompanying text.
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aspects of the production of the records. 7 Moreover, the contents do not
necessarily receive any protection because only the assertions involved in
producing the items are subject to the compulsion."3 8
Thus, Doe affords less protection than contemplated in Boyd because it
enables the government to compel production, heightens the penalty for
failure to comply, and circumscribes the aspects of production protected by
the immunity. However, the Court also expanded the protection for act-of-
production in one respect by imposing the use immunity protection of the
OCCA. In Boyd, basic excision was the solution-Boyd protection
correlated to Brain Tier Two protection. By requiring the government to
afford formal use and derivative use immunity pursuant to the OCCA, the
protection of compelled document production has been elevated to Tier
One, a potentially more encompassing protection than the Boyd excision
remedy. Act-of-production immunity for records under the Fifth Amend-
ment requires a formal grant of use immunity for the compelled, incrimi-
nating, and testimonial aspects of production. By implication, the scope of
immunity protection for those aspects of production corresponds to that
afforded other statements compelled pursuant to the OCCA. Thus, by 1985,
the Court had elevated the scope of Boyd protection from that of Bram Tier
Two to that of Kastigar Tier One, but narrowed the acts protected by that
more extensive scrutiny. 9 The requirement that compelled document
production proceed through formal immunity channels will prove of
importance in the models later proposed.
Two intriguing nuances of scope doctrine emerged in the wake of Doe.
The first appeared in 1988 in the five-to-four decision in Braswell v. United
States.24 In Braswell, the Court confirmed that a "custodian of corporate
records may [not] resist a subpoena for such records on the ground that the
237. Doe, 465 U.S. at 612-13 & n.10 ("If the party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has
voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the document are not
privileged."). Moreover, Doe immunity is unavailable if the "communicative aspects" of the act-of-
production are "foregone conclusions." See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-11 (1976);
Melilli, supra note 227, at 236 ("According to the Fisher Court, where the relevant testimonial compo-
nent--existence, possession, or authentication-is a 'foregone conclusion,' then the testimonial aspect
of the act of production... 'adds little or nothing to the sum total of the government's information.
.") (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411).
238. Doe, 465 U.S. at 612-13 & n.10. But see infra note 347.
239. The particular question of production of private papers has not been fully resolved by the
Court. But see Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I write separately, however, just to
make explicit what is implicit in the analysis of that opinion: that the Fifth Amendment provides
absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind.").
240. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
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act of production would incriminate him in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment." '24 The Court prohibited the custodian from claiming Fifth Amend-
ment protection because his act was merely the act of the entity, not a
personal act.242 If no Fifth Amendment claim were available either to the
entity or to the custodian,24 logic suggests that the Court's analysis
should have ended there. But the Braswell Court invented an evidentiary
limitation not apparent in prior production rulings and extended a limited
form of protection to the custodian. The majority forbade the government
from making any "evidentiary use of the 'individual act' against the
individual .... [I]n a criminal prosecution against the custodian, the
Government may not introduce into evidence before the jury the fact that
the subpoena was served upon and the corporation's documents were
delivered by one particular individual, the custodian." 2" Precisely what
scope this evidentiary use prohibition could claim is unclear. However, as
Professors LaFave and Israel have explained, "that prohibition did not carry
with it the burden of meeting the independent source requirement imposed
in the immunity cases."" Thus, this evidentiary limitation appears to
differ from act-of-production immunity. Perhaps Braswell implicates some
penumbral Fifth Amendment protection for the custodian.246 But whether
this Braswell evidentiary immunity replicates the scope of Bram Tier Two
or Simmons Tier Three, or illumines a separate level of protection remains
to be discovered. The Court itself, however,
reject[s] the suggestion that the limitation on the evidentiary use of the
custodian's act of production is the equivalent of constructive use immunity
.... Rather, the limitation is a necessary concomitant of the notion that a
corporate custodian acts as an agent and not an individual when he produces
corporate records in response to a subpoena addressed to him in his
representative capacity.247
241. Id. at 100.
242. Id. at 110. For a discussion of Braswell, see LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 33, at 444-45.
243. "A custodian may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds,"
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 113.
244. Id. at 118.
245. LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 33, at 444 n.12.
246. The Court argued that it was, in an effort to avoid jury confusion or misattribution of the act
of production, simply effectuating the legal fiction of the custodian's role in corporate law. Braswell,
487 U.S. at 118 n.1 1. The prohibition would thus be arguably unrelated to self-incrimination protection.
But unless the Court was acting in its supervisory capacity overseeing the federal courts, it is not readily
apparent upon what grounds the Court imposes this prohibition. One may, therefore, reasonably presume
that the prohibition rests upon a self-incrimination rationale. If so, Braswell may represent some
immunity shy of Kastigar immunity, whose prohibition against evidentiary use remains to be sculpted.
247. Id. at 118 n.ll.
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And yet, Braswell does seem to create a new level of protection for
custodians of records, one that differs from act-of-production immunity.
The most recent significant development in the evolution of scope
doctrine arose in the 1990 decision in Baltimore v. Bouknight.24' In
Bouknight, a juvenile court issued an order, under penalty of contempt,
requiring Ms. Bouknight to produce her child. Because the child was a
ward of the court, the Bouknight majority viewed Ms. Bouknight as the
child's custodian.249 In light of Braswell, the Court prohibited her from
successfully advancing a Fifth Amendment claim.25 0 The Court did
suggest, however, that, although
[w]e are not called upon to define the precise limitations that may exist upon
the State's ability to use the testimonial aspects of Bouknight's act of
production in subsequent criminal proceedings . . . imposition of such
limitations is not foreclosed. The same custodial role that limited the ability
to resist the production order may give rise to corresponding limitations upon
the direct and indirect use of that testimony."
To support that proposition, the Court cited Braswell, implying that some
type of use restriction might be available to Ms. Bouknight 2  The Court
explained that "[i]n a broad range of contexts, the Fifth Amendment limits
prosecutors' ability to use testimony that has been compelled." '253 Illus-
trating this contention, the Court listed cases arguably providing vastly
different levels of protection, including Simmons and Murphy.254 This
248. 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
249. Id. at 551-52.
250. The Bouknight Court stated:
Even assuming that this limited testimonial assertion is sufficiently incriminating and
"sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege,".. . Bouknight may not invoke the
privilege to resist the production order because she has assumed custodial duties related to
production and because production is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime.
Id. at 555-56 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)).
251. Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 561.
252. Id. (citing Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 118 & n. 11 (1988)).
253. Id. at 562.
254. Id. Supporting citations in the string cite also included: 1) Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449,
474-75 (1975) (White, J., concurring) (suggesting that "where the claim of privilege is overruled
because the witness has not carried his burden of demonstrating... that the sought-after answer may
incriminate him and there is apparently no occasion for an assurance of immunity... the witness is
nevertheless protected by a constitutionally imposed use immunity if he answers in response to the order
and under threat of contempt. If... the State later finds the answer or its fruits incriminating and offers
either against the witness in a criminal prosecution, the witness has a valid objection to the evidence
.. "); 2) Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181 (1954) (holding that a statute granting direct use
immunity to a witness testifying before a Senate Committee did not require assertion of the Fifth
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most recent doctrine is perhaps also the most enigmatic. The Court appears
to acknowledge, at least implicitly in its choice of supporting cases,
disparate protection under the Fifth Amendment, but the Court makes no
apparent attempt to reconcile those disparities.
D. Three Tiers for Reference
The preceding overview of Supreme Court doctrine summarizes the
evolution of disparity in the scope of protection that compelled statements
have received. This journey through the development of self-incrimination
scope doctrine illustrates a doctrine without an articulated framework,
without a coherent and comprehensive model to determine whether the
disparities of treatment represent principled or ad hoc decisionmaking. For
the purposes of this analysis, however, let us sculpt, in gross, three tiers of
the protection spectrum. These tiers will serve an essential function.
Because they represent the most clearly defined aspects of scope doctrine,
they furnish the class of cases through which we can determine if the
models meet the first criterion of a good model: the ability to "accurately
describe a large class of observations on the basis of a model that contains
only a few arbitrary elements." '
The tier of the spectrum receiving the highest levels of protection, Tier
One, involves statements compelled by formal grants of immunity. This
Kastigar immunity is often, although not exclusively, controlled by the
prosecuting authority. Lower courts tend to scrutinize the potential use of
these formally immunized statements extensively, or at least substantially.
Direct and derivative use prohibitions protect the immunized material.
Direct evidentiary use, whether in the case-in-chief or for impeachment
purposes, is prohibited. 6 Derivative evidentiary use is also prohibited.
Whether doctrines of attenuation of taint or inevitable discovery will apply
Amendment privilege for immunity to attach); 3) New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979)
(discussed supra in text); 4) Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (discussed Infra in Part
V). The Court also included two citations preceded by a But cf. signal. These references were to United
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 616-17 (1984) (discussed supra in text) and Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459
U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983) (discussed supra in text).
255. HAWKING, supra note 23, at 9.
256. Portash, 440 U.S. 450. Excluded from this prohibition on direct use are those cases, like
United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980), involving a separate prosecution for false swearing
during immunized testimony, which involve offenses that are integral to the act of giving compelled
testimony or failing to do so. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988) (permitting introduction of immunized
testimony in prosecutions "for pejury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the
order."). The models do not address and are not intended to apply to those cases.
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and consequently circumscribe the reach of the derivative use prohibition
in this tier remains disputed.1 7 Tier One may also prohibit some or all
direct or derivative nonevidentiary use." 8
Tier Two encompasses those statements produced by official questioning,
absent a formal grant of immunity, in which the speaker is promised some
qualifying form of lenity or threatened with something other than contempt
of court. The prototypical example involves the "constable's blunder" of
Bram. Courts scrutinize potential infringements in this tier moderately. As
in Tier One, the Court has outlawed direct evidentiary use, even for
impeachment purposes. Courts interpret the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree
doctrine to operate to prevent derivative evidentiary use in this tier. 9
257. See E. R. Harding, Note, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Testimony: Practical Problems
in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L. REV. 470, 489 (1974); Risks, supra note 3, at 647 n.l10, 651
n.137. The Hazelwood decision, referred to in Risks, supra note 3, at 651 n.137, rejecting the
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, was subsequently appealed to the Alaska Supreme
Court. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the inevitable discovery
doctrine did apply to the federal statutory use and derivative use immunity of 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5)
(1988), the reporting statute at issue in the Hazelwood case. State v. Hazelwood, 866 P.2d 827, 831-34
(Alaska 1993); Charles J. Walsh & Steven A. Rowland, Immunized Testimony and the Inevitable
Discovery Doctrine: An Appropriate Transplant of the Exclusionary Rule or a Broken Promise?, 23
SEToN HALL L. REv. 967 (1993). Consider also the discussion of Nix v. Williams supra notes 207-30
and accompanying text. I employ the terms attenuation and inevitable discovery for purposes of
consistency even though there is no primary illegality in the Kastigar context.
258. Courts have sometimes interpreted this tier as forbidding nonevidentiary use. United States v.
McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973) (dismissing indictments because the government failed
to prove that "the United States Attorney, who admittedly read [the defendant's immunized testimony)
did not use it in some significant way short of introducing tainted evidence"). Two recent circuit court
decisions illustrate the continuing uncertainty regarding Kastigar's position on nonevidentiary use. In
July of 1994, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated its position in North by
"assum[ing], without deciding, 'that a prosecutor cannot make nonevidentiary use of immunized
testimony,' any more than evidentiary use, without running afoul of use immunity." United States v.
Kilroy, 27 F.3d 679, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 860 (D.C.
Cir. 1990)). Also in July of 1994, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that it had "adopted the 'evidentiary'
interpretation of Kastigar. that the focus of a challenge on self-incrimination grounds should be on the
direct and indirect evidentiary uses of immunized testimony, rather than on non-evidentiary matters such
as the exercise of prosecutorial discretion." United States v. Schmigdall, 25 F.3d 1523, 1529 (11 th Cir.
1994) (citing United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1529-31 (1 1th Cir. 1985)).
259. See Risks, supra note 3, at 655-56; cf Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (implying
that an "actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights" rather than "a noncoercive Miranda
violation" would trigger application of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine). The Court has certainly
indicated that the derivative evidence prohibition of the fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine is available
in cases involving compulsion other than immunity. See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255
(1966) ("Even if we assume that the Government did acquire incriminating evidence in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, Blue would at most be entitled to suppress the evidence and its fruits if they were
sought to be used against him at trial."). The Court has also applied the attenuation principle associated
with the fruit of the poisonous tree in suggesting that the connection between a coerced confession and
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With the application of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, courts also
apply principles of attenuation of taint and inevitable discovery to truncate
the reach of the derivative use prohibition in this tier, thereby allowing
some derivative evidentiary use.260 And nonevidentiary use of the
accused's compelled statements is accepted practice.26 t
Tier Three is the compulsion of choosing between competing rights. In
this tier, the speaker preserves the option of silence but at the cost of
potential failure to prevail at a hearing. The paradigm example is that of the
defendant in Simmons. As in Tier Two, nonevidentiary use is the norm and
attenuation262 and inevitable discovery may render some derivative
evidence available for prosecutorial use in the case-in-chief. Unlike in Tiers
One and Two, however, direct evidentiary use, in the form of impeachment,
remains, at a minimum, an open question and plausibly a viable option.
Accordingly, unlimited derivative evidentiary use, for impeachment
purposes, presumably also remains, at least, an open question.
III. MODELING SELF-INCRIMINATION DOCTRINE
The overview just sketched reveals that the tiers of compelled statement
protection evolved in an environment almost devoid of comparative
scrutiny. As a result, the Court has produced no coherent framework to
explain the multiple tiers of protection. Nor has the Court adequately
addressed the factors that distinguish one tier of protection from another.
The paucity of side-by-side juxtaposition and evaluation and the consequent
absence of an articulated framework impede our ability to determine
whether existing disparities are justified or desirable. The absence of such
a framework also produces a guidance gap for principled evaluation and
resolution of future self-incrimination cases.263
an ultimate guilty plea could "'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."' Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 796 (1970) (citations omitted). Consider also Harrison v. United States, 392
U.S. 219, 222-26 (1968) (applying the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree and attenuation principles to illegally
obtained (although not involuntary) confessions).
260. See Risks, supra note 3, at 655-56. Again, for consistency I will continue to employ the terms
attenuation and inevitable discovery, whether or not there exists a primary illegality.
261. See id. at 653-56.
262. I continue to employ the terms attenuation and inevitable discovery for consistency even
though in a Tier Three context there may be no primary illegality.
263. Cf Regan v. New York, 349 U.S. 58, 64 (1955) ("The law strives to provide predictability so
that knowing men may wisely order their affairs; it cannot, however, remove all doubts as to the
consequence of a course of action.").
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A. The Need for a Coherent Framework: A Case-in-Point
The recent Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Beltran-
Gutierrez2" highlights the need for a structural framework to explain the
relationship among the tiers of protection. The defendant, Mr. Beltran-
Gutierrez, testified at his pretrial Simmons suppression hearing. The
prosecution later used the defendant's Simmons testimony during cross-
examination to impeach his trial testimony.26
On appeal, the defendant "assert[ed] that, under Simmons, his suppression
hearing testimony was 'implicitly' given 'a type of "use immunity"' and,
as such, was 'compelled' testimony which precluded its introduction to
impeach him under New Jersey v. Portash . ". ..- The Ninth Circuit
rejected the defendant's claim to protection from impeachment use. The
court offered a collection of reasons for rejecting the defendant's assertion.
First, the court distinguished Portash.
In Portash, the Court held that testimony given in response to a grant of
legislative immunity is coerced testimony and therefore may not be used
either to prove guilt or to impeach. Simmons did not hold that a defendant's
testimony at a suppression hearing was inadmissible because it was compelled
pursuant to a grant of immunity.267
Portash, in the Ninth Circuit's view, appears to differ from Simmons
initially in the type of coercion used to elicit the testimony. Portash
involved a grant of legislative immunity, Simmons did not. But the Ninth
Circuit's efforts to distinguish Portash (a Tier One case) from Simmons (a
Tier Three case) result in the court declaring the defendant's Simmons
testimony not compelled at all: "Gutierrez was not forced to testify at his
suppression hearing. He did so voluntarily in order to preclude the use of
incriminating evidence at his trial. Thus, he did not face 'the cruel trilemma
of self-accusation, perjury or contempt. ' ' 26s
Yet, if the defendant's testimony were voluntary,269 why would Self-
264. 19 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 1994).
265. Id. at 1288.
266. Id. at 1290.
267. Id. at 1290 (citation omitted).
268. Id. (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)). In the paragraph
following, the Ninth Circuit panel reiterated the position that "Gutierrez elected to testify in his own
defense at his trial." Id. at 1291.
269. If the statements had been taken within the coercive confines of custodial interrogation at a
police station, rather than at a pretrial suppression hearing as in Beltran-Gutierrez, a failure to
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Incrimination Clause protection attach at all?270 The court subsequently
asserts that "[t]he Fifth Amendment protected [the defendant] from the use
of his suppression hearing testimony in the Government's case in chief to
prove his guilt. It did not protect him from impeachment for testifying
falsely. 2 r The Ninth Circuit somehow perceives Simmons as providing
partial Fifth Amendment protection to voluntary statements. Although the
result in Beltran-Gutierrez, permitting impeachment use in Tier Three, is
consistent with Supreme Court precedent,272 the contradictory analysis
signals the need for a principled framework to explain different levels of
protection for statements resulting from different types of Fifth Amendment
compulsion.273
In the pages that follow, I propose two principled frameworks for
interpreting existing Supreme Court doctrine on the scope of compelled
statement protection and for guiding future decisions. The goal of each
model is to explain in relative terms how much protection a compelled
statement should receive. The models do not intend or pretend to offer
definitive methods for resolving the threshold question of determining
which statements should qualify as compelled. 4
administer prophylactic Miranda warnings would have prevented the prosecution from employing the
defendant's statement in its case-in-chief even if the statements were otherwise voluntary. In that police
setting, the court's use of the term "voluntary might have been less problematic.
270. But consider the evidentiary limitation of Braswell, 487 U.S. 99.
271. Beltran-Gutierrez, 19 F.3d at 1291.
272. The fundamental question raised in Beltran-Gutierrez was whether Simmons permits
impeachment use of the suppression hearing statements. The U.S. Supreme Court had explicitly raised
that issue and left the question open, if not impliedly condoned such use, in Salvucci. Thus, permitting
impeachment use is entirely consistent with existing Supreme Court doctrine. Moreover, Beltran-
Gutierrez does not raise the more complex question of hybrid circumstances among the tiers.
273. The Ninth Circuit is not alone in its efforts to distinguish among types of compelled statements
and the scope of their permitted use. See, e.g., People v. Pacchioli, 9 Cal. App. 4th 1331 (1992). In
Pacchioli, the defendant withdrew an earlier guilty plea and sought to have his postplea incriminating
statements, made to a probation officer, suppressed for case-in-chief and impeachment purposes at his
subsequent trial. Id. at 157-58. The Pacchioli court analyzed both Fifth Amendment and due process
issues to rule that the trial court's decision to permit impeachment use of the defendant's postplea
incriminating statements did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment or due process rights. Id. at
160-62.
274. As indicated earlier, the substantially larger task of articulating a coherent rationale for the
Fifth Amendment generally is not the aim of this Article. Moreover, many commentators have
suggested that a coherent framework for self-incrimination jurisprudence is simply not an attainable
goal. See, e.g., Dolinko, supra note 21, at 1064 ("I suggest that the leading contemporary efforts to
justify the privilege as more than a historical relic are uniformly unsatisfactory and that no efforts along
similar lines are likely to succeed."). But see William . Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1228 (1988) ("But while there may be no descriptively sound, comprehensive
theory of the privilege, there is an increasingly strong pattern that runs through a great deal of fifth
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Before examining each model, an observation about both models may be
helpful. As empirically driven descriptive models, each strives to explain
the results of Supreme Court decisionmaking. The components of the
models are drawn largely from the factors featured by the Court itself in its
language and from reasonable inferences to be drawn from its majority
decisions or dissents on self-incrimination.2 But supporting language has
been chosen selectively from the decisions. The goal of the models is not
to explain the substance or nuance of Supreme Court language, but to
explicate the results of the decisions in a reasoned manner conducive to
future predictions.
The principle animating the first model is compulsion. The extent of
compulsion determines the extent of protection: the greater the compulsion,
the greater the protection. The second model balances the right of the
accused against government interests in order to set the required level of
protection. The section immediately following is devoted to describing the
models and explaining how each fits existing Supreme Court doctrine.
Following this description and explanation, the Article concentrates on
evaluating the models and examining their limitations.
B. The Compulsion Model
1. The Model Described
The compulsion model posits a correlation between the extent of
compulsion and the extent of protection: the greater the compulsion, the
greater the protection. Under this model, compulsion is a sliding scale, with
certain types of compulsion meriting greater protection than others.
Compulsion is measured by three criteria: (1) the nature of the compulsion;
(2) the degree of automaticity of infliction of penalty; and (3) the
legitimacy of the compulsion.276
The nature of the compulsion measures its severity. The degree of
automaticity gauges whether the infliction of the penalty for failure to
succumb to the compulsion is direct or indirect, immediate or remote. The
legitimacy scale embodies two related calculations. First, the legitimacy
scale expresses whether the questioning occurred pursuant to some legally
authorized procedure, that is, a procedure with some colorable claim to
amendment law.... That pattern... can be derived from notions of excuse!").
275. For some insights on the process involved in selecting the components, see infra notes 372-86
and accompanying text.
276. For a discussion of the origin or selection of the models' components, see infra Part IV.D.
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legitimacy.277 Second, legitimacy measures the deliberateness of the
immunity grant-whether a promise of nonuse or immunity preceded the
questioning. The combination of official legal process and assurance of
nonuse yields the highest legitimacy figure. The absence of a colorable
claim of authorized procedure and/or the lack of a promise of nonuse of the
statements diminishes the legitimacy value.
On this scale, a severe penalty counts as greater compulsion than a mild
penalty, a swift and sure penalty constitutes greater compulsion than a
delayed and uncertain one, and an officially condoned procedure coupled
with a broad promise of immunity is more legally compelling than that
same penalty exacted without legal process or an immunity promise. Of the
three components, nature receives the widest range. The range serves two
functions. First, it accommodates the greater variability in types of
compulsion, and second, the wider range incorporates an intuitive
impression that whether one is being beaten rather than reprimanded is
more important than whether the beaters or reprimanders have a legitimate
right to engage in such behavior. Similarly, whether the beating is
contemporaneous with the refusal to comply with the compulsion or is
delayed, the circumstance of being beaten is probably more significant than
the temporal relationship between the silence and the resulting beating.
Once evaluated, these three factors enable assignment of a compulsion
value which will permit assessment of the amount of protection to be
afforded the compelled statement. Under the compulsion theory, the scope
of protection is inverse to the extent of permitted prosecutorial use of the
statement. The greater the compulsion, the less prosecutorial use permitted.
The less prosecutorial use, the greater the self-incrimination protection.
Prosecutorial use, for the purposes of this model, lies on a roughly
sketched scale beginning at the top with unimpeded direct evidentiary use
in the prosecution's case-in-chief, continuing downward through evidentiary
impeachment use, proceeding to derivative evidentiary use available under
principles of attenuation and inevitable discovery and through various forms
of nonevidentiary use, and concluding at the bottom with no use at all. The
277. In Kastigar, the Court implied that the legal authority to engage in the questioning is of some
moment to the Court's scope analysis:
There can be no justification in reason or policy for holding that the Constitution requires an
amnesty grant where, acting pursuant to statute and accompanying safeguards, testimony is
compelled in exchange for immunity from use and derivative use when no such amnesty is
required where the goverment, acting without colorable right, coerces a defendant into
incriminating himself.
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462.
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measure of use implicates the type of use rather than the number of times
a prosecutor makes particular use of the compelled statements. For
example, a prosecutor might feel a surge of increased confidence in the
case each time she picked up the file knowing the defendant had confessed
to the police. That type of nonevidentiary use would merit only a low value
in our calculus even if she picked up the file a thousand times. By contrast,
a prosecutor's evidentiary use of but a single phrase of the defendant's
compelled utterances in order to impeach the defendant before the trier of
fact would command a substantial value on the use scale.
This scale is extrapolated from current treatment of types of use in both
Supreme Court doctrine and other court scope decisions. Direct evidentiary
use in the prosecution's case-in-chief constitutes the master set of uses at
the apex of the scale. Other uses constitute subsets of the master set of
direct case-in-chief evidentiary use. The first well-defined subset is
evidentiary impeachment use. Although the prosecution is limited in timing
and purpose in its use of compelled statements, as a form of direct
evidentiary use, impeachment use confers greater benefits on the prosecu-
tion than nonevidentiary uses alone. Moreover, if the prosecution is
permitted to employ the actual compelled utterances against the defendant,
one may infer that the prosecution can also derive evidence from the
compelled statements to impeach the defendant. Impeachment use, albeit
a subset, offers prosecutors a wide range of possible uses.
Attenuated or inevitably discovered derivative evidentiary uses comprise
the next portion of the scale. The prosecutor can use derivative evidence
that qualifies as sufficiently attenuated or inevitably discovered throughout
his case." The ability to employ the evidence in his case-in-chief
endows the prosecutor with a full range of uses. As a result of this range,
a reasonable argument arises for placing this type of use above impeach-
ment use on the scale. Such a placement, however, would contradict
existing doctrine. While the Court has expressly prohibited direct use
through impeachment in both Tiers One and Two,279 lower courts
interpret Supreme Court doctrine as permitting derivative use through
attenuation and inevitable discovery in Tier Two cases. 80 As a conse-
quence, direct evidentiary use, albeit limited to impeachment, ranks as
greater use than derivative evidentiary use and stands higher on the scale.
278. Cf. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (upholding trial court's admission of derivative
evidence inevitably discovered in Sixth Amendment context).
279. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
280. See Risks, supra note 3, at 655.
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The next limiting line on the scale falls between that of evidentiary and
nonevidentiary uses. This demarcation is not well-defined. As one appellate
tribunal noted, "a precise definition of the term nonevidentiary use is
elusive."28 This elusiveness will also constrain the ability of the models
to offer definite predictions. Although there is no official consensus
ranking, courts, nonetheless, do distinguish among nonevidentiary uses.
Dicta in a Ninth Circuit case suggested, for example, that "use of
[immunized] testimony to persuade the complaining witness to consent to
the prosecution comes close to ... an evidentiary use." '282 That some uses
are closer to evidentiary use than others implies a hierarchy among
nonevidentiary uses. One may assume, for instance, that if planning trial
strategy qualifies as a nonevidentiary use, such use is closer to the
evidentiary line than is increased prosecutorial confidence in the guilt of the
defendant. Considering again the scale of prosecutorial use discussed
above,283 the further up the scale from the bottom at no use, through
various forms of nonevidentiary use and impeachment use, to case-in-chief
evidentiary use, the less protection the speaker's compelled statements
receive.
It may be helpful to represent the compulsion model itself as a
mathematical relation. In this expression, the Fifth Amendment is not
violated when, in a given case, the extent of compulsion, (C), plus the
extent of use, (U), is less than or equal to a given constant, k, where k
represents the government's interest in the detection and prosecution of
criminal conduct:
C+U k
For example, hypothesize that the maximum combination of compulsion
and use that does not violate the Fifth Amendment is twenty units (k equals
20). Further hypothesize that each of the two variables, compulsion and
use, may individually reach a maximum of twenty. Compulsion in which
all three of its components (nature, automaticity, and legitimacy) were at
their individual maximum would produce a value of twenty. Correspond-
ingly, unrestricted evidentiary use of the compelled statements in the
prosecution's case-in-chief would also produce a value of twenty.
Consistent with this equation, then, no self-incrimination violation would
281. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
282. Gwillim v. City of San Jose, 929 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991).
283. See supra notes 278-82 and accompanying text. For a discussion cataloguing some types of
arguably nonevidentiary use, see Strachan, supra note 19, at 807-09.
[VOL. 72:1603
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss4/5
FIFTH AMENDMENT COMPELLED STATEMENTS
occur if compulsion were at its most severe, most automatic, and most
legitimate, but the prosecution did not use the statement at all.284
(C)20 + (U)0 < 20(k)
Similarly, if the prosecution employed a defendant's statement as the
centerpiece of its case-in-chief but no compulsion were involved in
obtaining the statement, no self-incrimination violation would occur.28
(C)0 + (U)20 < 20(k)
The model thus presupposes that neither compulsion nor use alone violates
the self-incrimination proscription.8 6
By assessing the extent of compulsion, the model generates a prediction
for the relative quantity of permitted prosecutorial use. Because the
equation has only two variables, assessment of the compulsion value will
readily produce a measure of permitted prosecutorial use. The higher the
use value, the less self-incrimination protection afforded the statement.
For purposes of the applications to follow, the numerical options for the
nature component of compulsion range from zero to ten. Automaticity and
legitimacy each range from zero to five. Before applying the model, the
choice to include numerical values needs both an explanation and an
acknowledgement. Numbers are a valuable tool in assessing the validity of
the models. If no set of numerical values could be envisioned that fit the
models, the models would not be viable. Developing these models alerted
the author that versions without a numerical component (earlier versions of
the ones described here) could engender extravagant claims about their
abilities. Once numbers were inserted, limitations speedily surfaced.
Numerical values inhibit the advancement of unprovable claims and force
a certain precision in thinking." 7 The primary disadvantage of including
numbers, however, is the process of selecting particular numerical values.
The process proved, if not arbitrary, at least culturally relative, as discussed
284. For a discussion of this view of the Self-Incrimination Clause, see infra notes 391-93 and
accompanying text. To suggest that no Self-Incrimination Clause violation has transpired is not to
suggest that no due process violation has occurred.
285. An interesting subsidiary question is raised by the mathematical expression of the model:
Should the ideal case result in equality? Would that compose a utilitarian best use of resources? These
issues are not within the scope of this Article.
286. Consider the Court's dicta in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)
("Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that [self-
incrimination] right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial."). See also infra notes 391-93 and
accompanying text.
287. They reduce (but do not eliminate) the margin of discretion.
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in the critique in Part IV below." For those readers who find the
assignment of any numerical value jarring or who disagree with the
particular values selected, disregarding the numbers entirely or objecting to
particular numerical values selected should not preclude an evaluation of
the validity of the models' underlying premises, so long as some set of
numbers does exist that demonstrates the mathematical integrity of the
models.
2. The Model as an Explanation of Existing Doctrine
(a) Tier One-Legally Authorized Contempt Compulsion
Under current doctrine, statements compelled by formal immunity grants,
where compulsion consists of the threat of contempt, generally receive the
most exacting scrutiny.289 The Supreme Court held in Counselman that
speakers of these statements deserved total amnesty from prosecution.29
Many decades passed before the Court even permitted prosecution of the
speaker with independently obtained evidence.29" ' Analysis of these
statements began at the top of the protection spectrum, with challenges to
whether such statements could be compelled at all. Consequently,
concessions regarding the scope of protection came slowly and cautiously.
Before the accused looms the quintessential self-incrimination
trilemma-self-accusation, perjury, or contempt.292 This is the form of
compulsion for which Justice Stewart declared balancing impermissible,
characterizing compulsion under threat of contempt as "pristine."293
Compulsion through immunity still consistently triggers the highest levels
of scrutiny even though courts do not agree on precisely where within that
288. For a critique of the subjectivity of the numbers, see infra notes 397-98 and accompanying
text.
289. See, e.g., Risks, supra note 3, at 646-53; United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.),
modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991).
290. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
291. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441 (1972).
292. Preventing an individual from being subjected to the "cruel trilemma!'is considered one of the
"fundamental values" of the Self-Incrimination Clause. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 ("The privilege against
self-incrimination ... reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or
contempt....").
293. Portash, 440 U.S. at 459.
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declared range the protection should fall.294
Does the compulsion model explain the result under the actual doctrine?
Application of the model begins with assessment of the compulsion
variable. The model evaluates the three components of the compulsion
variable: nature, automaticity, and legitimacy. In Tier One, the penalty for
refusal to comply with the interrogator's requests is contempt of court and
jail. The nature of this compulsion is harsh and exacting. The nature
component merits an elevated value for its severity. Incarceration, though
extremely severe, ranks for purposes of the models as less severe than
physical violence or death, and thus merits a value approaching but not at
the maximum for the model.295 For our purposes then, incarceration
receives a nature component value of nine out of ten.296
With respect to automaticity, the mere refusal to comply with a
compulsion order of this type serves as the trigger for a contempt
proceeding and subsequent invocation by the executive authority of
incarceration to enforce its compulsion order. Because mere refusal to
answer, silence, achieves the threshold for imposition of the penalty, the
penalty is swift, if not automatic, in execution. This contempt compulsion
is, then, both severe in its nature and precipitate in its exaction. Compulsion
enforced by a penalty that follows almost inevitably and formally on the
refusal to comply invites insertion of a high value for automaticity. In the
range of zero to five, contempt compulsion garners a five for automaticity.
To these two components, we add a measure of the legitimacy of
contempt compulsion. Measuring legitimacy requires an assessment of both
the authorized process and the deliberateness of the immunity grant.
294. Compare North, 910 F.2d at 872 (requiring that the "inquiry must proceed witness-by-witness;
if necessary it will proceed line-by-line and item-by-item") with United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524,
1529 (1Ith Cir. 1985) ("The government is not required to negate all abstract 'possibility' of taint.').
See also Risks, supra note 3, at 645-53 (discussing the distinctious in protection of, inter alia, North
and Byrd).
295. This evaluation of the severity of compulsion is a relative and difficult one, generally
producing highly culturally contingent results. See infra notes 397-98 and accompanying text.
296. For convenient reference, the table of values below represents the values under the compulsion
model for all three tiers.
Tier # Nature Automaticity Legitimacy Compulsion Use
Tier One 9 5 5 19 1
Tier Two 7 3 0 10 I 10
Tier Three 2 1 2.5 5.5 14.5
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Compulsion in Tier One is often authorized through explicit statutory
enactment, like the OCCA, which contemplates deliberate action to secure
authorization under the pertinent empowering provisions.297 Authority to
engage in this compulsion is also often explicitly limited by statute. Thus,
a formal set of controls and procedures generally governs permission to
engage in this compulsion. Compulsion that is regarded as legally
authorized or "proper" receives the greatest protection against prosecutorial
use for the first measure of legitimacy. Because an official, broad, and
documented promise of nonuse precedes the questioning, the second factor
of legitimacy, an assurance of nonuse prior to questioning, is also satisfied.
Contempt compulsion receives a maximum value in legitimacy currency,
two and one-half units for authorization and two and one-half units for
prior assurance of nonuse, totaling five units.
The following represents the mathematical expression of the compulsion
value for Tier One compulsion:
9(Nature) + 5(Automaticity) + 5(Legitimacy) = 19(Compulsion)
Substituting the value of compulsion into the compulsion model produces:
19(C) + (U) __ 20(k)
The calculation of the compulsion variable enables rapid assessment of the
extent of permitted prosecutorial use. If prosecutorial use exceeds one unit,
the government violates the speaker's self-incrimination right. One unit of
use on a scale of one to twenty, ranging from no use to case-in-chief
evidentiary use, is quite minimal in current use doctrine terminology.
The minimal value assessed for prosecutorial use describes, with at least
relative concurrence, the first tier of protection that the Supreme Court has
historically afforded, and a number of lower courts currently afford,
compelled statements of the Tier One type. With the components of
compulsion in the model at or close to their relative maxima, contempt
compulsion, both in the model and in the doctrine the model is designed
to explain, secures close to the maximum measure of protection against
prosecutorial use. If the prosecution exceeds this minimal level of use, the
prosecution has violated the Fifth Amendment. Retrial, absent the offending
use, is available to the prosecution if the impermissible use has not fatally
tainted the evidence necessary to sustain a conviction.29 When the
prohibited use cannot be eliminated or sanitized, retrial becomes infeasible.
297. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988).
298. This Article does not explore the potential application ofthe harmless error doctrine as recently
modified in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
[VOL. 72:1603
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss4/5
FIFTH AMENDMENT COMPELLED STATEMENTS
(b) Tier Two-Traditional Coerced Confession Compulsion
Protection in the next tier of the model results from compulsion of a
different order. The Court has traditionally afforded less protection to
statements compelled with violence or threats of immediate violence by law
enforcement officers than to statements compelled by immunity grants,
even though many would deem this compulsion more repugnant than
contempt of court. From the time of Brain in the late 1800s, the Court has
never held that the compulsion of a confession by the "constable's blunder"
prohibited per se prosecution of the speaker.299 The Court began its
treatment of these statements with excision, not preclusion, as the
recourse.3" Although direct evidentiary use is prohibited in this tier of
the protection spectrum,3"' and the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine
and associated limiting principles may operate to prevent the admission of
most evidence derived from the coerced statements,3"2 incidental advan-
tages accruing from nonevidentiary use have not been condemned.3 3 The
battle now underway between circuits in Tier One cases regarding the
permissibility of nonevidentiary use"' appears either to have been lost or
not to have been waged with regard to coerced statements, because
nonevidentiary use is the norm in coerced confession cases. Thus, with this
form of compulsion, the scope of protection historically afforded is more
moderate than that afforded in the Tier One immunity sphere.30 5
Compulsion in this tier ranges from promises of lenity to physical
violence. The nature of compulsion in this sphere thus varies, from the
relatively mild to the extremely severe.30 6 Like the doctrine it seeks to
299. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 189 (1953) ("This Court never has decided that reception
of a confession into evidence, even if we held it to be coerced, requires an acquittal or discharge of a
defendant."), overruled on other grounds by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
300. Brai v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
301. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
302. "The Supreme Court has not expressly stated that the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine
applies to coerced confessions, but it is assumed that it does." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 278 (1991)(footnote omitted).
303. "Use preclusion in coerced confession cases only prohibits direct and derivative evidentiary
use. Prosecutorial knowledge of illegally extracted information and nonevidentiary use are not
prohibited." Strachan, supra note 19, at 831. 1 do not, however, mean to suggest that the permissibility
of nonevidentiary use in this tier has gone uncriticized. See, e.g., id.
304. See Risks, supra note 3, at 647-53 (outlining different interpretations of the permissibility of
nonevidentionary use).
305. Id. at 653-56.
306. For a critique of the subjectivity of the values, see infra notes 397-98 and accompanying text.
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clarify,30 7 the model selects one value for the nature component represent-
ing the entire tier, rather than a particularized value for the circumstances
of each case. The value assigned to the nature of compulsion is a relative
average over the range of types of compulsion in this tier. On the nature
of compulsion scale from zero to ten, the severity of the penalties ranges
from one to ten. A suggestion of leniency3 8 falls in the lower range and
violent physical assault attains the maximum of ten.
That threats of physical violence or death achieve the rating of greatest
severity, although culturally relative, is consistent with the fundamental
criminal law principle of duress. In criminal law, criminal conduct is
excused if the compulsion to engage in the criminal conduct meets the legal
definition of duress. 3 9 To qualify as duress, the threat facing the actor
generally must entail danger to life or threat of serious bodily injury.3"'
Criminal law excuses from criminal culpability those who act in response
to this level of threat. Similarly, the model assigns this level of threat or
violence the highest value on the severity of compulsion scale. But the
greater variability in the nature of compulsion results in a lower average
value for compulsion in this tier. The inclusion of the most severe penalty
in this range, physical violence endangering life, weights the average
toward the upper end of the range. However, commentators explain that
"there does seem to be general agreement that the forms of [compulsion]
have become less extreme, in that the use of overt physical violence has
307. The Supreme Court's definition of voluntariness has incorporated both positive inducements
and negative threats and punishment.
[T]he constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of state officers ... was shocking, but
whether the confession was "free and voluntary: that is, [it] must not be extracted by any sort
of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by
the exertion of any improper influence."... We have held inadmissible even a confession
secured by so mild a whip as the refusal, under certain circumstances, to allow a suspect to
call his wife until he confessed.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (citations omitted). But see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279
(1991); supra note 56.
308. The model's assignment of a lesser value for promises of lenity maybe read as consistent with
the Court's greater reluctance recently to recognize promises as meeting the requisite compulsion
threshold. See supra note 56 and sources cited therein discussing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279
(1991).
309. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(6) (West 1994) ("Persons (unless the crime be punishable
with death) who committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient
to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they
refused .. "). For an argument that a "pattern of excuse runs through a great deal of Fifth Amendment
law," see Stuntz, supra note 274, at 1228.
310. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(6) (West 1994).
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largely given way to the employment of more subtle kinds of pres-
sure."31' Accordingly, the value assigned the nature of compulsion, on
average, merits perhaps a seven on the scale of one to ten.
312
Similar to the variability in the nature of the compulsion component, the
automaticity of infliction of punishment for failure to respond also varies
widely in Tier Two, from immediate to nonexistent. Failure to respond to
the interrogator's questions, silence, may or may not spawn infliction of the
threatened penalty. Due to the range for the automaticity component, its
average value falls near the middle of its scale, perhaps a three in a range
of zero to five.
Finally, this form of compulsion enjoys none of the authorized status of
its immunity cousins. Rather, the exercise of compulsion in this tier can
form the basis of a civil rights suit against the compelling party. 3 Nor
does this compulsion contemplate an official assurance of nonuse prior to
questioning.314 To the contrary, in large measure the compulsion is
designed to elicit admissions to be used against the speaker at a criminal
trial. On the scale of zero to five, its legitimacy value is zero. Combining
the values of the three components of Tier Two compulsion produces:
7(Nature) + 3(Automaticity) + O(Legitimacy) = 10(Compulsion)
Inserting the compulsion value into the compulsion model yields:
10(C) + U ___20
Pursuant to the model, Tier Two permits up to ten units of use, a
substantially greater measure than the one unit available in Tier One. Ten
units probably contemplates the full range of nonevidentiary possibilities,
however ultimately defined, as well as derivative evidentiary use that meets
the attenuation or inevitable discovery principles. Correspondingly, the
model predicts a much diminished level of protection for Tier Two
311. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 33, at 292. See also LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT xiii (2d ed. 1986) ("The Court should also realize that law enforcement agencies rarely
today engage in third degree tactics.").
312. For a critique of the assignment of values, see infra notes 397-98 and accompanying text.
313. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 470-71 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(mentioning the possibility of suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
314. Protection in this tier is self-executing, requiring neither statutory enactment nor deliberate
decisionmaking by government officials. Automatic protection for the compelled statements may still
require a threshold showing by the compelled speaker that, in fact, she suffered from some variation
of recognized compulsion. However, the speaker need voice no objection to the interrogation at its
inception or throughout its duration to later invoke a prohibition against use.
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statements. The characterization of compulsion in Tier Two as animating
this moderate protection of coerced confessions corresponds roughly to the
class of cases and inferences drawn from them that the Supreme Court"'
and lower courts have ascribed to this category, permitting prosecutors wide
latitude in nonevidentiary uses and some derivative evidentiary use." 6
(c) Tier Three-Choice-of-Rights Compulsion
Tier Three characterizes the compulsion inherent in Simmons. In the
Simmons circumstance, the defendant may opt for silence without incurring
the penalties present in Tiers One and Two. But the silence may be costly.
Exercise of the privilege may result in an inability to satisfy the criteria of
standing and preclude advancement of a claim that items to be used against
the defendant were seized unreasonably in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. However, the choice required here is not dissimilar to that
faced at various junctures in the criminal justice process. For example, this
choice resembles the one the defendant must make when deciding whether
to testify in his own defense during trial. The right to testify weighs against
the right to silence.3"7 The accused must choose. The nature of compul-
sion in Tier Three is a choice between the exercise of competing constitu-
tional rights: sufficient compulsion to meet the self-incrimination threshold,
but not in the range of violence or incarceration. Accordingly, this
borderline compulsion, similar to choices that fail to meet the threshold of
compulsion recognized by the Self-Incrimination Clause, merits a low value
on the nature of compulsion scale, perhaps a value of two units.
To this, the model adds a value for the automaticity of infliction of the
315. The Supreme Court itself has neither employed the nonevidentiary use terminology nor probed
any explicit limitations on nonevidentiary use in its scope cases. The conclusion drawn here is a logical
inference from the evolution of the doctrine and its application by lower courts. Similarly, the fruit-of-
the-poisonous-tree doctrine with its associated limiting principles is presumed to apply. See DRESSLER,
supra note 302, at 278.
316. See Risks. supra note 3, at 653-56.
317. One commentator has noted:
There are numerous situations in our adversary system where tensions arise between the
exercise of different constitutional rights. The most common of these situations is the choice
put to a criminal defendant either to remain silent and assert his privilege against self-
incrimination or to testify and assert his due process right to be heard. No one would contend
that a criminal defendant may not be put to such a choice.
Stein, supra note 19, at 674.
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penalty.318 Here the penalty for silence is indirect,319 potential loss of the
suppression motion, rather than incarceration or insistent interrogation, or
bullying, or even promises of lenity as inducements. Exercise of the option
of silence results in no automatic and direct penalty by the government.
The penalty is an indirect result of the choice of silence.320 Thus, the
automaticity value is very low. On the scale of zero to five, automaticity
rates perhaps one unit.
Third, the model requires an assessment of legitimacy. Simmons
compulsion is a function of a legally authorized process, the orderly
proceeding of a suppression hearing prior to trial, deserving of two and
one-half units for this first of two aspects of legitimacy. The second aspect
of legitimacy is a measure of deliberateness-did a promise of nonuse
precede the questioning? Since Simmons immunity is triggered by the
defendant's decision to testify, deliberateness by an entity with immunity-
conferring power is absent.321 The immunity attaches automatically with
318. Unlike Tier One, but similar to Tier Two, protection in "choice-of-rights" compulsion is self-
executing. It attaches without need for explicit assertion of the right against self-incrimination. Self-
execution, however, does not absolve the speaker or her representative from a threshold showing that
choice-of-rights compulsion was implicated in the obtaining of the statements, and an objection to the
use of those statements.
319. See Stein, supra note 19, at 677 ("In Simmons, on the other hand, the penalty on the privilege
was imposed indirectly through the operation of the normal criminal procedure."). Stein ultimately
rejects the direct-indirect distinction. Id. at 689.
320. In distinguishing the circumstances of Simmons from those of "compelled testimony cases,"
a pair of commentators noted:
[T]hough defendants have a constitutional right to testify in both suppression and revocation
proceedings, they retain the absolute right to stand silent at such proceedings. This situation
is quite different from the nondiscretionary compulsion to testify provided by new immunity
statutes. While harm to a defendant may in fact flow from his decision not to testify at a
suppression hearing, or even at a probation revocation hearing, he still has other rights on
which to rely, most notably the government's burden of affirmatively proving guilt. In
contrast, refusal to testify under a statute which allows the compulsion of testimony upon the
grant of immunity can subject a witness to imprisonment A compulsory statute that cuts more
drastically into the right against self-incrimination would seem to warrant a greater extension
of immunity than that condoned in the non-compulsory setting[] of... Simmons.
Jeffrey M. Feldman & Stuart A. Ollanik, Compelling Testimony in Alaska: The Coming Rejection of
Use and Derivative Use Immunity, 3 ALAsKA L. REV. 229, 245 (1986) (footnote omitted). The authors
contended that the Alaska Supreme Court would probably reject the then-new use immunity statute in
effect in Alaska, resulting in a return to transactional immunity. Id, While I would characterize the
Simmons circumstance as minimally compulsory, the quoted authors' position that differing levels of
protection should accompany different types of statements is consistent with Supreme Court doctrine
and the models proposed in this Article.
321. Although the power to protect these statements does reside with the judiciary, control over the
receipt of the immunity rests with the defendant or his counsel.
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the choice to testify; therefore, there is no addition for any deliberate choice
to confer immunity in a particular case. The legitimacy value remains at
two and one-half units. Combining the values of each of the three
components produces:
2(Nature) + 1(Automaticity) + 2.5(Legitimacy) = 5.5(Compulsion)
Inserting the compulsion value into the model yields:
5.5(C) + U _< 20
Thus, the prosecution may exercise up to fourteen and one-half units of
use before a self-incrimination violation accrues. This value affords
prosecutors substantial latitude on the current scale. Fourteen and one-half
units superimposed on current use doctrine probably contemplates not only
the full panoply of nonevidentiary uses and derivative evidentiary use under
principles of attenuation and inevitable discovery, but almost certainly
includes a measure of direct evidentiary use. Evidentiary use in the form
of impeachment would probably be consistent with a value of fourteen and
one-half units. The model's prediction accords roughly with the measure
of use that current doctrine allocates to Tier Three statements:
nonevidentiary use is the norm, and direct evidentiary use in the form of
impeachment remains at least an open question. Here, where the Court
seems to perceive the accused's utterances as barely or quasi-compelled,
both the Court and the model sculpt a miserly realm of protection.
Although the specific figures chosen above are somewhat arbitrary, the
insertion of numerical values illustrates the inverse correlation posited by
the model-that greater compulsion results in less permitted use. Since U
represents the scope of protection, when U is a low number, little use is
permitted and protection is consequently higher. When U is a high number,
much greater use is permitted and protection is correspondingly diminished.
The compulsion model then provides a framework for understanding the
three basic tiers of protection that result from different degrees or types of
compulsion. By articulating a guiding principle, the model is useful for
both explaining the disparities in existing doctrine and forecasting and
evaluating future self-incrimination circumstances. But compulsion is not
the only principle through which existing doctrine can be understood or
clarified. The next section proposes a second method for explaining the
database of existing scope cases.
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C. The Balancing Model322
1. The Model Described
The balancing model weighs the pertinent governmental interests against
the speaker's privilege against self-incrimination. Unlike the compulsion
model, which selects one primary variable as the controlling principle, the
balancing model weighs a number of variables in determining the relative
level of protection. In particular, the balancing model incorporates
322. Discussions of balancing in the larger context of qualifying for self-incrimination protection
are not uncommon. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 274, at 1237 ("The real challenge is to explain why
the balances are struck as they are in particular cases, and to do so in a way that allows one to assess,
at least in broad terms, whether the doctrine is internally coherent. It may be that this challenge simply
cannot be met-that unstructured balancing is the best we can do in explaining fifth amendment
law-but if we can do better, we should.'); Lisa Tarallo, Note, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination: The Time Has Come for the United States Supreme Court to End Its Silence on the
Rationale Behind the Contemporary Application of the Privilege, 27 NEw ENG. L. REV. 137, 185 (1992)
(advocating explicit recognition and adoption of a balancing approach, outside criminal matters, for self-
incrimination cases, and claiming that "the balancing approach should be applied outside the criminal
sphere where, although the individual has interests in protecting himself from compelled self-
incrimination, the government also has a legitimate goal (separate from any criminal objectives) to
obtain the sought after information"); Herman, supra note 19, at 503 ("[I]n administering the various
functions of the privilege, the Court ordinarily does not balance the government's interest in obtaining
information against the individual's interest in avoiding compulsion. Whether a case involves the
admissibility of a compelled statement in a criminal proceeding or a witness's effort to avoid a sanction
for nondisclosure, the Court normally ignores the government's interest in obtaining information.").
Professor Herman argues that its refusal to balance results from its belief "that the tension between
governmental and individual interest can best be adjusted by use of immunity." Herman, supra note 19,
at 504-05.
The Court, in its plurality opinion in Byers, explicitly used a balancing construct. See supra notes
115-21 and accompanying text. A balancing approach also featured prominently in Justice Harlan's
dissent in two compulsion cases in 1967. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 507 (1967) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) ("The validity of a consequence depends both upon the hazards, if any, it presents to the
integrity of the privilege and upon the urgency of the public interest it is designed to protect."); Spevack
v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 525 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (advocating the "select[ion of] the rule or
standard most appropriate for the hazards and characteristics of each consequence"). For additional
discussions of balancing in the Court's determination of which statements reach the Fifth Amendment
threshold and qualify for protection, see LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 33, at 433; Larry J. Ritchie,
Compulsion That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MtNN. L. REV. 383,
407, 414-15 (1977); Stein, supra note 19, at 676; and Jessica Wilen Berg, Note, Give Me Liberty or
Give Me Silence: Taking a Stand on Fifth Amendment Implications for Court-Ordered Therapy
Programs, 79 COiELL L. REv. 700, 702-03 (1994) (proposing "that a state's legitimate interest in
compelling testimony for reasons other than amassing evidence for a criminal prosecution should be
balanced against the defendant's interest in asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege," to determine
whether Fifth Amendment protection should be available to the speaker).
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flexibility on the government interest side of the expression that was
unavailable in the compulsion model. In addition to the primary compulsion
variable and the use variable, previously present on the left side of the
compulsion model relation, the right side of the balancing model relation
now consists of two new variables and a constant.
The constant on the right side of the relation is best characterized as it
is in the compulsion model as an overarching governmental interest in the
detection and prosecution of criminal conduct. Prohibitions or limitations
on use of compelled statements can jeopardize the government's ability to
uncover and punish criminal conduct. The value assigned this constant
remains the same in the balancing model as it was in the compulsion
model-a value of twenty. Using the same value for the constant facilitates
comparison of the results of the models.
However, this primary governmental interest may be particularly
endangered by certain circumstances, circumstances not adequately
comprehended or accounted for in the compulsion model. For example, the
identity of the person or entity granting immunity affects the ability of the
government to satisfy its primary interest in the immunity context.3"
When the prosecuting entity controls the decision of whether to compel and
the timing of the compulsion order, the risk of impeding the detection and
prosecution of crime is lowest. In contrast, where the prosecution does not
control the grant of immunity, the risk of irremediable damage to the
government's interest in the detection and prosecution of crime is
heightened. 24 The circumstances of Oliver North's criminal prosecution
offer a notable example of the problems that may confront the prosecution
when control of the decision to confer immunity rests elsewhere than with
the prosecutors.3" This risk bears directly upon the prosecution's ability
323. The concern with the identity of the immunity giver reflects in part the repeated emphasis of
the Court, at least in the context of the federal immunity statute, on prosecutorial or executive control
over the immunity grant. "No court has authority to immunize a witness. That responsibility, as we have
noted, is peculiarly an executive one... :'Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). "Use
immunity was intended to immunize and exclude from a subsequent criminal trial only that information
to which the Government expressly has surrendered future use." Id. at 260.
324. For a Ninth Circuit opinion explicitly acknowledging the risk to a criminal prosecution when
the immunity derives from colleague police officers, see United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1431-35
(9th Cir. 1994), discussed more fully infra note 442.
325. Although Congress apparently anticipated that its investigation would not preempt the criminal
prosecution of Oliver North, its grant of immunity, coupled with the strict appellate definition of use,
tolled the death knell for that prosecution. United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300, 304 (D.D.C.
1988) (noting that Congress "did not intend to prevent the prosecution," and that prior to taking the
immunized testimony, Congress' "own legal staff analyzed the evidence already developed ... to
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to pursue the immunized accused wrongdoer.326 The balancing model
accommodates the phenomenon of risk by adding a risk variable (R) to the
government constant. When control over the decision to confer immunity
to the speaker rests with the prosecution, additional risk approaches zero.
When control over the immunity grant shifts from the prosecution to other
actors, the model increases the value assigned to the risk variable, ranging
on a scale of zero to two.3 27
In addition to a small increment for risk to the primary government
interest constant, the balancing model anticipates, in certain circumstances,
potential augmentation on the government side of the mathematical
expression through addition of interests other than the primary interest in
the detection and prosecution of crime. For example, a respect for
federalism might enhance the value on the government side of the
expression in much the way a respect for federalism motivated the Court
to permit use rather than transactional immunity for prosecutions initiated
by a sovereign other than the one that conferred immunity.328 Supplemen-
demonstrate ... that ample proof of the principal crimes ... already existed"). The citation here is to
the 1988 Poindexter opinion because at that time the North and Poindexter cases were still joined. The
convictions in both cases were subsequently reversed and/or vacated. United States v. North, 910 F.2d
843 (D.C. Cir.), modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992). Following the appellate court's definition of use,
the trial court commented: "You must realize that there is a very slight possibility that the ablest group
of lawyers in the world could meet the standard of the court of appeals .... I don't believe there's
anyone I know of who could." David Johnston, North's Judge Doubts Verdict Will Stand Up, N.Y.
TIMES, June 15, 1991, at Al. Prior to Congress' grant of immunity, Independent Counsel Walsh had
written a memo to Congress including the following: "Any grant of use and derivative use immunity
would create serious-and perhaps insurmountable-barriers to the prosecution of the immunized
witness." Memorandum of the Independent Counsel Concerning Use Immunity 1 (Jan. 13, 1987)
(submitted to the Joint Congressional Iran/Contra Committees), cited in North, 910 F.2d at 863.
Ultimately, Walsh informed the court that "the government is not likely, in the unique circumstances
here presented, to be able to sustain a successful outcome." Haynes Johnson & Tracy Thompson, North
Charges Dismissed at Request of Prosecutor, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1991, at At.
326. The governmental interests do not include, as the doctrine they model does not include,
assessment of the government's particular need for the compelled statement in a given case.
327. The limited range accorded this factor allows only a modest adjustment or fine-tuning of the
values in the balancing model. The limitations on the range of this variable largely stem from
maintaining the constant at a stable value of twenty in both models to facilitate a comparative analysis.
If the models had been developed independently of each other, then the range for this variable might
have been greater.
328. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be compelled to give
testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and
its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal
prosecution against him. We conclude, moreover, that in order to implement this constitutional
rule and accommodate the interests of the State and Federal Governments in investigating and
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tary interests, however, reach more substantial values, perhaps up to ten
units, when the interest derives from a "regulatory regime" '329 distinct
from criminal investigation and prosecution. The paradigm example arises
in the context of custodial duties. Certain entities or persons, including
corporations, are subject to governmental rights of inspection.33 This
supplementary governmental interest in the right of inspection in this
regulatory context serves to augment the government interest side of the
expression and, consequently, to limit the scope of protection available to
custodians of such entities.
The government side of the expression in the balancing model then has
one constant and two variables, the primary government interest constant
(G), a risk variable (R), and a supplementary interest variable (S). At this
stage, a mathematical expression may enhance explanation of the balancing
model.
C+U_<G+R+S
The left side of the expression largely represents harm to the privilege
against self-incrimination of the accused. This harm is measured as
compulsion plus use and calculated exactly as in the compulsion model.
When this harm is less than or equal to the primary government interest in
the detection and prosecution of crime (G) plus any increment for risk to
that government interest (R) plus enhancement by separate, pertinent
government interests (S), no self-incrimination violation occurs. When,
however, the sum of compulsion plus use is greater than the sum of the
government interest, the risk to that interest, and any boost provided by an
interest separate from that in the prosecution and detection of crime, the
speaker's self-incrimination right is violated.
prosecuting crime, the Federal Government must be prohibited from making any such use of
compelled testimony and its fiuits.
Id. at 79. Although the cited passage indicates that the government interests in question are those of
investigating and prosecuting crime, these are interests belonging to each of the two sovereigns.
Transactional immunity would satisfy the constitutional rule if not for the federalism concern. It is the
separate interest in federalism that induces the Court to fashion the use immunity compromise. I use
the term federalism to refer to truncating the rights or abilities of another sovereign, either federal or
state. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 463-64 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
329. Baltimore Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556 (1990).
330. "[T]he corporation 'is a creature of the State,' with powers limited by the State. As such, the
State may, in its exercise of the right to oversee the corporation, demand the production of corporate
records." Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988) (citations omitted).
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2. The Model as an Explanation of Existing Doctrine
Under existing doctrine, compelled statements protected by formal grants
of immunity-Tier One statements-stand at the zenith of the protection
spectrum. In the balancing model, these statements earn their extensive use
immunity protection through a weighing of the speaker's privilege against
competing governmental interests. On the speaker's side of the balance,
exercise of the privilege, refusal to answer the interrogator's inquiries, in
the face of immunity incurs a direct, legally authorized, and relatively
automatic penalty, contempt and jail, the heaviest legally sanctioned penalty
for refusal to answer. In these circumstances, compulsion is at an extremely
elevated value, a value of nineteen-the same value as in the compulsion
model.
Opposing this direct and formidable tax on the exercise of the privilege
is the governmental interest in the detection and prosecution of crime, a
constant. From that constant, the balancing model permits addition of risk
not adequately accounted for in the compulsion model. The dominant risk
lies in the identity of the immunity giver. In a Tier One circumstance where
the immunity decision rests with the prosecution, the risk value is zero. In
addition to risk, the balancing model also takes into account separate
governmental interests, like federalism. Unless the conferring and
prosecuting authorities represent different sovereigns, or other supplementa-
ry government interests are present, this "S" value in the posited Tier One
example is zero.
When the conferring and prosecuting authority are the same, the Tier
One balancing model expression yields:
19(C) + (U) < 20(G) + 0(R) + 0(S)
In this illustration of Tier One balancing, when none to minimal use is
made of the compelled statement, no violation of the speaker's self-
incrimination right occurs. 33' As Justice Marshall argued in his dissent in
331. For convenience, the following table supplies the values for the balancing model in each tier:
Tier # Nature Auto. Legit. Comp. Risk Supp. Use
Int.
Tier 1 9 5 5 19 0 0 1
Tier 1+ 9 5 5 19 1 0 2
Tier 2 7 3 0 10 1 0 1
Tier 3 2 1 2.5 5.5 2 0 16.5
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Kastigar, "because an immunity statute operates in advance of the
interrogation, there is room to require a broad grant of. . . immunity
without imperiling large numbers of otherwise valid convictions. '332
Thus, in this situation, the balancing model reduces to the compulsion
model, because none of the distinguishing components of the balancing
model is active.
However, the power to grant immunity is not limited to prosecutors. The
OCCA clearly contemplates that additional authorities will grant immuni-
ty.333 When, under the OCCA, Congress or an administrative agency
invokes the immunity-granting power, risk to the primary government
interest claims a value above zero, at least one unit. The expression then
becomes:
19(C) + (U) < 20(G) + 1(R) + 0(S)
The addition of a unit of risk supports a use value one unit higher than in
the first Tier One balancing equation.
Although the petitions for certiorari in both North and Poindexter
brought the Court the opportunity to address the scope of congressionally
supplied immunity, the Court denied both petitions.334 The Supreme
Court has not specifically addressed, therefore, the question of whether the
scope of permitted use varies when Congress or an administrative agency
is the immunity giver under the OCCA. The result suggested by the model
arguably differs from the actual result of the North and Poindexter circuit
tribunals. The majority on the panels in both of those cases indicated that
any use would be scrutinized vigorously.3 5 Translated into the terminolo-
gy of the models, the North and Poindexter panels probably reach a result
more closely approximating the result in the compulsion model, a value not
exceeding one unit of use. Because the Court declined to resolve the
question, the balancing model posits a measure of use arguably more
generous than that permitted by the circuit courts in North and Poindexter.
Nonetheless, the balancing model still supports a high level of protection
for statements compelled by formal prosecutorial grants of immunity, and
332. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall was referring to
transactional immunity. Id.
333. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1988). In particular, the OCCA contemplates immunity grants by
Congress, its committees, and various administrative agencies. Id.
334. United States v. North, 500 U.S. 941 (1991); United States v. Poindexter, 113 S. Ct. 656
(1992).
335. See Risks, supra note 3, at 646-53.
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a slightly reduced level for those compelled by Congress or administrative
agencies within Tier One. As the mathematical expressions illustrate,
however, the measure of use between the compulsion and balancing models
does not vary substantially for these Tier One examples. Both models
provide at least substantial protection against use, consistent with the
limited guidance of Supreme Court doctrine.
Weighing the same factors in Tier Two results in a lesser measure of
protection for statements compelled by the overzealous interrogator with no
formal legal authority to grant immunity. As in the compulsion model,
nature, automaticity, and legitimacy sum to ten units.336 Weighed against
the uncertain, but potentially grave, illegitimate penalty for exercise of the
privilege, is the cost of protection for these compelled statements to the
government's ability to detect and prosecute criminal conduct. In Tier Two,
as Justice Marshall explained in his dissent in Kastigar, "the decision to
question... is often made in haste, under pressure, by an officer who is
not a lawyer." '337 Because the immunity giver is not a prosecutorial actor,
the risk to the governmental interest in detection and prosecution is greater
than when the immunity decision rests with the prosecution. Under a
balancing rationale, consistent with Justice Marshall's observation, we
charge a higher price for a prosecuting lawyer's decision to confer
immunity than for the same decision made by a police actor. A portion of
the price, that for haste versus deliberateness, was tabulated within the
compulsion legitimacy variable. Greater legitimacy and greater protection
accompanied statements procured through a deliberate choice to confer
immunity.
But the compulsion model did not adequately comprehend the additional
risk of a nonprosecutorial actor conferring the immunity. Risk to the
government interest in this context is elevated, receiving one of the
available two units. The risk rises only a single unit because on the relative
scale of zero to two, the greatest risk to prosecutorial interests derives from
immunity givers whose goals are directly antagonistic to those of the
prosecution. The police, however, generally pursue goals similar to those
of the prosecution, and the prosecution can have some influence over police
procedure when both agencies' goals coincide. The supplementary
336. See supra notes 306-14 and accompanying text for the calculation of the values on the
speaker's side. Unlike the compulsion in Tier One, which is legally authorized, some measure of
remedial action for improper compulsion may reside in civil rights actions against the offending law
enforcement officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
337. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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governmental interest value in this particular example is zero. In the
paradigm Tier Two case, the balancing model yields:
10(C) + (U) <920(G) + I(R) + 0(S)
Permitted prosecutorial use is eleven units, one unit greater than in the
compulsion model. As in the compulsion model, eleven units of use should
encompass the full range of nonevidentiary use and derivative evidentiary
use-through attenuation and inevitable discovery-and roughly corre-
sponds to the treatment of Tier Two statements by the limited Supreme
Court doctrinal guidance and by the practice of lower courts.33
In Tier Three, choice-of-rights compulsion merits the lowest figure on
the compulsion scale. As in the compulsion model, the compulsion value
is five and one-half units.339 On the government's side of the expression,
risk triggered by the defendant's decision to testify poses the greatest
hazard, of the three tiers, to the government's interest in the detection and
prosecution of crime. While the prosecution may assert some influence or
indirect control over Congress' decision to grant immunity or over police
policy regarding interrogation of suspects, the defendant has every incentive
to frustrate prosecutorial goals. As a result, the risk value in the Tier Three
circumstance reaches the top of its range, receiving a value of two units.
Again, assuming an absence of federalism or other supplementary interests,
the supplementary government interest value is zero. The Tier Three
balancing relation follows:
5.5(C) + (U) < 20(G) + 2(R) + 0(S)
Use achieves a value of sixteen and one-half units. Use, therefore, bows to
few restrictions. Nonevidentiary use is the norm. In addition, derivative
evidentiary use through attenuation and inevitable discovery, and even
direct evidentiary use for impeachment purposes appears encompassed
comfortably within the use value. Tier Three balancing provides a
somewhat greater use value than that of the compulsion model. But, like
the compulsion model, the balancing model furnishes a quantum of
protection roughly commensurate with that of the doctrine it seeks to
explain.
338. See Risk , supra note 3, at 653-56.
339. See supra notes 317-21 and accompanying text for the calculation of this value.
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D. Other Possible Models
In addition to these two primary models, two alternate models merit at
least brief discussion. The first is a case-by-case model. This model rejects
efforts to superimpose any pattern or guiding principle on self-incrimination
doctrine. It permits ad hoc case-by-case evaluation. This model, however,
like the Court's current disparate scope doctrine, impairs our ability to
understand and evaluate the constitutionality of the disparities in scope
cases. And it offers little guidance for the resolution of future cases.
Because it lacks predictive ability, this model fails Hawking's criterion for
a good theory. Understanding, evaluation, and guidance are fundamental for
principled decisionmaking.3 °
In the second alternate model, compelled utterances merit a set, uniform
quantum of protection. In this model, the Self-Incrimination Clause is
unbending and absolute. Compulsion occurs at a given moment and the
scope of protection is fixed and consistent. This view of the Clause is not
without appeal. At least with respect to establishing a uniform level for
Tiers One and Two, it seems to correspond to a number of clues in
Supreme Court text34t and the thinking of at least one prominent com-
mentator on disparate scopes of protection.342 Nor is it difficult to
envision the Supreme Court adopting this model. Adoption, however,
would require a substantial overhaul of existing doctrine because the goal
of a uniform quantum of protection bears little resemblance to existing
Supreme Court treatment of compelled statements.3 43 The model's failure
to explain the existing decision database suggests that it also would fail
340. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
341. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
342. Assistant United States Attorney Humble argues that nonevidentiary use "is beyond the scope
of the fifth amendment privilege." Humble, supra note 14, at 384. "Thus, the fifth amendment allows
the nonevidentiary use of compelled testimony just as it allows nonevidentiary use of coerced
confessions." Id. at 383. Humble explains that "[t]he fifth amendment does not protect immunized
witnesses more than it protects others." Id. at 384. Implicit, if not explicit, in his argument is the
understanding that the Fifth Amendment provides a single, uniform minimum level of protection for
both Tier One and Tier Two statements.
343. To the extent that the Court has never explicitly resolved the nonevidentiary use issue, and in
light of inferences a reader might draw from the analogy and references to coerced confessions and
statutory immunity in Court opinions, one could conclude that, currently, the distinctions between Tier
One and Tier Two statements are illusory. But that conclusion is far from well established and is
inconsistent with the interpretations by many lower courts of statutory immunity. See Risks, supra note
3, at 645-53. Moreover, the merger of Tiers One and Two would still leave the Court's treatment of
Tier Three statements outside the new framework and therefore unexplained.
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Hawking's definition of a good theory. Because this Article focuses on
developing theories which both explain existing Self-Incrimination Clause
doctrine and furnish guidance for principled decisionmaking, exploration
of the fixed-quantum model is not pursued here.
Other models are conceivable. For example, a utility-based theory might
explain the data. Where the least harm accrues to the government interest
in the detection and prosecution of criminal conduct, the model would
afford the greatest protection (a variant of the proposed balancing
model).3 4
In developing the main models of this Article, I do not suggest,
therefore, that the field has been exhausted. Rather, these models are initial
approaches to surfacing patterns in disparate treatment. Both of the primary
models do describe, in large part, existing Supreme Court doctrine on
statements the Court has deemed compelled. Moreover, the models'
component elements stem from reasoned consideration of the factors
composing self-incrimination doctrine rather than arbitrary adjustments to
accommodate individual cases. Thus, the two primary models, subject to
limitations described in Part IV, do substantially fulfill the first criterion of
a good model. They describe a large subset of existing Supreme Court
cases without many arbitrary elements. However, before we apply the
models' forecasting abilities, and confront the second criterion of
Hawking's definition of a good model,345 the significant assumptions and
limitations of the models deserve examination.
IV. CRITIQUING THE MODELS
This Part highlights underlying assumptions and limitations inherent in
the models and their abilities to explicate the pattern of Supreme Court
decisionmaking in the realm of scope doctrine.
A. The Fit
1. Beyond and Between the Three Reference Tiers
Although the models furnish a tolerable fit to the three tiers of protection
doctrine sculpted for our descriptive purposes, close analysis of Supreme
Court doctrine reveals that carving the doctrine into three neat tiers belies
344. For a discussion of another model focused more directly on due process, see infra Part IV.E.
345. Do the models enable us to forecast the appropriate scope of protection in compelled statement
cases where the scope of protection remains to be articulated?
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the complexity and nuances of the existing cases. One unresolved question
is where to include the Braswell evidentiary limitation circumstance. In
Doe,346 the pertinent decision preceding Braswell, the Court clarified that
production of documents in response to a subpoena duces tecum was
entitled to scrutiny similar to that accorded other formally compelled
statements, Tier One protection.347 The Court's choice in Braswell to
provide lesser protection-a strictly evidentiary limitation on the identity
of the custodian complying with the production order-may represent
assignment of dual levels of protection to formally compelled statements
in the unique circumstances of custodial subpoena duces tecum responses.
If Braswell does represent a departure,34 in which tier of the protection
spectrum does the evidentiary limitation fall? Or does it create a new tier?
If this aspect of Braswell refracts a new hue on the protection spectrum,
then it signals a limitation on, at least, the compulsion model. The
compulsion involved in a subpoena duces tecum is the compulsion of Tier
One--contempt and jail for refusal to comply. In the first model, that high
a degree of compulsion should require a very low use value to avoid
violating the Fifth Amendment. But restrictions solely on evidentiary use
suggest a value in the mid-range for the use element. If the use element
falls in the mid-range in the first model, the expression becomes: 19(C) +
10(U) > k(20), and the Braswell Court nuance does not fit within the
compulsion model. The possibility that Braswell creates an exception
demonstrates one of the limits on the model 349-its fit to existing doctrine
may prove a close but not precise match.
Unlike the compulsion model, the balancing model may accommodate
the Braswell evidentiary limitation. While the left side of the expression
remains unchanged from the compulsion model, the Braswell circumstance
embodies a supplementary governmental interest of importance to the Court
and the model. Braswell's production was required as part of his custodial
responsibilities, responsibilities that existed as a result of the State's control
346. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
347. Id. at 616-17. For an analysis of a number of different approaches to the scope of act-of-
production immunity, see Melilli, supra note 227. These approaches focus on whether act-of-production
immunity results in immunizing the contents of the items produced, an issue not specifically addressed
by the models proposed here. On the question of immunizing the contents, see also Robert P. Mosteller,
Simplibing Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV. 1, 40-49 (1987).
348. See supra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
349. The model's limitation might be due in part to the Court's less than precise explication of the
Braswell evidentiary restriction, or the Braswell limitation may simply not be a form of Fifth
Amendment use immunity. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 118 n. 11 (1988).
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over a "state creature," a corporation. The government's regulatory
interest in the corporate records existed outside of the criminal context.
That government interest rates a substantial value, perhaps as high as ten
units, a value that could enable the level of protection the Court assigns the
custodian in Braswell, an evidentiary use limitation.
19(C) + (U) < 20(G) + 0(R) + 10(S)
The balancing model's potential success may be illustrated by applying
it to the case that followed the theory of Braswell, namely Baltimore v.
Bouknight.351 The Court in Bouknight found that
[e]ven assuming that [the] limited testimonial assertion is sufficiently
incriminating and "sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege,"
Bouknight may not invoke the privilege to resist the production order because
she has assumed custodial duties related to production and because production
is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime.352
The Bouknight Court's language emphasized the importance of the separate
regulatory governmental interest: "When a person assumes control over
items that are the legitimate object of the government's noncriminal
regulatory powers, the ability to invoke the privilege is reduced." '353 The
supplementary interest operates to reduce the level of protection afforded
the compelled statements.
Despite the Court's protestation in Braswell that it was not enforcing a
Fifth Amendment constructive use immunity,354 in Bouknight the Court
made clear that limitations on evidentiary use do derive from Fifth
Amendment protection.355 While the Bouknight Court did not perceive its
role as requiring a definition of "the precise limitations that may exist upon
the State's ability to use the testimonial aspects of Bouknight's act of
350. Id. at 110.
351. 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
352. Id. at 555-56.
353. Id. at 558.
354. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118 n. 11.
355. "The State's regulatory requirement in the usual case may neither compel incriminating
testimony nor aid a criminal prosecution, but the Fifth Amendment protections are not thereby
necessarily unavailable to the person who complies with the regulatory requirement after invoking the
privilege and subsequently faces prosecution." Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 561-62. The Bouknight Court also
cited an array of cases offering different levels of protection to support the proposition that "(ijn a broad
range of contexts, the Fifth Amendment limits prosecutors' ability to use testimony that has been
compelled." Id. at 562.
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production in subsequent criminal proceedings,""35 the Court did note that
the "imposition of such limitations is not foreclosed. The same custodial
role that limited the ability to resist the production order may give rise to
corresponding limitations upon the direct and indirect use of that testimo-
ny." '357 The act of production did implicate the Fifth Amendment although
it did not permit the custodian to refuse production. Perhaps the Court is
implying that the evidentiary limitation is sufficient protection, or "use
immunity," to overcome the Fifth Amendment claim. The Court's treatment
of the "speaker" in Bouknight is consistent with the theory of the balancing
model. The balancing model, by incorporating flexibility on the government
interest side of the expression and introducing a substantial value for that
interest in the Braswell/Bouknight custodial context, can rationally explain
the evidentiary use restriction in those circumstances. The flexibility of the
balancing model suggests that it promises a closer affinity to the doctrine
that it is designed to explain than does the compulsion model.
2. The Proximity on the Protection Spectrum of Tier One and Tier Two
in Existing Supreme Court Doctrine
A second fit limitation, which is applicable to both models, lies in the
potential proximity in which the Court has placed immunized Tier One and
coerced Tier Two statements in recent years. For example, the Court's
analogy to coerced confessions in Kastigar358 and its reference to Mincey
for support of the limitations on evidentiary impeachment use of immu-
nized testimony3 59 may suggest a greater parity in treatment of Tier One
and Tier Two statements than the models can accommodate.
If one reads the Court's decisions as creating a single, uniform level of
protection for Tier One and Tier Two statements,3" then the models will
not accurately describe the existing database of Supreme Court scope
decisions nor fulfill Hawking's first criterion of a good model. Such a
reading is not implausible. It would simplify much scope doctrine, although
the discrepant protection of Tier Three would remain to be addressed. But
lower courts, rather than unreservedly embracing this reading, are
356. Id. at 561.
357. Id. (citing Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118 n. 11).
358. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
359. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979).
360. For a commentary arguing that the Fifth Amendment does not require a more demanding
standard in Tier One type cases than in Tier Two, see Humble, supra note 14. For an explication of the
position that Tier One statements should receive greater court protection than those of Tier Two, see
Strachan, supra note 19.
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embroiled in a dispute over the appropriate scope of protection to be
afforded Tier One statements.36' The debate ranges from the applicability
of attenuation-of-taint and inevitable discovery principles,362 whose
availability lower courts generally accept in Tier Two, 63 to the permissi-
bility of nonevidentiary uses, 3 4 also generally accepted by lower courts
in Tier Two.365 Even courts that permit relatively greater use for Tier One
statements often seem to retain residual concerns about use that appear to
distinguish their Tier One protection from that which courts generally
accord Tier Two.366 As a result, it seems that even some of the more
"permissive" lower courts do not truly equate the protection of Tier One
and Tier Two statements.367 Parity also ignores the extended historical
disparities of treatment between these two tiers.368 Thus, while Tier One
and Tier Two statements may someday receive equivalent protection,
current doctrine implies that such parity is not yet the case. Therefore, the
models' differing treatment is not inconsistent with either the evolution of
protection in Supreme Court doctrine or the reality of interpretation of that
doctrine by many lower courts considering statements in these two tiers.
B. No Absolute Values
To a substantial extent, the models offer only comparative values for the
quantum of protection appropriate for each tier. Tier One embodies
protection greater than Tier Two, which is greater than Tier Three. The
models do not resolve the prickly debate regarding what constitutes
nonevidentiary use or derivative use. Nor do they define the parameters of
the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree, attenuation-of-taint, and the inevitable
discovery doctrines. These doctrines and questions riddle efforts to
delineate the exact scope of protection within the tiers. But perhaps
determining whether there are articulable reasons for permitting any
disparity in treatment is a question that needs to be addressed at least at the
361. See Risks, supra note 3, at 646-53.
362. See, e.g., id.
363. See id. at 655.
364. See id. at 646-53.
365. Id. at 654.
366. Id. at 647-53. For different expressions of the Ninth Circuit's position on permitted use, see
United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988);
United States v. Mapelli, 971 F.2d 284, 287-88 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416
(9th Cir. 1994).
367. See Risks, supra note 3, at 646-53 (comparing the treatment of the tiers).
368. See supra notes 29-262 and accompanying text.
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same time as efforts to define the precise contours of each level of
protection in the spectrum. If no principled model could be posited to
explain disparate treatment, then the attempt to carve the detailed contours
of each level might incline toward a purely intellectual exercise.
C. No Moral Content/Ultimate Normative Assessment
While the models do describe a large class of observations, they make
few, if any, independent moral or normative judgments about the
underlying doctrine. In distilling a guiding principle and developing a
model based upon that principle, the models offer reasoned explanations of,
and patterns in, existing doctrine. They are empirically driven descriptive
models. The independent moral or normative evaluation of their legitimacy
in larger constitutional and philosophic terms represents the next step in
evaluating the models. That second step is beyond the scope of this Article.
Until, however, an evaluation in larger constitutional and philosophic terms
is undertaken, unreserved endorsement of the models would be premature.
On a larger scale, the merits of balancing as a mode of constitutional
interpretation have become the focus of extensive scholarly debate.369 An
evaluation of the positions of that debate and their potential applicability
to the models proposed here exceeds the parameters of the instant analysis.
It is, however, worth noting that balancing or sliding scale adjudication is
not magic. These decisional methods will continue to require the exercise
of judicial wisdom in ascertaining the values for the components of the
models. Nor do these types of adjudication eliminate subjectivity,37 even
if applied through mathematical models.
Moreover, the models do not address potential application of the doctrine
of harmless error.37' They merely facilitate prediction of when prosecuto-
rial use will violate the Self-Incrimination Clause, not whether such a
violation, for example, necessitates reversal of a conviction.
369. See, e.g., Symposium, When Is a Line as Long as a Rock Is Heavy?: Reconciling Public
Values and Individual Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 707 (1994); T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); Coffin,
supra note 22; David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88
Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1994); Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1022 (1978).
370. Coffin, supra note 22, at 25 ("What balancing does not do, even when done superbly, is
eliminate all subjective forces from decision.").
371. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
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D. The Origins and Support for the Models' Components
As may be understood from the discussion of the doctrinal development
and the models' descriptions, the models' components have been distilled
from clues in Supreme Court text, outcomes in cases, and apparent policy
.choices made by the Court.372 They represent the results of efforts to
determine why the Court distinguished among different tiers of protection
or declined to provide any protection at all. This subpart catalogues several
additional examples of the clues used in formulating the models.
In the study of Supreme Court treatment of compulsion, the Court
responds to different types of compulsion differently. The nature of the
compulsion appears to count. For instance, in the Portash decision, the
Court describes Tier One immunized testimony as "the essence of coerced
testimony. In such cases there is no question whether physical or psycho-
logical pressures overrode the defendant's will; the witness is told to talk
or face the government's coercive sanctions. 373 If some form of compul-
sion is the essence of coercion, then by implication some form or forms are
not the essence, but may still qualify as coerced. The particular form of
compulsion that the Court employs to contrast against Tier One "essence"
testimony is a form that, by description, is Tier Two coerced confessions.
In Tier One, the compulsion is unquestionable. But in Tier Two, the
defendant must prevail in a voluntariness hearing before the burden shifts
to the prosecution regarding use of the defendant's coerced utterances. At
that hearing, the court must decide the threshold question applicable in Tier
Two but not Tier One cases: whether "physical or psychological pressures
overrode the defendant's will." The Court's language signals a sensitivity
to differences in the nature of compulsion.
Support for the selection of the nature of compulsion as a component in
the models also inheres in the Court's 1953 decision in Stein v. New
York.374 In evaluating the voluntariness of a confession, the Court
contrasted compulsion by physical violence with that by psychological
372. It is not my intention to suggest that the models developed in a vacuum. Like commentators
before me, I have benefitted consciously, and undoubtedly subconsciously, from immersion in a wealth
of commentary on the Fifth Amendment and related areas.
When that benefit was conscious, and where appropriate, I have endeavored to recognize those
commentators, by citation, whose works were directly pertinent to the text materials. I am grateful to
all those additional commentators whose works supplied background information. Nonetheless, to my
knowledge, the models, as described here, are unique.
373. Portash, 440 U.S. at 459.
374. 346 U.S. 156 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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coercion.375 With respect to physical violence, the Court declared:
Physical violence or threat of it by the custodian of a prisoner during
detention serves no lawful purpose, invalidates confessions that otherwise
would be convincing, and is universally condemned by the law. When
present, there is no need to weigh or measure its effects on the will of the
individual victim. The tendency of the innocent, as well as the guilty, to risk
remote results of a false confession rather than suffer immediate pain is so
strong that judges long ago found it necessary to guard against miscarriages
of justice by treating any confession made concurrently with torture or threat
of brutality as too untrustworthy to be received as evidence of guilt.376
Although trustworthiness is no longer a cornerstone of the voluntariness
evaluation,377 the Court in Stein perceives physical violence or its threat
as obviating the need for inquiry into voluntariness. In contrast, the Court,
while acknowledging that "a process of interrogation can be so prolonged
and unremitting, especially when accompanied by deprivation of refresh-
ment, rest or relief, as to accomplish extortion of an involuntary confes-
sion,,' 37  indicates that evaluation of psychological coercion "has a
different point of departure. '3 79 "Interrogation is not inherently coercive,
as is physical violence. Interrogation does have social value in solving
crime, as physical force does not."30 As a consequence, psychological
coercion necessitates evaluation of the particular circumstances. From these
passages, a relative weighing of at least two types of coercion is possible.
Moreover, these passages suggest that a nature of compulsion scale that
elevates physical violence to the apex is consistent with the concern
expressed by the Court here.
Another clue to the influence of the nature of compulsion on Supreme
Court doctrine lies in the reduced protection the Court affords Tier Three
statements, those that result from competing rights. Providing less
protection for this tier is consistent with a perception that the compulsion
in this tier is barely distinguishable from the many difficult choices
involved in trial strategy that do not cross the self-incrimination threshold.
375. 346 U.S. at 182-86.
376. Id. at 182.
377. See infra note 386.
378. Stein, 346 U.S. at 184.
379. Id.
380. Id. It would appear, as a means of reconciling a possible inconsistency in the Court's
pronouncements in Portash and Stein, that within Tier Two, once physical violence is established, it,
like contempt, is recognized as inherently coercive. Perhaps the Portash weighing regarding "physical
pressures" involves a determination of whether those pressures qualify as violence.
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The automaticity component stems, in part, from repeated reference in
Court doctrine to the existence or absence of a direct link between
invocation of the privilege and punishment for silence. For example, in
1976 the Court held in Baxter v. Palmigiano"' that prison disciplinary
authorities could consider the prisoner's silence at the disciplinary hearing
as one factor in determining whether to impose disciplinary sanctions.382
The Court distinguished the line of cases involving discharge of public
employees and contractors, because "refusal to submit to interrogation and
to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege, standing alone and without regard
to the other evidence, resulted in loss of employment or opportunity to
contract with the State." '383 Whether the penalty accrues directly or
automatically upon invocation of the Fifth Amendment is an important
factor in self-incrimination doctrine. This factor is embodied in the
automaticity component of both models.
With respect to legitimacy, as Justice Marshall explained in his dissent
in Kastigar, we charge a higher price for "a calm and reasoned decision
whether to compel testimony and suffer the resulting" '84 loss of evidence.
The deliberateness of the choice to compel testimony also factors into both
models.
A reader considering policy rationales motivating early protection of
coerced statements may wonder why reliability is not a component of the
models.38 5 Its absence derives from the Supreme Court's repeated
rejection of reliability as a pertinent inquiry in the self-incrimination
context.38 6 In this instance the Court's rejection renders reliability an
381. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
382. Id. at 318.
383. Id.
384. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at471 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's comments were directed
to a comparison of transactional immunity and the exclusionary rule for coerced confessions. However,
the logic of his position applies to the disparities in scope between the immunity that Kastlgar approved
and traditional coerced confessions.
385. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 33, at 294 (discussing the common law rule and
the question of reliability).
386. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) ("The aim of the requirement of due
process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness i, .he use
of evidence, whether true or false.'); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964) ("It is now axiomatic
that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in
whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the
confession . .. :"); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) ("The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments provide a privilege against compelled self-incrimination, not merely unreliable self-
incrimination.'). But see United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1951) (implying that involuntary
confessions might be excluded due to untrustworthiness).
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uninformative factor for distinguishing among protection levels.
This brief subsection is offered not as an exhaustive explanation but as
an illustrative demonstration that the components of the models are
grounded in reasoned consideration of the doctrine that they seek to
explain. Nonetheless, the components chosen are not the only ones
available within the tapestry of self-incrimination jurisprudence, nor do they
stem exclusively from decisions focused on scope distinctions. As a
consequence, the individual components and the models they form invite
evaluation and commentary.
E. Due Process Versus Self-Incrimination
Another critique of the models involves their reliance on the Self-
Incrimination Clause as a unifying constitutional entitlement. The Court,
particularly in recent years, has frequently evaluated confessions under the
Due Process Clause rubric.387 One could construct models based in whole
or in part on the Due Process Clause. However, in light of the Court's
tendency to employ due process and self-incrimination interchangeably in
many facets of the compulsion context3 1 switching from one rationale
(self-incrimination) to another (due process), might prove simply a change
in terminology rather than substance. Moreover, because this Article defers
detailed consideration of the larger constitutional policies and purposes
supporting the primary models proposed here, and in light of the Court's
recent inclination to interpret the clauses either together or interchangeably
when adjudicating scope cases, assorted policies underlying due process as
well as those underlying self-incrimination may already be integral to or
advanced by the proposed models.
One could, however, construct a due process or mixed model in which
different relationships for each tier reflect the recognition of different
factors influencing the Court in each tier. Consider, for example, a mixed
387. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157
(1986).
388. See, e.g., supra note 174 and accompanying text; ef White, supra note 56, at 950 ("[The
Court has indicated that the admission of an involuntary confession also will violate the defendant's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.'); Elizabeth A. Ganong, Note, Involuntary
Confessions and the Jailhouse Informant: An Examination of Arizona v. Fulminante, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 911, 917 (1992) ("Today, the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and
the Fourteenth Amendment due process protections are interpreted together to prohibit the introduction
of involuntary and coerced confessions at trial."). The Court has also suggested that coerced confessions
receive protection beyond the protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453,
461-62.
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model. In this alternative, the Self-Incrimination Clause supplies the
constitutional justification for exclusion of Tier One cases, and the Due
Process Clause for Tiers Two and Three. Rather than equating the two
clauses in the scope of protection context, the models promote both distinct
and overlapping purposes and require incorporation of different factors in
their mathematical expressions. Grounding the protection afforded the tiers
on different constitutional entitlements may promise a ready justification for
disparate treatment. Moreover, because Tiers Two and Three seem
particularly conducive to balancing, due process opens a welcoming forum.
In Tier One, under a self-incrimination rationale, the model could reject
balancing, as Justice Stewart seemed to advocate in Portash,389 yielding
instead, a single bright-line level of protection. The Kastigar premise of
restoring the speaker to "substantially the same position 39 she occupied
before her compelled utterances would dictate the single appropriate level
of protection. A different and presumably lesser amount of protection
would result from balancing in Tier Two, where deterrence of police
misconduct or factors other than restoring the speaker to her pre-speech
status would affect the choice of components for the expression. In Tier
Three, perhaps the focus would be on fundamental fairness in the
reformulated relation.
The mixed model is attractive and may be worth pursuing as a normative
option. Nonetheless, as a possible model under the Hawking definition, the
mixed expression model, one nonbalancing relation and two balancing
relations with potentially different factors, may not only prove substantially
more complex than the proposed models, but also less able to meet the
predictive criterion of a good model. For instance, with separate expres-
sions for different tiers, how would such a model treat hybrids-those cases
that incorporate elements of different tiers?
Both of the models proposed in this Article do contemplate auxiliary due
process protection, beyond that which may be incorporated in the factors
of the existing expressions, for those circumstances involving deterrence of
law enforcement misconduct. This auxiliary protection, however, does not
augment the scope of statement exclusion but rather involves civil rights
remedies.
389. 440 U.S. at 459 ("[Wie deal with the constitutional privilege against compulsory self.
incrimination in its most pristine form. Balancing, therefore, is not simply unnecessary. It is
impermissible."). It should be noted, nonetheless, that Portash employed both due process and self-
incrimination language. Id.
390. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462.
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F. The Assumptions and Implications of the Models
Perhaps both the greatest strength and weakness of the models is their
ability to reveal assumptions embedded in the doctrine they pattern. This
ability is a fundamental purpose in positing models in the first place. The
models, however, because of their close affinity to the doctrine itself, also
generally incorporate its assumptions, for good or ill. For example, both
models rely upon an understanding of the Self-Incrimination Clause as a
provisional privilege of silence. The design, for instance, of the compulsion
model permits violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause only where there
is a combination of compulsion and use. When either use or compulsion is
absent (equal to zero), no violation occurs. While philosophic analysis of
this premise is left to later reflection, this fundamental assumption deserves
brief discussion here.
Is the Self-Incrimination Clause violated by forcing an individual to
admit criminal conduct if that witness' evidence is not used against him in
a criminal case? The focus of the clause, under the models, is not on
protecting the speaker's private realm but on preventing any compelled
utterance from being used against the speaker in a criminal case.39' As
long as the presumption is that the speaker's utterances are available for use
against him in a criminal case, the speaker may remain silent. 92 Once an
391. "As long as use immunity is granted, the government is free to compel even the most damning
and private disclosures. This is irrational in privacy terms, for there is no apparent connection between
privacy intrusion on the one hand and the threat of criminal punishment on the other." Stuntz, supra
note 274, at 1234 (footnotes omitted).
392. Compare
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination has two primary interrelated facets: The
Government may not use compulsion to elicit self-incriminating statements, see, e.g.,
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547; and the Government may not permit the use in a
criminal trial of self-incriminating statements elicited by compulsion. See e.g., Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 57 n.6 (parallel citations omitted) with
[L]anguage in these [Supreme Court] cases suggests that the right against self-incrimination
is not violated by the mere compulsion of statements, without a compelled waiver of the Fifth
Amendment privilege or the use of the compelled statements against the maker in a criminal
proceeding.
Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1994) (Powell, J., ret.). Consider also the Court's dicta in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) ("Although conduct by law enforcement
officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that [self-incrimination] right, a constitutional violation
occurs only at trial."). See also Arnold H. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution:
Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence from Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 907 (1989). But see, e.g., Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
407 (1992) (holding that procuring the speaker's statement through compulsion, even absent court use,
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assurance against use replaces that presumption, compelling the witness to
speak is no longer prohibited. In those circumstances where compulsion
preceded assurance of nonuse, to prevent violation, improper use must be
prohibited. The Fifth Amendment becomes a prohibition on use rather than
gathering, for if compelling the speaker to utter incriminating remarks alone
were the thrust of the amendment, no quantity of immunity would suffice
to supplant it. As a consequence of this understanding of the Self-
Incrimination Clause, compulsion alone does not violate the clause. The
compulsion model represents this by limiting both C and U individually to
the value of the constant. Neither alone can violate the privilege of silence.
While this assumption is not a revelation,393 it is important in its relation
to examining the justifiability or desirability of disparate tiers of protection.
A second implication of current doctrine laid bare by the models, and
related to the implication just above, involves the incentive for improper
compulsion. Because the most extensive scrutiny accompanies formally
compelled statements, and more moderate scrutiny accompanies statements
obtained as a result of a "constable's blunder," government actors may be
encouraged to obtain information through Tier Two compulsion practices,
in lieu of pursuing formal immunity grants. To avoid just this outcome in
the context of Fourth Amendment searches, and to encourage police to
obtain search warrants, the Supreme Court has created a good-faith
exception doctrine,394 excusing certain errors in the warrant or search
procedure. Existing compelled statement doctrine arguably furnishes a
reverse incentive, encouraging election of improper compulsion and lesser
scrutiny rather than more formal compulsion and greater scrutiny. Of
course, one response to the problem of reverse incentive is embodied in
differences between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. A number of courts
and commentators have argued that the Fourth Amendment is concerned
could constitute a cause of action against police officials pursuant to a self-incrimination theory). For
an analysis of Cooper, see Julie E. Hawkins, Note, Cooper v. Dupnik: CivilLiabilityfor Unconstitution-
al Interrogations, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1191 (1993).
393. See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 392; Ritchie, supra note 322, at 388 ("The [Burger) Court thus
views the fifth amendment strictly as a protection against the state's use of compelled testimony, rather
than as a protection against the act of compulsion itself."). As Professor Ritchie suggests, pursuant to
this view of the protection, "police torture of a defendant would not violate the fifth amendment
privilege if the resulting confession were not used against him, but would violate the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments." Id. at 393.
394. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) ("We conclude that the marginal or
nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on
a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion").
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with good and bad faith and focuses on information gathering.395 In
contrast, and as argued above, the Fifth Amendment is primarily concerned
with preventing use of compelled information rather than remedying any
improprieties of compulsion.396 However, to the extent that the underlying
doctrine promotes election of improper compulsion, that encouragement
remains in the models. The models' ability to surface these underlying
assumptions should facilitate improved understanding and evaluation of the
doctrine.
G. Subjectivity and Cultural Contingency
In a recent article on the residents of an area of northern Pakistan called
Hunza, the article's author interviewed the trangfa, the individual formerly
responsible for resolving certain disputes in the Hunza community.397 The
trangfa gave the following description of assessing punishment:
In resolving crimes such as a man receiving a blow to his arm or face during
a personal dispute with another man . . , we would usually decide that he
should get an ox or two; that is to say, if the victim had received one injury
to the head, then he should receive one ox from his tormentor as compensa-
tion, and if he had received two wounds to his head-or one wound to his
head and one wound to his arm-then he should get two oxen; arms and
heads, of course being considered equally.398
The trangfa's pronouncement that arms and heads are considered equally
is much like the determination that physical violence is more severe than
incarceration. Both are culturally contingent. To the extent that cultural
perspectives differ and those using the models for prediction purposes
cannot assess the relative values of, for instance, the nature of compulsion
in the cultural paradigm from which the numbers derive, the models will
not prove effective tools to assess the scope of protection for cases in
which compelled statement protection has yet to be ascertained. Because
the numbers represent subjective, culturally relative values, the models are
limited by the difficulty in entering the cultural paradigm from which such
numbers derive.
On a larger scale, this limitation is an invitation to rethink and to critique
cultural assumptions embodied in the models and the underlying doctrine.
395. See Risks, supra note 3, at 681-82.
396. Id.
397. John McCarry, High Road to Hunza, NAT'L GEoGRAPHIC, Mar. 1994, at 114, 134.
398. Id.
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H. Occam's Razor Versus the Existence of the Balancing Model
Proposing more than one model inherently evokes a need to justify why
more than one model has been proposed. Perhaps advancing more than one
model further anticipates preference ranking between the models. In at least
partial response to these issues, I offer the following observations. First, the
compulsion model has the Occam's Razor advantage, simplicity. With a
single variable (albeit one with three components), the compulsion model
makes a swift evaluation of the scope of protection, as represented
inversely by the value of the use variable. It provides, however, an arguably
myopic view of self-incrimination jurisprudence because it represents the
governmental interests as an unchanging constant. The balancing model's
ability to accommodate structurally the varying importance of governmental
interests offers a more detailed explanation of the government side of the
equation. The balancing model thus furnishes a flexibility that the
compulsion model lacks.
Flexibility has the potential to be either a boon or a bane. For those who,
although preferring the Self-Incrimination Clause as an absolute, are willing
to concede the existence of disparate levels, flexibility may spell abuse or
excessive deference to government interests. For some, the mere provision
for a variable government interest is taboo-violating the language of
Portash, discussed at greater length below,399 that forbids balancing as
"impermissible." Flexibility may also mask bias and often proves subject
to great manipulation.
The flexibility of the balancing model also raises the larger question of
the origin of government interests. Which government interests fall within
the cognizable range? The supplementary government interests included in
the balancing model thus far derive from particular interests to which the
Court has made reference in its self-incrimination-related opinions.
Presumably as new circumstances requiring assessment of the scope of
protection arise, so too will the need to evaluate the cognizability of
previously unmentioned or unrecognized government interests. The inability
of the balancing model, at its inception, to name every possible cognizable
government interest or to delineate the appropriate location on the interest
scale will constrain its predictive ability. Thus, in evaluating the
cognizability and weight to be assigned government interests not previously
399. See infra notes 402-08 and accompanying text.
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part of the calculus, some speculation will be involved.4"
Balancing may, nonetheless, more accurately model the concerns
motivating Court recognition of disparities. For instance, "because an
immunity statute operates in advance of the interrogation, there is room to
require a broad grant of transactional immunity without imperiling large
numbers of otherwise valid convictions. '41 Although the language is
particularly addressed to the distinction between transactional immunity and
the "exclusionary rule" for coerced confessions, and advocates transactional
immunity rather than use immunity, this language used by Justice Marshall
in his dissent in Kastigar seems to imply a balancing of the government
interest in the detection and prosecution of crime and the Fifth Amendment
right. Different levels of protection may be appropriate depending upon the
timing of the immunity grant. Consciously conferred prospective immunity,
granted before the speaking, may produce less damage to the government
interest in the detection and prosecution of crime. It imperils fewer
convictions than retrospective immunity. Justice Marshall's language
accommodates that lesser risk to the governmental interest by suggesting
that greater protection is appropriate.
In addition, the balancing model explains scope decisions that the
compulsion model cannot. In particular, it explains decisions embodying
supplementary regulatory interests, like those in Braswell and Bouknight.
As a consequence, balancing, while sometimes providing only minor
adjustments to the compulsion equation, may, nonetheless, constitute a
preferable method of evaluating the scope of protection. To the extent that
disparities of treatment among compelled statements continue to be
recognized as justifiable, desirable, or even existent, balancing may furnish
a more equitable, although manipulable, means of explaining the disparities.
I. The Balancing Model and Portash
One cogent critique of the balancing model is that the premise of the
model, balancing, directly contradicts the language of the Supreme Court
in New Jersey v. Portash.0 2 In the majority opinion, Justice Stewart
wrote: "Here, by contrast, we deal with the constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form. Balancing,
400. For critiques and discussions of constitutional balancing generally, see the sources cited supra
note 369.
401. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 471 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
402. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
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therefore, is not simply unnecessary. It is impermissible.'40 3 To which
precise portion of the compelled statement spectrum the prohibition on
balancing applies is not entirely apparent. However, the language and
context do indicate that balancing in the scope of protection is impermissi-
ble for at least the upper tier or tiers of the spectrum.
That the Court appears to view balancing as impermissible should not,
however, prove dispositive. First, the Court has offered no framework for
otherwise explaining the disparities in scope doctrine. Nor does the Portash
Court's rejection of balancing appear in the context of evaluating or even
acknowledging the spectrum of disparate scope decisions. Rather, the Court
is contrasting the balancing of interests involved in the scope of protection
for noncompelled statements (Miranda violations) with that of compelled
statements.4" Second, despite the Court's explicit rejection of balancing,
balancing can effectively explain most, if not all, of the Supreme Court
results in the scope arena. Moreover, the Court itself, in addition to relying
on balancing in regulatory contexts, has relied upon balancing in the
"pristine" immunity situation.4 °5 In the 1964 decision of Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission,4 6 the Court employed a balancing rationale to
introduce use immunity, in lieu of transactional immunity, into
intersovereign prosecutions:
[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be
compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law
unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner
by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him. We
conclude, moreover, that in order to implement this constitutional rule and
accommodate the interests of the State and Federal Governments in
investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal Government must be
prohibited from making any such use of compelled testimony and its
fruits.
4 07
Accommodation is a balance struck between the privilege and the
government interest. While not specific to the scope of use immunity, the
Murphy decision dramatically reduced-from transactional to use-the
scope of immunity protection itself. Federalism motivated a compromise
403. Id. at 459.
404. Id.
405. But see Lushing, supra note 199, at 1697 ("No language in the Court's self-incrimination
opinions, however, indicates that privilege ever bends under the weight of competing interests.").
406. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
407. Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
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accommodation that would permit states to grant transactional immunity but
not to automatically bar federal prosecution for the same transactions.4"
In sum, the models suffer from a number of flaws, some a reflection of
the doctrine they pattern, others a function of the models themselves. But
these limitations should not prevent them from fulfilling the basic criteria
of good models. Perhaps of greater significance, their advancement should
encourage more extended and effective debate on the need for a satisfactory
treatment of compelled statements.
V. FORECASTING WITH THE MODELS
To fulfill the definition of a "good" model, in addition to describing the
database of Supreme Court scope doctrine with relative accuracy and little
arbitrariness, the model "must make definite predictions about the results
of future observations."4" This section explores whether the proposed
models satisfy this final criterion. Of course, evaluation of the ultimate
accuracy of either model's predictive ability must await future Court
pronouncements. To probe the models' capacity to forecast and the
certainty with which they forecast, each model will be applied in two
circumstances for which the scope of self-incrimination protection remains
unresolved. In the first of these, the Garrity410 problem, the Supreme
Court has explicitly found that the compulsion involved exceeds the Fifth
Amendment threshold.4 ' The second circumstance involves a hypotheti-
cal suggested by the Court in Minnesota v. Murphy.4" 2
In applying the models to each of these problems, two questions need
resolution. First, does the model offer any prediction on the appropriate
scope of scrutiny? Second, if the model makes a prediction, how definite
or specific is the prediction?
A. Application to the Garrity 13 Situation
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of
408. See supra note 328 and accompanying text. For the applicable definition of federalism, see
supra note 328.
409. HAWKING, supra note 23, at 9.
410. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
411. Id. at 500. Because Garrity was a state case, the Court speaks in terms of the Fourteenth
Amendment, through which the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination provision was applied to the
states. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
412. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
413. The description of Garriy is drawn largely from Risks, supra note 3, at 638-39.
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protecting statements compelled by threat of employment termination. In
Garrity v. New Jersey,414 Edward Garrity and several colleague police
officers were questioned concerning the alleged fixing of traffic tickets.415
Prior to answering the questions, the state officers conducting the
interrogation had informed Garrity and his colleagues that they were
entitled to remain silent and that any information obtained could be used
against them in a criminal prosecution,41 but that a refusal to answer
(invoking their Fifth Amendment right) would subject them to removal
from office.4 17 Statements given in response to that questioning were later
introduced by the prosecutor against Garrity and his associates during their
criminal trial.4" 8 The criminal conviction that ensued was upheld through
the highest state court of New Jersey. On certiorari, in a five-to-four
decision, the United States Supreme Court concluded that these statements
were coerced: "The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs
or to incriminate themselves. The option to lose their means of livelihood
or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice
to speak out or to remain silent."4"' The use of these coerced statements,
the Court found, was prohibited by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.42 In the concluding paragraph, the majority declared: "We now
hold the protection of the individual under the Fourteenth Amendment
against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings
of statements obtained under threat of removal from office, and that it
extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of our body
politic."42'
Thus, Garrity dictated that the statements given in response to a threat
of removal from office were coerced and subject to protection by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The statements themselves were exempt from
use in subsequent criminal proceedings.4 " But to what scope of protec-
tion is the exemption entitled? Later decisions did little to clarify the
relevant scope of protection. Six years after Garrity, the Court in Lejkowitz
v. Turley, citing Kastigar, indicated that statements like those at issue in
414. 385 U.S. 493.
415. Id. at 494-95.
416. Id. at 494.
417. Id. at 494-95.
418. Id. at 495.
419. Id. at 497.
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Garrity could be obtained by a prospective grant of immunity, or, even
absent such prospective protection, once obtained, would merit the
retrospective protection of Brain.422 Which of these levels of protection
(Kastigar or Brain) do these statements merit? The analysis grew more
complex when in 1977, in Cunningham, the Court suggested that where
there was a competing constitutional right, Simmons also would protect the
relevant statements.424 The scope of protection to which these statements
are entitled remains an open question and, therefore, the case presents an
excellent opportunity for application of models designed to predict the
scope of protection to be afforded compelled statements.
1. The Compulsion Model
The fundamental task in the application of the compulsion model is
assessing the extent of compulsion in the threat of dismissal from
employment. The first goal in assessing the compulsion value is gauging
the nature or severity of the compulsion. Determining the weight of this
criterion is difficult.421 Constitutional protections exist to shield property
interests, but society demands, and the Court has imposed, the greatest
constitutional safeguards to ensure the protection of liberty interests.
Examples of the proportionately greater value placed upon protection of
liberty abound in the different treatment afforded civil and criminal
cases.426 In the criminal realm, for instance, the sovereign shoulders the
costs of representation for indigent individuals to protect liberty.427 The
423. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1973) ("[fln any of these contexts, therefore, a
witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer...
424. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807-08 (1977).
425. "It is said that from a practical standpoint threatened loss of a government job carrying
valuable vested benefits or suspension from a profession may be a more effective compulsion than a
small fine or even a few days in jail." Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case
for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 707 (1968).
426. Although the liberty interest is at stake in contempt proceedings for refusal to testify in Tier
One immunity cases, the contempt may be either civil, see, e.g., In re Younger, 986 F.2d 1376, 1378
(11 th Cir. 1993) (civil contempt for refusal to testify under immunity grant limited to "the lesser of the
duration of the bankruptcy case or eighteen months"); criminal, see, e.g., United States v. Monteleone,
804 F.2d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987); or both. In Monteleone, after
defendant's refusal to testify pursuant to an immunity grant, "he was held in civil contempt and lived
out the life of the grand jury in jail." Id. at 1006. He was subsequently convicted of criminal contempt
related to his continuing refusal to testify before that grand jury. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
criminal contempt conviction and sentence of four years imprisonment. Id. at 1012.
427. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of counsel for indigent criminal defendants applies to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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burden of proof required to deny an individual liberty far exceeds that
generally required for civil cases involving deprivation of property: beyond
a reasonable doubt versus preponderance of evidence. The Self-Incrimina-
tion Clause itself attests to society's greater concern with loss of liberty
than loss of property because it offers protection only against compelled
witnessing in a criminal case, where the ultimate threat is of loss of liberty.
In light of these reflections, compulsion in the form of threat of job loss is
perceived as less severe than incarceration, and less severe than physical
assault. Job loss, however, rates as a greater penalty than promises of lenity
or choice-of-rights compulsion. On the severity scale, job loss therefore
receives a mid-range value, about five units.428
Second, in relation to automaticity, imposition of the penalty can follow
swiftly on invocation of the privilege and consequent refusal to respond.
Refusal itself can furnish sufficient legal grounds for transforming the
threat of dismissal into the reality of loss of employment for a public
employee.429 The penalty, then, may flow directly and rapidly from
invocation of the privilege. Automaticity's value reaches the apex of that
scale, a value of five units.
Third, threatening dismissal for a refusal to respond to reasonable job
performance related inquiries is part of a legitimate official inquiry,43
gaining full measure for that factor in the legitimacy gradient, two and one-
half units. With respect to advance promises of nonuse, Garrity immunity
can attach absent any prior promise of nonuse. No formal grant is
required. 43 ' Nonetheless, in many, if not most, jurisdictions the question-
ing is preceded by an admonition that the speaker's answers cannot be used
428. For convenience, the table below sets forth the values for the compulsion model in both
example cases:
Example Nature Auto. Legit. Compulsion Use
Garrity 5 5 4.5 14.5 5.5
Modified Murphy 8 5 2.5 15.5 4.5
429. Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 806 ("Public employees may constitutionally be discharged for
refusing to answer potentially incriminating questions concerning their official duties if they have not
been required to surrender their constitutional immunity.") (citing Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273,
278-79 (1968)).
430. Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 806.
431. "[U]se immunity automatically attaches as a matter of constitutional law when a public
employer compels an employee, on pain of dismissal, to answer possibly incriminating questions about
the employee's performance of his official duties." Brown v. City of North Kansas City, 779 S.W.2d
596, 599 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (summarizing Erwin v. Price, 778 F.2d 668 (1lth Cir. 1985)).
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against her in court.432 Although the immunity may attach absent an
advance assurance of nonuse, more often, a formal inquiry into the officer's
conduct will begin with an appropriate use immunity admonishment.4 33
Combining the occasional automatic attachment with the probably more
common prior promise of nonuse, the second factor in the legitimacy
calculation yields perhaps two of the two and one-half available units. The
resultant legitimacy value is a four and one-half of five possible units.
Inserting the relevant values produces the compulsion value:
5(N) + 5(A) + 4.5(L) = 14.5(C)
Placing the compulsion value in the compulsion model shows:
14.5(C) + (U) < 20(k)
The model allows the prosecutor five and one-half units of use434
before she transgresses on self-incrimination principles. Five and one-half
units places the protection for Garrity statements between the protection of
Tier One and the protection of Tier Two. Applied to existing doctrine, the
model permits a substantial measure of nonevidentiary use, although a
smaller measure than that allocated to Tier Two statements, and proscribes
direct evidentiary use of any form. Derivative evidentiary use (through
attentuation or inevitable discovery)435 is probably not available. Applica-
432. See Risks, supra note 3, at 669 ("[C]ourts in many jurisdictions have required a tripartite
warming, including notice to the officer:. (1) of possible termination; (2) that the statements cannot be
used in a criminal proceeding; and (3) that the questions will relate specifically and narrowly to the
performance of his official duties.").
433. Id.
434. A recent commentator "address[ing] the use of [Garrity] statements in the context of the grand
jury proceeding" asserts that:
Courts should be reluctant to begin categorizing coercions as more or less violative of the
Fifth Amendment. If the inquisition of a police officer pursuant to an internal investigation
gives rise to a compelled statement contrary to the privilege against self-incrimination, the
court should recognize it as such. Violations of the Fifth Amendment should not come in
different sizes and flavors.
Andrew M. Herzig, Note, To Serve and Yet To Be Protected: The Unconstitutional Use of Coerced
Statements in Subsequent Criminal Proceedings Against Law Enforcement Officers, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 401, 403, 430 n.181 (1993). Mr. Herzig appears to endorse Mr. Humble's position, Humble,
supra note 14, permitting nonevidentiary use of compelled testimony. Herzig, supra (citing Assistant
United States Attorney "Humble's convincing argument supporting the use of compelled testimony for
nonevidentiary purposes"). As indicated in the evolutionary development section of this Article, it is
my position that as a descriptive matter the Court has been engaging in disparate treatment of compelled
statements.
435. For purposes of consistency, I employ the terms attenuation and inevitable discovery to express
the type of derivative evidentiary use that might be available even though there may be no primary
illegality in the Garrity context.
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tion of the compulsion model illustrates its Occam's Razor advantage.
Achieving a value for the compulsion variable dictates the remainder of the
relation.
This application permits a determination of whether the model fulfills the
final criterion of a good model. First, does the model offer a prediction
regarding the allowable scope of protection? In defining, at least in relative
terms, the realm of permissible use, the model does forecast the scope of
scrutiny or protection to which Garrity statements are entitled. Second, is
the scope prediction definite? To this inquiry, a somewhat more tentative
response appeals. The scope or extent of permitted use is relatively definite
assuming confidence in the value of the compulsion variable. However, due
to unresolved questions in the doctrine of use, the model offers only a
comparative value for use and a rough translation of that value into
practical employ. In the unsettled field of use doctrine, five and one-half
units encompasses certain levels of "use." For instance, those units include
prosecutorial awareness of the substance of the statements. They probably
further condone the incidental benefits of increased prosecutorial confidence
in the case and greater reluctance to plea bargain. Whether that level allows
other arguably nonevidentiary uses, e.g., the formulation of trial strategy,
cannot be predicted by the model because the field of use doctrine itself
remains unsettled.436 If that doctrine were clarified, then the model's
predictive ability in concrete terms would be amplified. Thus, the
compulsion model largely satisfies the second and final criterion of a good
model by projecting a prediction, relatively definite given the state of use
doctrine.
2. The Balancing Model
Formulation of the Garrity compulsion model first simplifies efforts to
complete the balancing model. Because the compulsion variable represents
the same considerations in each model, it is appropriate to transpose the
value for the compulsion variable from the compulsion model to the
balancing model. To determine the extent of scrutiny or permitted use, the
focus shifts now to the government interest side of the equation. The
variables for which values remain to be determined include the risk to the
government interest and any supplementary government interests present in
this context.
436. Cf. United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("An initial difficulty is that
a precise definition of the term nonevidentiary use is elusive.").
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The risk to the government interest in the detection and prosecution of
crime is greater when the immunity giver is a colleague (i.e., another law
enforcement officer) than when the decision lies with the prosecution. Risk
here might parallel the one unit of risk for Tier Two circumstances, which
also generally involve interrogation by law enforcement officers. However,
in some respects, the Garrity situation does not precisely parallel the
paradigm interrogation of the stranger suspect. In the Garrity case, the risk
of abuse of immunity may exceed that applicable in most routine stranger
interrogations. On occasion, incentive to immunize a colleague from
criminal liability may be stronger, thus fostering intentional efforts to
protect colleagues from criminal prosecution with Garrity immunity. The
greater the disclosure, the greater the burden on the prosecutor to
demonstrate independent sources for her evidence. The possibility of this
protective conduct elevates the risk to the government, from one unit to one
and one-half units.437
Perhaps the most challenging task in applying the balancing model is the
determination of the existence and value of any supplementary interests.
Assessing the cognizability of such supplementary interests in the Garrity
context is particularly difficult. Although the Court announced, in Garrity
itself, that "policemen, like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a
watered-down version of constitutional rights," '438 the Court in a later
decision also characterized the government interests "in maintaining an
honest police force and civil service" as "compelling."439 Perhaps these
compelling government interests, while not precluding recognition of the
statements as meriting Fifth Amendment protection (i.e., exceeding the
compulsion threshold), may appropriately factor into an assessment of the
quantum of protection these compelled statements receive once the initial
compulsion threshold has been exceeded. Consequently, the statements
qualify as compelled, but in the balancing model, the government interests
437. For convenience, the following table sets forth the balancing model values for both example
cases:
438. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
439. Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 808.
1994] 1697
Washington University Open Scholarship
1698 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
would modify the quantity of protection the statements received. If the
government interest in the integrity of its police force were recognized, the
supplementary interest value would increase, thereby permitting greater use.
The unresolved question of whether these interests should be recognized by
the model illustrates one of the limitations on the predictive ability of the
balancing model."' Employing the models is not a mechanical process,
nor are the results precise. Evaluating the scope of protection to which
compelled statements should be entitled continues to require the investment
of judicial wisdom. The models, however, make explicit the choices that
judges make."
Presuming, however, the same sovereign interrogation and prosecution
with no cognizable supplementary interests, the balancing model would be
as follows:
14.5(C) + (U) < 20(G) + 1.5(R) + 0(S)
The balancing model yields a use value of seven available units before self-
incrimination infringement fastens. Consistent with the design of the model,
with greater flexibility on the government interest side of the equation, the
use value is correspondingly higher in the balancing model than in the
compulsion model. Seven units of use still places the permitted use between
the Tier One and Tier Two allowances, thus condoning substantial
nonevidentiary use, perhaps on the margin of allowing attenuated-type or
inevitable-discovery-type derivative use, but forbidding direct evidentiary
use.
Applying the final criterion of a good model to the Garrity balancing
model supports several conclusions. First, the model does offer a prediction
on the scope of protection through a measure of permitted use. Second, the
scope forecast is, within the fuzzy parameters of use doctrine and limits on
ascertaining the applicability of supplemental government interests, a
reasonably definite prediction. Therefore, at least in gross, the model
satisfies the definition of a good model, offering a reasonably definite
prediction in a case in which the scope of protection remains to be
articulated by the Court."2
440. For a discussion of this limitation, see supra Part IV.
441. Explicit and structured reasoning should enhance the employment of balancing. With respect
to constitutional balancing generally, see Coffin, supra note 22, at 22 ("It is therefore high time to
stimulate a more self-conscious, systematic, sensitive, comprehensive, and open effort at balancing.').
442. Of note, in 1994, the Ninth Circuit specifically addressed the scope of protection appropriate
for a Garrity statement. The court's decision in United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416 (1994), merits
attention here. First, the court in Koon explicitly acknowledged the existence of the risk to a criminal
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prosecution when the immunity giver is a police official.
As the North court recognized, federal immunity statues provide a framework for a
prosecuting attorney or Congress to make a reasoned decision as to whether the benefits of
obtaining compelled testimony justify the obstacles that may be created in any future
prosecutions.
In contrast, immunity attaches [in an employment interview with a public employee] when
a threat of loss of employment forces a public employee to respond to questioning by another
public employee .... [I]n thefse] context[s, in particular in] internal affairs investigations,
police officers could protect each other by compelling testimony and disseminating it widely,
placing any criminal prosecution at serious risk and possibly barring prosecution altogether.
Id. at 1433 n.13. In the Ninth Circuit case, Koon had given a compelled statement to the Los Angeles
Police Department Internal Affairs Division in the aftermath of the beating of Rodney King. Id. at 1431.
A witness testifying for the prosecution had subsequently been exposed to Koon's compelled interview
statement. On appeal, the defense sought to have Koon's convictions reversed based upon the alleged
taint of prosecution witness testimony from exposure to Koon's compelled interview statements. In
addressing the identity of the immunity giver, the court contrasted the circumstances of Koon with those
of a prosecutorial grant of immunity under the OCCA, id. at 1433 n.13, highlighting the OCCA
prosecutor's opportunity "to make a reasoned decision as to whether the benefits of obtaining compelled
testimony justify the obstacles that may be created in any future prosecution." Id. The court also
recognized the opportunity for reasoned decisionmaking when Congress grants OCCA immunity. Id.
The court suggested that in the Koon context, "the individuals who question the employee are concerned
about potential misconduct... . They do not necessarily act with the care and precision of a prosecutor
weighing the benefits of compelling testimony against the risks to future prosecutions." Id. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit explicitly recognized the special risk to the government interest in the detection and
prosecution of crime that rests with the identity of the immunity giver. Recognition of the risk to the
government interest suggests that the balancing model, through its inclusion of the risk factor, may
furnish a preferable paradigm for analyzing scope cases.
Nonetheless, the Koon court rejected the premise that "the showing required under the Fifth
Amendment varies depending on the situation in which the testimony was compelled." 34 F.3d at 1433.
The court explained: "The Fifth Amendment protects defendants from the use of their compelled
statements regardless of when or where the statements were taken. We merely point out the implications
of applying North in the Garrity context." Id. Those implications bolstered, in part, the court's rejection
of the extremely stringent Tier One standard against use articulated by the D.C. Circuit in North and
Poindexter. Id.
The court, in effect, chose a single level of protection for both Garrity statements, compelled by
threat of job loss, and for North or OCCA statements, compelled by threat of contempt and
incarceration. The court describes that use level as follows: "In sum, it is the law of our circuit that the
prosecutor's Kastigar burden is met if the substance of the deposed witness's testimony is based on a
legitimate source that is independent of the immunized testimony." Id. at 1432. This description,
apparently applicable to both the statements in the Koon case and OCCA statements, suggests a
relatively wide range of uses. In rejecting the North standard, id. at 1432-33, the Ninth Circuit appears
to have chosen not to prohibit a witness from shaping or altering her testimony as a result of her
exposure to the immunized materials so long as "there is an independent source for all matters on which
the witness testifies." Id. at 1432. To some extent, the range of permissible use will depend upon the
definition of the terms "substance" and "matter." Nonetheless, neither a witness' awareness of the
immunized testimony nor his structuring of his own testimony, as a result of that awareness, before the
trier of fact would necessarily violate the Fifth Amendment under the Ninth Circuit Koon standard.
Although it is difficult to discern with certainty, the range of use suggested here might be in the general
range of that posited by the models.
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In addition to engendering careful scrutiny of scope doctrine and its
underlying assumptions, the creation and application of the proposed
models should enable courts to address the scope problem in a reasoned
fashion. Equipping courts with a more explicit description of the doctrine
and a method for applying the doctrine should promote enhanced dialogue
and growing understanding of the complex problem of the contours of self-
incrimination protection.
The models also embody advantages that attend greater predictability in
law. For example, prospective application of the models could inform
policymakers of the probable scope of protection that compelling statements
in a given circumstance would produce. Then, as for example in the
Garrity situation, policymakers could perform a cost-benefit analysis to
determine, in advance of the compulsion, whether in light of the amount of
protection available to the compelled statements, colleague police officers
should engage in taking a compelled statement during the internal affairs
investigation. 3 At a minimum, the models advance a dialogue on which
factors courts should consider in sculpting the realm of protection for these
compelled statements.
B. Probation Officer Interviews
The second test case stems from the 1984 decision of Minnesota v.
However, the 1994 Koon standard seems to conflict with language in a 1992 Ninth Circuit opinion
in a traditional OCCA Tier One case. See United States v. Mapelli, 971 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1992). In
Mapei1, the Ninth Circuit cited the stringent McDaniel case to support the following assertion: "The
proscribed indirect use includes 'planning trial strategy."' Id. at 287. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit's
range of permitted uses, particularly in the traditional Tier One context, may not be as permissive as
the Koon language initially implies. Or, perhaps the court's language in Koon is a function of the
specific facts of the case. The court indicated that the testifying witness "was exposed to two
substantially identical statements, one of which was immunized and one of which was not." 34 F.3d
at 1433.
Moreover, even under a permissive interpretation, the court's standard does not allow direct
evidentiary impeachment use of the immunized material. As a consequence, there remains a need to
reconcile or explain the differing treatments the court gave the Garrity statements in Koon with the
court's treatment, also in 1994, of the defendant's statements in Beltran-Gutierrez, discussed supra notes
264-73 and accompanying text, where the court condoned direct evidentiary impeachment use of Tier
Three statements. Consequently, the Koon standard, adopted without apparent consideration of the
remainder of the self-incrimination spectrum, does not effectively resolve the self-incrimination scope
conundrum. For the treatment by a number of other lower courts of the scope of protection appropriate
to a Garrity statement, see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated December 7 and 8, Issued to Bob
Stover, 40 F.3d 1096, 1100-02 (10th Cir. 1994); Risks, supra note 3, at 665-68.
443. See Risks, supra note 3 (detailing risks to prosecution and Fifth Amendment when scope of
protection is unknown in the Garrity circumstance and proposing prosecutorial notice and veto before
Garrity statements are compelled).
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Murphy.444 In Murphy, the defendant's probation officer learned that the
defendant had admitted committing an unsolved rape and murder, crimes
unrelated to the case for which he was on probation. Murphy made this
admission during counseling, provided as a condition of his probation."
The probation officer, who had learned of the confession from Murphy's
counselor, contacted Murphy by letter asking that Murphy contact her to
"discuss a treatment plan for the remainder of his probationary period."" 6
Prior to contacting Murphy, the probation officer, after consultation with
her supervisor, had decided that she would divulge any incriminating
remarks made by Murphy regarding the heretofore unsolved crimes to the
police."7 In response to the letter, Murphy scheduled and attended a
meeting with the probation officer.448 During that session, Murphy
repeated the incriminating admissions he had made earlier to his counsel-
or."9 Murphy then sought suppression of the admissions made to his
probation officer at his subsequent criminal prosecution on Fifth Amend-
ment grounds.
The Court described its task as determining "whether a statement made
by a probationer to his probation officer without prior warnings is
admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding."45 Under the circum-
stances of Murphy's interview with his probation officer, the Court held
that the statements were voluntary. The Court found no factors denying
"'the individual a "free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to an-
swer' ' ' ' '45t present in Murphy. The privilege was therefore not self-
executing and Murphy's failure to invoke the privilege rendered the ensuing
statements voluntary for Fifth Amendment purposes. The Court indicated
that:
A State may require a probationer to appear and discuss matters that affect
his probationary status; such a requirement, without more, does not give rise
to a self-executing privilege. The result may be different if the questions put
to the probationer, however relevant to his probationary status, call for
answers that would incriminate him in a pending or later criminal prosecu-
444. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
445. Id. at 423-24.
446. Id. at 423.
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. 465 U.S. at 423-24.
450. Id. at 425.
451. Id. at 429 (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657 (1976) (quoting Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941))).
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tion. There is thus a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the
State, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of the
privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it would have created the
classic penalty situation, the failure to assert the privilege would be excused,
and the probationer's answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible
in a criminal prosecution.4 2
It is this modified circumstance, in which the state conditions response
on revocation, that serves as the second test case. The Murphy Court
suggests that such conditioning would prove "impermissible."453 Such
impermissible conditioning would produce compulsion cognizable by the
Self-Incrimination Clause. Under these circumstances, those of a "classic
penalty situation," a self-executing privilege would follow. But to how
much protection would a defendant in the modified Murphy circumstances
be entitled? What quantum of protection is indicated by "inadmissible in
a criminal prosecution"?
In attempting to forecast the ambit of that protection pursuant to the
models, the first step is the characterization of the nature of the compulsion
in the modified Murphy context. Probation is often conceived of as a form
of conditional liberty.4 54 By accepting and complying with the terms of
probation, a defendant can avoid imposition of a jail or prison sentence.
Although probation may include local incarceration as part of the probation
grant, probation generally assumes the form of a trial period through which,
if one complies with the terms, one can avoid substantial custody time.
Probation is therefore usually a preferred sentence of those convicted.
Revocation of probation generally entails a return to, or initiation of,
incarceration-a loss of that conditional liberty. The penalty in our
452. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435.
453. Id. at 436. In fact, the Court explicitly contrasts the situation in Garrity to that of Murphy. In
Garrity, the defendants were informed that failure to respond would result in loss of employment.
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 494 (1967). However, "Murphy was not expressly informed
during the crucial meeting with his probation officer that an assertion of the privilege would result in
the imposition of a penalty." Murphy, 465 U.S. at 438.
454. Black's Law Dictionary defines probation as a:
[s]entence imposed for commission of crime whereby a convicted criminal offender is
released into the community under the supervision of a probation officer in lieu of
incarceration. ... It is not a matter of right, but rather is an act of grace and clemency
available only to those defendants found eligible by the court.... It implies that defendant
has a chance to prove himself and its purpose is reform and rehabilitation. For this purpose
the defendant must agree to specified standards of conduct and the public authority operating
through the court impliedly promises that if he makes good, his probation will continue;
however, his violation of such standards subjects his liberty to revocation....
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1202 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
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modified Murphy case resembles the penalty imposed in our highest tier of
protection, Tier One.
Perhaps the more difficult evaluation is whether the loss of conditional
liberty is equivalent to the loss of unconditional liberty. Based upon
distinctions in court treatment of accused nonprobationers and probationers,
the losses are similar but not identical. Probationers have a diminished
expectation of liberty. To violate probation and incur a penalty of
incarceration does not necessarily require commission of a criminal act. For
instance, a no-alcohol condition could constitute a condition of probation
for an alcohol-related offense.455 Violation of the condition, consumption
of alcohol, while not criminal conduct, could constitute a violation of
probation and trigger consequent punishment. Moreover, the standard of
proof that the prosecution must meet at a probation revocation hearing can
be lower than beyond a reasonable doubt.456 As a result, the loss of
conditional liberty, while arguably exceeding the loss of a job, may not
equate precisely with the loss of unconditional liberty. On the severity scale
of one-to-ten, with incarceration following unconditional liberty receiving
a nine, revocation of probation rates perhaps an eight.
The second aspect of the compulsion variable is the automaticity of the
infliction of the penalty for failure to respond to interrogation. Failure to
respond may result in implementation of the threat of revocation. Summary
revocation, in its crudest form, may occur immediately, with the instant
detention and incarceration of the probationer pending official revocation
proceedings.457 The automaticity in the modified Murphy case would
simulate that of the witness who refuses to respond to questioning pursuant
to a subpoena, with the potential of immediate detention pending the
official contempt proceeding. In the comparison of automaticity, Tier One
and modified Murphy cases can be deemed equivalent, each receiving five
units on the automaticity scale.
The third characteristic of the compulsion variable is the legitimacy of
the compulsion. The first component of the legitimacy inquiry involves a
determination of the legality of the interrogation and the compulsion
employed to induce the probationer to speak. A probation officer's
455. See, e.g., People v. Lindsay, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1642 (1992).
456. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 51 Cal. 3d 437, 439 (1990) (requiring a preponderance of
evidence standard at a probation revocation hearing).
457. The ultimate determination regarding revocation would be made by a court at a formal hearing.
The hearing "is not a criminal proceeding," Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n.7, although the "proceeding
must comport with the requirements of due process." Id.
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interview of a probationer represents a standard and legitimate component
of probationary supervision. "A State may require a probationer to appear
and discuss matters that affect his probationary status; such a requirement,
without more, does not give rise to a self-executing privilege." 458 The
more difficult inquiry is whether a state may legitimately threaten
revocation of probation for refusal to answer. Although the various
passages in Murphy regarding the legitimacy of revoking probation for
refusal to answer incriminating inquiries are difficult to reconcile,4 59 it
appears that so "long as [the State] recognizes that the required answers
may not be used in a criminal proceeding," the State may legitimately
insist, under threat of revocation, that the probationer answer. 6' It is
unclear whether the State must inform the probationer of the protected
nature of his disclosures at the time of the compulsion.462 If, however, the
probationer responds to inquiries under penalty of revocation, even without
formal or prior reassurance that the utterances are protected, the disclosure
would enjoy protection against use in a criminal case. Interrogation in the
modified Murphy circumstances may then be considered part of an
authorized legal process. The first aspect of legitimacy, therefore, receives
two and one-half units.
The second factor in the legitimacy evaluation calculates the deliberate-
ness with which immunity is granted, or in other words, the existence or
absence of a promise of nonuse prior to the questioning. As indicated,
458. Id. at 435.
459. Compare
Our cases indicate, moreover, that a State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating
questions and hence sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the
required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of
incrimination .... [A]nd nothing in the Federal Constitution would prevent a State from
revoking probation for a refusal to answer that violated an express condition of probation or
from using the probationer's silence as "one of a number of factors to be considered by the
finder of fact" in deciding whether other conditions of probation have been violated.
Id. at 436 n.7 with
Our decisions have made clear that the State could not constitutionally carry out a threat to
revoke probation for the legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege.... Indeed,
in its brief in this Court, the State submits that it would not, and legally could not, revoke
probation for refusing to answer questions calling for information that would incriminate in
separate criminal proceedings.
Id. at 438.
460. Id. at 436 n.7.
461. Id. The State apparently may also penalize the probationer's failure to answer relevant
inquiries. It is not clear whether the State is required to have informed the probationer of the protected
nature of his disclosures prior to penalizing the probationer for failure to respond. See id. at 439.
462. Consider Murphy, 465 U.S. at 439.
[VOL. 72:1603
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss4/5
FIFTH AMENDMENT COMPELLED STATEMENTS
whether an assurance of nonuse is required at the time of the modified
Murphy compulsion is unclear. In particular, such an assurance might be
required prior to penalizing a probationer for her silence in the face of
inquiries. If a probation officer in fact delivered such an assurance, the
value of the legitimacy factor involving a promise of nonuse use would be
two and one-half units. However, absent an explicit policy within a
probation department or a request for assurance of protected status by the
probationer, the more likely scenario in the probation context is probably
the absence of a promise of nonuse at the time of questioning. The
suggestion that absence of such a promise is the likely scenario results from
the usual circumstances of a probation interview.463 Because routine
probationary interviews are not necessarily directed toward the investigation
of criminal wrongdoing apart from the circumstances of the probationary
offense,4" probation officers would probably be unlikely to spontaneously
offer assurances of nonuse, even if they might be inclined to insist that the
probationer respond or face revocation. Because the responses are protected
even absent the prior promise, the models are useful in evaluating the
extent of protection that a probationer's responses merit, with or without
a prior assurance of nonuse. For purposes of this example, let us presume
that an assurance of nonuse would be uncommon in the usual modified
Murphy interview. Absent a promise of nonuse, the legitimacy value
remains at two and one-half units.
Summing the compulsion value yields:
8(N) + 5(A) + 2.5(L) = 15.5(C)
Inserting the compulsion value into the compulsion model renders the
463. The probable absence of a promise of nonuse in a modified Murphy case may be contrasted
with the probable provision of such an explicit assurance in the Garrity circumstance. In the
probationary context, the usual purpose of the interview is to ascertain the probationer's compliance
with the conditions of probation, rather than to seek incriminating information about other criminal
conduct. As a result, incriminating information that does surface is likely to arrive unanticipated. In
Garrity, the interview is an investigatory one. It is generally conducted by an internal affairs unit of a
police department and, if not seeking information regarding potential criminal offenses, seeks
information regarding matters subject to disciplinary action. Moreover, probation interviews are a
standard part of probation supervision. Garrity interviews would be the exception rather than the norm
for police officers.
464. Past criminal conduct, however, would not be an uncommon topic for probationary
consideration. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 432 ("IT]he nature of probation is such that probationers should
expect to be questioned on a wide range of topics relating to their past criminality."). Such conduct is
often the subject of prior convictions and may no longer raise Fifth Amendment concerns as a
consequence of the status as a prior conviction and/or the passage of time and its effect on the relevant
statute of limitations.
19941 1705
Washington University Open Scholarship
1706 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
following:
15.5(C) + (U) _< 20(k)
In the modified Murphy case, permitted use may reach four and one-half
units. Compulsion of the modified Murphy variety permits more use by
prosecutors of the defendant's statements than would Tier One compulsion,
but less use than Tier Two. Evidentiary use would be prohibited, but a
number of nonevidentiary uses would be permissible.
Application of the compulsion model to the modified Murphy situation
furnishes a prediction for the scope of protection, measured by the models
as the amount of permitted prosecutorial use. The prediction, while relative,
is also relatively specific, within the limitations of "nonevidentiary use"
doctrine. The model facilitates a formal and reasoned evaluation of the
scope of protection, exposing the analysis of the factors that comprise the
model.
Under the balancing model, the compulsion variable is simply transposed
from the first model. The focus shifts to the right side of the equation for
an assessment of any enhanced risk and additional governmental interests
implicated by the modified Murphy case. Control over the interrogation and
resulting use immunity rests not with the prosecution but with the probation
officer. The shift in the locus of control outside the prosecutorial sphere,
but to a governmental figure not antagonistic to prosecutorial interests,
merits one unit of risk in the balancing equation.
In addition to the risk to the overarching governmental interest, the right
side of the balancing model allows augmentation of the governmental
values by the addition of other governmental interests. In the modified
Murphy circumstances, augmentation might spring from a governmental
interest in the administration of the probation system, namely, the need for
a method of monitoring convicted individuals granted conditional liberty
status. It is conceivable that a court could view this administrative role as
a government interest distinct from that of the detection and prosecution of
crime, and a role worthy of some weight in the balancing equation.
Assuming such an interest deserves recognition in the model, there remains
the difficulty of assigning a value to that interest. As administration of
probation may be viewed as distinct from, but related to, crime control and
consequently to the overarching governmental interest, a small supplemen-
tary value seems suitable, perhaps one unit. Substituting the values for the
relevant factors, the balancing model would be the following:
15.5(C) + (U) _ 20(G) + l(R) + l(S)
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FIFTH AMENDMENT COMPELLED STATEMENTS
The balancing model would permit six and one-half units of use, greater
use than in the compulsion model but still within the range between Tier
One and Tier Two. Transposing six and one-half units to the fuzzy
parameters of use doctrine, six and one-half units includes substantial,
albeit less than the full range of, nonevidentiary use and probably forbids
evidentiary use of any kind. Subject to the limitations inherent in the
models, the balancing model supplied a relatively definite forecast of the
scope of protection in the modified Murphy situation. The balancing model,
like the compulsion model, does fulfill, at least in relative terms, the final
criterion of a good model. Ultimate evaluation of the models' accuracy
awaits future Court pronouncements. In the interim, each model furnishes
a reasoned method for evaluating the scope of protection due a compelled
statement.
Of note, the compulsion model arrives at similar levels of permitted use
for both the Garrity (five and one-half units) and the modified Murphy
(four and one-half units) test cases. The balancing model also produced
only a minor differential in permitted use, seven units for Garrity and six
and one-half units for modified Murphy. The minor differential may seem
counterintuitive in light of the differential in severity of compulsion
between loss of job and loss of conditional liberty. However, the size of the
differential is a function of the fact that the models have more than one
component factor. In the compulsion model, the difference in the values for
the legitimacy component largely explains the proximity of the final quanta
of permitted use. For the balancing model, the differences in the legitimacy
value, as well as in the risk and supplemental interest values, determine the
similarity of the final values for the two test cases.
That the models produce counterintuitive results should not prove
surprising. After all, the introductory conundrum of scope doctrine lay in
the greater protection that courts afforded Tier One statements than Tier
Two statements. Observers, at least initially, might be inclined to assume,
based upon the severity of compulsion alone, that Tier Two, encompassing,
inter alia, physical violence, deserved greater protection than Tier One,
whose compulsion was a threat of incarceration. Yet, when all the factors
were considered, the models explained the elevated protection of Tier One
based upon factors beyond the severity of compulsion. In the end, one
additional benefit the models may engender is a challenging of our initial
assumptions about this realm of constitutional doctrine.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Initial observation of Supreme Court treatment of the scope of protection
afforded compelled statements revealed no coherent articulated framework.
This pronounced absence limited understanding of the doctrine, cabined its
reasoned evaluation, and undermined the ability of lower courts to decide
scope cases. Closer scrutiny unearths discernable patterns and enables the
creation of models of scope doctrine. The Article proposes two models, one
based upon compulsion and another based upon balancing. The articulation
and subsequent application of each of the models exposes underlying
assumptions and limitations of the decision database. As a result, the
models facilitate comprehension of the existing Supreme Court doctrine and
further furnish a concrete method for guiding lower courts in their efforts
to sculpt the contours of protection in cases in which that scope has yet to
be determined. Ultimately, the models suggest that the dimensions of the
realm of protections afforded compelled statements, the realm of Proteus'
metamorphoses, can be reasoned and at least relatively predictable.
Whatever intrinsic value the models may possess as assessments of past
Court conduct and forecasters of future Court efforts, their greatest
contribution may lie elsewhere. The models supply a common language and
a motivation for courts to explain the process by which they determine the
appropriate level of protection due compelled statements. Both within and
without the courts, explicit reasoning fosters dialogue and evaluation of the
current underpinnings of scope decisions. That conversation and enhanced
understanding can then inform normative inquiries: Is a scope doctrine
providing disparate treatment, based upon compulsion or balancing or any
of the components that compose those models or other factors, desirable or
legitimate in larger philosophic, constitutional, or other normative terms?
And ultimately, what degree of protection should the courts accord the
various types of compelled statements?
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